Bio-AKA: An efficient fingerprint based two factor user authentication and key agreement scheme

The fingerprint has long been used as one of the most important biological features in the field of biometrics. It is person-specific and remain identical though out one’s lifetime. Physically uncloneable functions (PUFs) have been used in authentication protocols due to the unique physical feature of it. In this paper, we take full advantage of the inherent security features of user’s fingerprint biometrics and PUFs to design a new user authentication and key agreement scheme, namely Bio-AKA, which meets the desired security characteristics. To protect the privacy and strengthen the security of biometric data and to improve the robustness of the proposed scheme, the fuzzy extractor is employed. The scheme proposed in the paper can protect user’s anonymity without the use of password and allow mutual authentication with key agreement. The experimental results show superior robustness and the simplicity of our proposed scheme has been validated via our performance and security analysis. The scheme can be an ideal candidate for real life applications that requires remote user authentication

Lightweight Three-Factor Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for Internet-Integrated Wireless Sensor Networks

Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) will be integrated into the future Internet as one of the components of the Internet of Things, and will become globally addressable by any entity connected to the Internet. Despite the great potential of this integration, it also brings new threats, such as the exposure of sensor nodes to attacks originating from the Internet. In this context, lightweight authentication and key agreement protocols must be in place to enable end-to-end secure communication. Recently, Amin et al. proposed a three-factor mutual authentication protocol for WSNs. However, we identified several flaws in their protocol. We found that their protocol suffers from smart card loss attack where the user identity and password can be guessed using offline brute force techniques. Moreover, the protocol suffers from known session-specific temporary information attack, which leads to the disclosure of session keys in other sessions. Furthermore, the protocol is vulnerable to tracking attack and fails to fulfill user untraceability. To address these deficiencies, we present a lightweight and secure user authentication protocol based on the Rabin cryptosystem, which has the characteristic of computational asymmetry. We conduct a formal verification of our proposed protocol using ProVerif in order to demonstrate that our scheme fulfills the required security properties. We also present a comprehensive heuristic security analysis to show that our protocol is secure against all the possible attacks and provides the desired security features. The results we obtained show that our new protocol is a secure and lightweight solution for authentication and key agreement for Internet-integrated WSNs