Towards a Layered Architectural View for Security Analysis in SCADA Systems

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems support and control the operation of many critical infrastructures that our society depend on, such as power grids. Since SCADA systems become a target for cyber attacks and the potential impact of a successful attack could lead to disastrous consequences in the physical world, ensuring the security of these systems is of vital importance. A fundamental prerequisite to securing a SCADA system is a clear understanding and a consistent view of its architecture. However, because of the complexity and scale of SCADA systems, this is challenging to acquire. In this paper, we propose a layered architectural view for SCADA systems, which aims at building a common ground among stakeholders and supporting the implementation of security analysis. In order to manage the complexity and scale, we define four interrelated architectural layers, and uses the concept of viewpoints to focus on a subset of the system. We indicate the applicability of our approach in the context of SCADA system security analysis.Comment: 7 pages, 4 figure

Conceptual Systems Security Analysis Aerial Refueling Case Study

In today’s highly interconnected and technology reliant environment, systems security is rapidly growing in importance to complex systems such as automobiles, airplanes, and defense-oriented weapon systems. While systems security analysis approaches are critical to improving the security of these advanced cyber-physical systems-of-systems, such approaches are often poorly understood and applied in ad hoc fashion. To address these gaps, first a study of key architectural analysis concepts and definitions is provided with an assessment of their applicability towards complex cyber-physical systems. From this initial work, a definition of cybersecurity architectural analysis for cyber-physical systems is proposed. Next, the System Theory Theoretic Process Analysis approach for Security (STPA Sec) is tailored and presented in three phases which support the development of conceptual-level security requirements, applicable design-level criteria, and architectural-level security specifications. This work uniquely presents a detailed case study of a conceptual-level systems security analysis of a notional aerial refueling system based on the tailored STPA-Sec approach. This work is critically important for advancing the science of systems security engineering by providing a standardized approach for understanding security, safety, and resiliency requirements in complex systems with traceability and testability

Understanding and Identifying Vulnerabilities Related to Architectural Security Tactics

To engineer secure software systems, software architects elicit the system\u27s security requirements to adopt suitable architectural solutions. They often make use of architectural security tactics when designing the system\u27s security architecture. Security tactics are reusable solutions to detect, resist, recover from, and react to attacks. Since security tactics are the building blocks of a security architecture, flaws in the adoption of these tactics, their incorrect implementation, or their deterioration during software maintenance activities can lead to vulnerabilities, which we refer to as tactical vulnerabilities . Although security tactics and their correct adoption/implementation are crucial elements to achieve security, prior works have not investigated the architectural context of vulnerabilities. Therefore, this dissertation presents a research work whose major goals are: (i) to identify common types of tactical vulnerabilities, (ii) to investigate tactical vulnerabilities through in-depth empirical studies, and (iii) to develop a technique that detects tactical vulnerabilities caused by object deserialization. First, we introduce the Common Architectural Weakness Enumeration (CAWE), which is a catalog that enumerates 223 tactical vulnerability types. Second, we use this catalog to conduct an empirical study using vulnerability reports from large-scale open-source systems. Among our findings, we observe that Improper Input Validation was the most reoccurring vulnerability type. This tactical vulnerability type is caused by not properly implementing the Validate Inputs tactic. Although prior research focused on devising automated (or semi-automated) techniques for detecting multiple instances of improper input validation (e.g., SQL Injection and Cross-Site Scripting) one of them got neglected, which is the untrusted deserialization of objects. Unlike other input validation problems, object deserialization vulnerabilities exhibit a set of characteristics that are hard to handle for effective vulnerability detection. We currently lack a robust approach that can detect untrusted deserialization problems. Hence, this dissertation introduces DODO untrusteD ObjectDeserialization detectOr), a novel program analysis technique to detect deserialization vulnerabilities. DODO encompasses a sound static analysis of the program to extract potentially vulnerable paths, an exploit generation engine, and a dynamic analysis engine to verify the existence of untrusted object deserialization. Our experiments showed that DODO can successfully infer possible vulnerabilities that could arise at runtime during object deserialization

Usability requirements for architectural analysis tool to support CBD

Component-based development is an architecture-centric process that relies on the integration of pre-fabricated software components. These are often blackbox components whose functionality and configuration may not match the “ideal” system architecture. Systematic architectural analysis can help ensure that risks resulting from architectural adaptations and trade-offs do not adversely affect critical system qualities (e.g. performance, security and modifiability). However, architectural analysis is a complex activity that involves planning, analysis, negotiation and assessment of large amounts of interrelated, often conflicting information. Good tool support is therefore essential for effective architectural analysis. However, the success of a tool depended not only on powerful analysis methods but also on the quality of the toolset's usability. This paper presents functional and non-functional requirements of the tool’s user interface, and discusses the HCI design principles and guidelines in designing a high-quality user interface that would allow developers to parse, analyse and modify architecture specification easily and effectively

Facilitating Forensics in the Mobile Millennium through Proactive Enterprise Security

This work explores the impact of the emerging mobile communication device paradigm on the security-conscious enterprise, with regard to providing insights for proactive Information Assurance and facilitation of eventual Forensic analysis. Attention is given to technology evolution in the areas of best practices, attack vectors, software and hardware performance, access and activity monitoring, and architectural models. Keywords: Forensics, enterprise security, mobile communication, best practices, attack vectors