Business models to support content commons

The application of conventional, 'scarce resource' economics to content has been mistaken and harmful. More appropriate forms of economic analysis highlight the critical role that accessibility to information plays in the process of innovation. Meanwhile, down at the micro-economic level, there is an all-too-common perception that open content approaches are unsustainable and bad for business, and reflect naïve idealism on the part of their proponents. This paper identifies a range of suitable business models, and thereby demonstrates that the content commons is sustainable and appropriate for profit-oriented business enterprises

Transparency in International Investment Law: The Good, the Bad, and the Murky

How transparent is the international investment law regime, and how transparent should it be? Most studies approach these questions from one of two competing premises. One camp maintains that the existing regime is opaque and should be made completely transparent; the other finds the regime sufficiently transparent and worries that any further transparency reforms would undermine the regime’s essential functioning. This paper explores the tenability of these two positions by plumbing the precise contours of transparency as an overarching norm within international investment law. After defining transparency in a manner befitting the decentralized nature of the regime, the paper identifies international investment law’s key transparent, semi-transparent, and non-transparent features. It underscores that these categories do not necessarily map onto prevailing normative judgments concerning what might constitute good, bad, and murky transparency practices. The paper then moves beyond previous analyses by suggesting five strategic considerations that should factor into future assessments of whether and how particular aspects of the regime should be rendered more transparent. It concludes with a tentative assessment of the penetration, recent evolution, and likely trajectory of transparency principles within the contemporary international investment law regime

Regulating substantively unfair terms in online contracts

https://journals-co-za.ez.sun.ac.za/doi/10.47348/SLR/2021/i3a8Publishers versio

Accessory Disloyalty: Comparative Perspectives on Substantial Assistance to Fiduciary Breach

Culpable participation in a fiduciary\u27s breach of duty is independently wrongful. Much about this contingent form of liability is open to dispute. In the United States, well-established general doctrine defines the elements requisite to establishing accessory liability, which is categorized as a tort and often referred to as aiding-and abetting liability. What\u27s controversial is how the tort applies to particular categories of actors, most recently investment banks that advise boards of target companies in M&A transactions. In the United Kingdom, in contrast, accessory liability in connection with a breach of trust or fiduciary duty is controversial because the law is less clear, at least in part due to significant shifts in doctrine within a relatively short period of time. And equity houses the wrong, not tort (and the requisites for aiding-and-abetting liability in connection with a tort are significantly different). This essay, written as a contribution to a forthcoming book, uses contrasts between law in the US and the UK to deepen its examination of this distinctive form of wrongdoing. The essay\u27s central claim is that how the law categorizes a wrong matters for the elements of accessory liability. That is, breaching a fiduciary duty and culpably assisting in the fiduciary\u27s breach are both instances of wrongful conduct. Characterizing both as tortious, as does US law, has consequences for the elements of accessory liability. The comparative account also illustrates the independent character of accessory liability, underscored by outcomes in both jurisdictions in which the accessory\u27s culpability differs from that of the fiduciary as primary wrongdoer

Accessory Disloyalty: Comparative Perspectives on Substantial Assistance to Fiduciary Breach

Culpable participation in a fiduciary\u27s breach of duty is independently wrongful. Much about this contingent form of liability is open to dispute. In the United States, well-established general doctrine defines the elements requisite to establishing accessory liability, which is categorized as a tort and often referred to as aiding-and abetting liability. What\u27s controversial is how the tort applies to particular categories of actors, most recently investment banks that advise boards of target companies in M&A transactions. In the United Kingdom, in contrast, accessory liability in connection with a breach of trust or fiduciary duty is controversial because the law is less clear, at least in part due to significant shifts in doctrine within a relatively short period of time. And equity houses the wrong, not tort (and the requisites for aiding-and-abetting liability in connection with a tort are significantly different). This essay, written as a contribution to a forthcoming book, uses contrasts between law in the US and the UK to deepen its examination of this distinctive form of wrongdoing. The essay\u27s central claim is that how the law categorizes a wrong matters for the elements of accessory liability. That is, breaching a fiduciary duty and culpably assisting in the fiduciary\u27s breach are both instances of wrongful conduct. Characterizing both as tortious, as does US law, has consequences for the elements of accessory liability. The comparative account also illustrates the independent character of accessory liability, underscored by outcomes in both jurisdictions in which the accessory\u27s culpability differs from that of the fiduciary as primary wrongdoer

A Formal Model of Rational Exchange and Its Application to the Analysis of Syverson's Protocol

We propose a formal model of rational exchange and exchange protocols in general, which is based on game theory. In this model, an exchange protocol is represented as a set of strategies in a game that is played by the protocol parties and the network that they use to communicate with each other. Within this model, we give a formal definition for rational exchange and various other properties of exchange protocols, including fairness. In particular, rational exchange is defined in terms of a Nash equilibrium in the protocol game. We also study the relationship between rational and fair exchange, and prove that fairness implies rationality, but not vice versa. Finally, we illustrate the usage of our formal model for the analysis of existing rational exchange protocols by analyzing a protocol proposed by Syverson. We show that the protocol is rational only under the assumption that the network is reliable

Distinctive Imperatives for Mission Driven Teaching in Catholic Business Schools

We contend that there are distinct and socially beneficial perspectives, rooted in the Catholic Intellectual Tradition (CIT) and Catholic Social Teaching (CST), which can help nurture future managers to be more attuned to the societal and ethical impacts resulting from their marketing decisions. In this paper, we briefly review several of these themes and illustrate how such messages can be integrated into the marketing instruction that takes place inside of business schools at Catholic universities

Beyond Gatekeeping: The Normative Responsibility of Internet Intermediaries

This paper puts forward a normative approach to the responsibility of Internet intermediaries for third-party content they host. It argues that, in thinking about intermediary liability, our focus should be, rather than on the outcomes of intermediaries’ decisions, on their responsibility towards the reasoning processes in reaching these. What is necessary is a framework that, at the same time that it attaches responsibilities to such decisions, creates a cushioning system for their making, attenuating the hardship of honest mistakes. Within this framework, intermediaries must be seen not as mere keepers of gates, but as designers of artefacts whose use plans settle normative questions and play a fundamental role in the construction of our normative reality. Accordingly, an interpretive commitment must be required towards the integrity of such a reality. Every time intermediaries make a decision, as they always will and should, – in all this hidden jurisprudence – the integrity of our normative order and the values it reflects are at stake. All this must be seen as part of a broader concern with justice (corrective, normative) in the internal life of the information environment. For the same reason, however, we should not expect perfection from intermediaries, but responsible efforts. Like journalists who are entitled to make mistakes, if only they seek responsibly to avoid these (which is the idea of responsible communication in defamation), so it should be with Internet intermediaries. Understanding so enables us to move away from outcomes-based approaches towards a more granular and fairer system of intermediary liability.preprin