Post-Westgate SWAT : C4ISTAR Architectural Framework for Autonomous Network Integrated Multifaceted Warfighting Solutions Version 1.0 : A Peer-Reviewed Monograph

Police SWAT teams and Military Special Forces face mounting pressure and challenges from adversaries that can only be resolved by way of ever more sophisticated inputs into tactical operations. Lethal Autonomy provides constrained military/security forces with a viable option, but only if implementation has got proper empirically supported foundations. Autonomous weapon systems can be designed and developed to conduct ground, air and naval operations. This monograph offers some insights into the challenges of developing legal, reliable and ethical forms of autonomous weapons, that address the gap between Police or Law Enforcement and Military operations that is growing exponentially small. National adversaries are today in many instances hybrid threats, that manifest criminal and military traits, these often require deployment of hybrid-capability autonomous weapons imbued with the capability to taken on both Military and/or Security objectives. The Westgate Terrorist Attack of 21st September 2013 in the Westlands suburb of Nairobi, Kenya is a very clear manifestation of the hybrid combat scenario that required military response and police investigations against a fighting cell of the Somalia based globally networked Al Shabaab terrorist group.Comment: 52 pages, 6 Figures, over 40 references, reviewed by a reade

"Out of the loop": autonomous weapon systems and the law of armed conflict

The introduction of autonomous weapon systems into the “battlespace” will profoundly influence the nature of future warfare. This reality has begun to draw the attention of the international legal community, with increasing calls for an outright ban on the use of autonomous weapons systems in armed conflict. This Article is intended to help infuse granularity and precision into the legal debates surrounding such weapon systems and their future uses. It suggests that whereas some conceivable autonomous weapon systems might be prohibited as a matter of law, the use of others will be unlawful only when employed in a manner that runs contrary to the law of armed conflict’s prescriptive norms governing the “conduct of hostilities.” This Article concludes that an outright ban of autonomous weapon systems is insupportable as a matter of law, policy, and operational good sense. Indeed, proponents of a ban underestimate the extent to which the law of armed conflict, including its customary law aspect, will control autonomous weapon system operations. Some autonomous weapon systems that might be developed would already be unlawful per se under existing customary law, irrespective of any treaty ban. The use of certain others would be severely limited by that law. Furthermore, an outright ban is premature since no such weapons have even left the drawing board. Critics typically either fail to take account of likely developments in autonomous weapon systems technology or base their analysis on unfounded assumptions about the nature of the systems. From a national security perspective, passing on the opportunity to develop these systems before they are fully understood would be irresponsible. Perhaps even more troubling is the prospect that banning autonomous weapon systems altogether based on speculation as to their future form could forfeit their potential use in a manner that would minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects when compared to non-autonomous weapon systems

An Evaluation Schema for the Ethical Use of Autonomous Robotic Systems in Security Applications

We propose a multi-step evaluation schema designed to help procurement agencies and others to examine the ethical dimensions of autonomous systems to be applied in the security sector, including autonomous weapons systems

Shoot, Move and Communicate - Increasing NSW mission effectiveness through AI/ML augmented unmanned systems

NPS NRP Executive SummaryThe combination of unmanned systems and Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning (AI/ML) provides a methodology to significantly improve NAVSPECWAR (NSW) operations. This proposal focuses on evaluating an augmented, collaborative, unmanned systems architecture as a force multiplier for NSW expeditionary warfare mission objectives. The goal is to analyze the proposed architecture for increasing combat effectiveness by minimizing the management and coordination through advanced AI/ML techniques.Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM)N7 - Warfighting DevelopmentThis research is supported by funding from the Naval Postgraduate School, Naval Research Program (PE 0605853N/2098). https://nps.edu/nrpChief of Naval Operations (CNO)Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

Shoot, Move and Communicate - Increasing NSW mission effectiveness through AI/ML augmented unmanned systems

NPS NRP Project PosterThe combination of unmanned systems and Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning (AI/ML) provides a methodology to significantly improve NAVSPECWAR (NSW) operations. This proposal focuses on evaluating an augmented, collaborative, unmanned systems architecture as a force multiplier for NSW expeditionary warfare mission objectives. The goal is to analyze the proposed architecture for increasing combat effectiveness by minimizing the management and coordination through advanced AI/ML techniques.Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM)N7 - Warfighting DevelopmentThis research is supported by funding from the Naval Postgraduate School, Naval Research Program (PE 0605853N/2098). https://nps.edu/nrpChief of Naval Operations (CNO)Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

Autonomous weapon systems and international humanitarian law: a reply to the critics

In November 2012, Human Rights Watch, in collaboration with the International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School, released Losing Humanity: The Case against Killer Robots.[2] Human Rights Watch is among the most sophisticated of human rights organizations working in the field of international humanitarian law. Its reports are deservedly influential and have often helped shape application of the law during armed conflict. Although this author and the organization have occasionally crossed swords,[3] we generally find common ground on key issues. This time, we have not. “Robots” is a colloquial rendering for autonomous weapon systems. Human Rights Watch’s position on them is forceful and unambiguous: “[F]ully autonomous weapons would not only be unable to meet legal standards but would also undermine essential non-safeguards for civilians.”[4] Therefore, they “should be banned and . . . governments should urgently pursue that end.”[5] In fact, if the systems cannot meet the legal standards cited by Human Rights Watch, then they are already unlawful as such under customary international law irrespective of any policy or treaty law ban on them.[6] Unfortunately, Losing Humanity obfuscates the on-going legal debate over autonomous weapon systems. A principal flaw in the analysis is a blurring of the distinction between international humanitarian law’s prohibitions on weapons per se and those on the unlawful use of otherwise lawful weapons.[7] Only the former render a weapon illegal as such. To illustrate, a rifle is lawful, but may be used unlawfully, as in shooting a civilian. By contrast, under customary international law, biological weapons are unlawful per se; this is so even if they are used against lawful targets, such as the enemy’s armed forces. The practice of inappropriately conflating these two different strands of international humanitarian law has plagued debates over other weapon systems, most notably unmanned combat aerial systems such as the armed Predator. In addition, some of the report’s legal analysis fails to take account of likely developments in autonomous weapon systems technology or is based on unfounded assumptions as to the nature of the systems. Simply put, much of Losing Humanity is either counter-factual or counter-normative. This Article is designed to infuse granularity and precision into the legal debates surrounding such weapon systems and their use in the future “battlespace.” It suggests that whereas some conceivable autonomous weapon systems might be prohibited as a matter of law, the use of others will be unlawful only when employed in a manner that runs contrary to international humanitarian law’s prescriptive norms. This Article concludes that Losing Humanity’s recommendation to ban the systems is insupportable as a matter of law, policy, and operational good sense. Human Rights Watch’s analysis sells international humanitarian law short by failing to appreciate how the law tackles the very issues about which the organization expresses concern. Perhaps the most glaring weakness in the recommendation is the extent to which it is premature. No such weapons have even left the drawing board. To ban autonomous weapon systems altogether based on speculation as to their future form is to forfeit any potential uses of them that might minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects when compared to other systems in military arsenals

Training and education for network centric warfare : issues for New Zealand's Defence Force : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Defence and Strategic Studies at Massey University

The concept of Network centric warfare (NCW) is viewed as the next revolution in military affairs. Its introduction globally will necessarily affect the way the New Zealand Armed Forces operates in future conflicts. With the increasing use of digital technology in the military environment the need for and degree of increasing knowledge of Network Centric Warfare and its concepts must be explored.This country will have to combine its own definition and understanding of NCW into the framework of its Armed Force if it wants to continue to remain interoperable with technologically advanced coalition forces. This thesis looks into the issues and solutions which have been considered by other countries in their attempts to implement the NCW concept. It examines in detail how issues and solutions could be applied to New Zealand's attempt at NCW. Chapters One and Two define the academic processes which have been used in this study. They also give a brief introduction to the broad idea of Network Centric Warfare and its origins. Chapter Three examines in detail the complex evolution of the concept of Network Centric Warfare to its present state. In particular, it looks at how the events of September 11th 2001 have redefined warfare and the impact of that revolution on the traditional NCW concept. This chapter also focuses on the advantages and disadvantages of NCW which have now been proven through the experiences of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. These two conflicts have been described as the first information technology wars of the 21st century. Chapter Four focuses on how the concept of Network Centric Warfare has and will affect the specifics of personnel and make-up of the New Zealand Defence Force, as it makes the transition from a Platform centric to a Network Centric approach in warfare. The special focus in this chapter is on the New Zealand Army. The concepts of the ethos and cultural identity of a force are introduced here, with a view to revealing the influences that the adaptation of NCW methods and techniques can have on the organisation of that force. The discussion concludes that the introduction of NCW can have profound and permanent effect on a force's ethos and identity. This chapter also considers the influence of technology can help in the recruitment and retention of highly skilled people in the Army. Chapter Five shows how the adoption of the concept of Network Centric warfare also has the potential to fundamentally change the way in which higher level policy and doctrine are introduced and modified in the Armed Forces. This chapter looks at how future infrastructure and policies will need to have increased flexibility built into them from the start in order to embrace the demands of NCW for rapid developments in information technology and force-wide diffusion of such developments. Chapter Six discusses a third important consequence of adopting the concept of Network Centric Warfare. Namely, how the introduction of NCW will affect both training and education of service personnel. In particular, it examines how the change from Platform Centric to Network Centric forms of warfare puts changing demands on the skill sets and needs required of service personnel. Examples are given of the new skill sets needed in order for them to work effectively in a NCW environment. Chapter Seven discusses the formation of a new training branch of service which will need to be set up to accommodate the new methods and skills that NCW brings to the battlefield. Included in this chapter are the imperatives of Information Warfare, Electronic Warfare, and Computer Network Operations for such a branch. Alongside Air, Land, Sea and Space NCW brings with it the creation of a fifth battle space. This battle-space is cyberspace which encompasses the electromagnetic sphere, the Internet and all manner of Wide and Local Area Networks (WANs and LANs). Chapter Eight returns to the issue of training and education introduced in Chapter Six, but focuses specifically on the use of simulation techniques and technologies. Such techniques will be required in order to help train soldiers to work effectively and efficiently under NCW. Why other training methods won't work well given an NCW environment, and why simulation technologies will work, is explained with examples of each. This chapter argues in particular that simulation provides the most effective training in the unified data architecture that will be needed to provide cross platform capability and inter and intra service solutions in Network Centric Warfare. Examples of data solutions are provided to help explain the underlying simulation concepts and methods. Chapter Nine is the conclusion of this study. It reviews the results of this thesis and provides recommendations on the implementation of the Network Centric Warfare environment required in the New Zealand Armed Forces