Social Aspects of New Technologies - the CCTV and Biometric (Framing Privacy and Data Protection) in the Case of Poland

The purpose of this paper is to review the institution responsible for the protection of personal data within the European Union and national example - Polish as a country representing the new Member States. The analysis of institutional system - providing legal security of communication and information institutions, companies and citizens against the dangers arising from the ongoing development of innovative new technologies in the European Union and Poland. This article is an attempt to analyze the possibility of using security systems and Biometry CTTV in Poland in terms of legislation. The results of the analysis indicate that, in terms of institutions Poland did not do badly in relation to the risks arising from the implementation of technology. The situation is not as good when it comes to the awareness of citizens and small businesses. This requires that facilitate greater access to free security software companies from data leakage or uncontrolled cyber-terrorist attacks. With regard to the use of security systems, CCTV and biometrics, Poland in legal terms is still early in the process of adapting to EU Directive. The continuous development of technology should force the legislature to establish clear standards and regulations for the application of CCTV technology and biometrics, as it is of great importance in ensuring the fundamental rights and freedoms of every citizen of the Polish Republic.Wyniki analizy wskazują, że pod względem instytucji Polska nie wypada źle w odniesieniu do zagrożeń wynikających z wdrożenia technologii. Sytuacja nie jest tak dobra, jeśli chodzi o świadomość obywateli i mniejszych firm. Wymaga to ułatwiania szerszego dostępu do darmowych programów zabezpieczających firmy przed wyciekiem danych lub niekontrolowanych cyber-ataków terrorystycznych. W odniesieniu do stosowania systemów zabezpieczeń CCTV oraz biometrii, Polska pod względem prawnym jest wciąż na początku procesu dostosowania do dyrektywy UE. Ciągły rozwój technologii powinien zmusić ustawodawcę do stworzenia jednoznacznych standardów i przepisów obowiązujących w zakresie stosowania technologii CCTV oraz biometrii, gdyż ma to ogromne znaczenie w zapewnieniu podstawowych praw i wolności każdego obywatela Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej

Pseudo Identities Based on Fingerprint Characteristics

This paper presents the integrated project TURBINE which is funded under the EU 7th research framework programme. This research is a multi-disciplinary effort on privacy enhancing technology, combining innovative developments in cryptography and fingerprint recognition. The objective of this project is to provide a breakthrough in electronic authentication for various applications in the physical world and on the Internet. On the one hand it will provide secure identity verification thanks to fingerprint recognition. On the other hand it will reliably protect the biometric data through advanced cryptography technology. In concrete terms, it will provide the assurance that (i) the data used for the authentication, generated from the fingerprint, cannot be used to restore the original fingerprint sample, (ii) the individual will be able to create different "pseudo-identities" for different applications with the same fingerprint, whilst ensuring that these different identities (and hence the related personal data) cannot be linked to each other, and (iii) the individual is enabled to revoke an biometric identifier (pseudo-identity) for a given application in case it should not be used anymore

Quantum surveillance and 'shared secrets'. A biometric step too far? CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe, July 2010

It is no longer sensible to regard biometrics as having neutral socio-economic, legal and political impacts. Newer generation biometrics are fluid and include behavioural and emotional data that can be combined with other data. Therefore, a range of issues needs to be reviewed in light of the increasing privatisation of ‘security’ that escapes effective, democratic parliamentary and regulatory control and oversight at national, international and EU levels, argues Juliet Lodge, Professor and co-Director of the Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence at the University of Leeds, U

"When the welfare state meets the regulatory state: EU occupational pension policy"

The increasing relevance of occupational pensions for the income security of the elderly moves this policy area to the core of the tension between national redistributive welfare states and EU-wide single market regulations. Focusing on the European pension fund directive, the paper investigates whether European occupational pension policies are primarily shaped by the Commission’s and international business’ agenda of market liberalization or the governments’ preferences for national autonomy in social policy. The study finds that the Directive liberalizes the pension market to some extent. Member states largely succeeded in securing the national prerogative in social policy. In explaining this outcome the paper argues that the nature of domestic pension arrangements does not only shape government preferences but also the preferences of the European Parliament and important business actors. Business was too fragmented internally to succeed in establishing a full blown liberal Europe in regard to occupational pensions, although their pressure was sufficient to secure liberal investment principles

Binary Biometrics: An Analytic Framework to Estimate the Performance Curves Under Gaussian Assumption

In recent years, the protection of biometric data has gained increased interest from the scientific community. Methods such as the fuzzy commitment scheme, helper-data system, fuzzy extractors, fuzzy vault, and cancelable biometrics have been proposed for protecting biometric data. Most of these methods use cryptographic primitives or error-correcting codes (ECCs) and use a binary representation of the real-valued biometric data. Hence, the difference between two biometric samples is given by the Hamming distance (HD) or bit errors between the binary vectors obtained from the enrollment and verification phases, respectively. If the HD is smaller (larger) than the decision threshold, then the subject is accepted (rejected) as genuine. Because of the use of ECCs, this decision threshold is limited to the maximum error-correcting capacity of the code, consequently limiting the false rejection rate (FRR) and false acceptance rate tradeoff. A method to improve the FRR consists of using multiple biometric samples in either the enrollment or verification phase. The noise is suppressed, hence reducing the number of bit errors and decreasing the HD. In practice, the number of samples is empirically chosen without fully considering its fundamental impact. In this paper, we present a Gaussian analytical framework for estimating the performance of a binary biometric system given the number of samples being used in the enrollment and the verification phase. The error-detection tradeoff curve that combines the false acceptance and false rejection rates is estimated to assess the system performance. The analytic expressions are validated using the Face Recognition Grand Challenge v2 and Fingerprint Verification Competition 2000 biometric databases

Usability and Trust in Information Systems

The need for people to protect themselves and their assets is as old as humankind. People's physical safety and their possessions have always been at risk from deliberate attack or accidental damage. The advance of information technology means that many individuals, as well as corporations, have an additional range of physical (equipment) and electronic (data) assets that are at risk. Furthermore, the increased number and types of interactions in cyberspace has enabled new forms of attack on people and their possessions. Consider grooming of minors in chat-rooms, or Nigerian email cons: minors were targeted by paedophiles before the creation of chat-rooms, and Nigerian criminals sent the same letters by physical mail or fax before there was email. But the technology has decreased the cost of many types of attacks, or the degree of risk for the attackers. At the same time, cyberspace is still new to many people, which means they do not understand risks, or recognise the signs of an attack, as readily as they might in the physical world. The IT industry has developed a plethora of security mechanisms, which could be used to mitigate risks or make attacks significantly more difficult. Currently, many people are either not aware of these mechanisms, or are unable or unwilling or to use them. Security experts have taken to portraying people as "the weakest link" in their efforts to deploy effective security [e.g. Schneier, 2000]. However, recent research has revealed at least some of the problem may be that security mechanisms are hard to use, or be ineffective. The review summarises current research on the usability of security mechanisms, and discusses options for increasing their usability and effectiveness