“Growing mangoes in Iceland”: How social media and online communities enable an antifragile and propitiously unpredictable innovation model

Online communities, in combination with innovation contests and social media, can create a context for ground-breaking innovation. Coalesced communications, accompanied by the long-standing "Hacker Ethic", and bolstered by the increasing prevalence of inexpensive tools such asthe 3D printer and Raspberry Pi, have re-invigorated an oldermodelof innovation whereby the tinkerer and hobbyist were positioned as a main source of invention. This paper states that this innovation model, following theideas of Nassim Nicholas Taleb, can be accurately described as “Antifragile”: i.e., it is not solely dependent on the success of one inventor, and can be geared to become stronger through the “failure” of individual projects and the sharing of data. Evidence is also presented which shows that this paradigm can also lead to "happy accidents", following Morton Meyers' assertion that "Three thingsare certain about discovery: Discovery is unpredictable. Discovery requires serendipity. Discovery is a creative act" (Meyers, 2011, p.24). For example, aninnovation contest in 2014 hosted by the online electronics engineering community element14 whose original intent was to create a new "networkedpollution sensor" instead enabled the development of a Carbon Monoxide detector for Latvian classrooms,a dust sensor for Singaporean streets, and an algal bloom detector for water supplies in the Philippines. As this example suggests, this paper also argues that setting ambiguous goals can inspire the aforementioned “happy accidents” that could potentially “grow mangoesin Iceland”; too tightly defined aims can diminish the potential for this form of innovation

State Antifragility: An Agent-Based Modeling Approach to Understanding State Behavior

This dissertation takes an interdisciplinary approach to understanding what makes states antifragile and why this matters by constructing a parsimonious, first of its kind agent-based model. The model focuses on the key elements of state antifragility that reside along a spectrum of fragility and transverse bidirectionally from fragile to resilient to antifragile given a certain set of environmental conditions. First coined by Nicholas Nassim Taleb and applied to economics, antifragility is a nascent concept. In 2015, Nassim Taleb and Gregory Treverton’s article in Foreign Affairs outlined five characteristics of state antifragility. This project aims to advance the study of anti-fragility in the context of the nation-state beyond these initial contributions by (1) development of three propensity variables associated with antifragility, (2) a new agent-based model to investigate antifragility, and (3) applying the findings of the model and the propensity score theorizing to two case studies. This research posits three propensity variables for a state to become fragile, resilient or antifragile. These variables include learning, power conversion, and agility. Cumulatively, these variables comprise a state’s capacity for dealing with various stressors in the international environment. The agent-based model in this dissertation captures the behavior of a single state when confronted with a stress in a variety of scenarios, forming an essential building block for future work (hinted at in the case studies) involving the interaction between states. The case studies show how the propensity variables, and the model results provide the basis for a distinctive and relatively novel evaluation of the historical record involving the history of the United States in and with Iraq, and the evolving great power rivalry between the United States and China, emphasizing the value of taking antifragility seriously in the context of International Studies

Chapter 2 Strategic underperformance

"This book examines the key dimensions of 21st century war, and shows that orthodox thinking about war, particularly what it is and how it is fought, needs to be updated. Accelerating societal, economic, political and technological change affects how we prepare, equip and organise for war, as well as how we conduct war – both in its low-tech and high-tech forms, and whether it is with high intensity or low intensity. The volume examines changes in warfare by investigating the key features of the conduct of war during the first decades of the 21st century. Conceptually centred around the terms ‘kinetic’, ‘connected’ and ‘synthetic’, the analysis delves into a wide range of topics. The contributions discuss hybrid warfare, cyber and influence activities, machine learning and artificial intelligence, the use of armed drones and air power, the implications of the counterinsurgency experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria, as well as the consequences for law(fare) and decision making. This work will be of much interest to students of military and strategic studies, security studies and International Relations.

UNDERSTANDING BITCOIN AND ITS UTILITY FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

In just over 12 years, Bitcoin rose from an obscure idea posted to a cryptographer’s mailing list to a globally-recognized asset class with market cap of over $1 trillion. This paper examines Bitcoin and the blockchain technology on which it is based from two distinct angles: 1) its long-term viability as money or a durable unit of exchange, and 2) its potential applications within U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to enhance operational effectiveness. As a unit of exchange, Bitcoin contains the fundamental properties of money—durability, portability, divisibility, uniformity, and limited supply—but lacks one important characteristic: acceptability. Bitcoin’s odds of reaching this final milestone are threatened by the basic psychology of power, fear, and sovereign nations’ ability to exert control over its money supply. Within USSOCOM, early adoption of Bitcoin can provide a suite of tactical tools and options to counter Chinese expansion, enable human intelligence operations, and modernize frontline payment methods with the use of digital tokens and e-wallets.Lieutenant, United States NavyApproved for public release. Distribution is unlimited

COVID-19 PANDEMIA AND PUBLIC AND GLOBAL MENTAL HEALTH FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY

The Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic emerged in Wuhan, China and has spread all over the world and has caused huge threats to health and lives. It has affected different frontiers of lives and induced many psychiatric individual and collective problems such as panic, anxiety, depression, post-traumatic stress disorders, suspiciousness, infodemia, cacophony, xenophobia, racisms, etc. The COVID-19 outbreak has induced public and global mental health crisis as well as a huge psychosocial experiment. Psychiatry and other mental health sciences can play very useful role in supporting the well-being of COVID-19 patients and their families, healthcare personnel and the society. For successful fighting with present and future pandemics we have to learn more about psychiatric and psychological aspects of COVID-19 from the perspectives of public and global mental health

Proceedings, MSVSCC 2015

The Virginia Modeling, Analysis and Simulation Center (VMASC) of Old Dominion University hosted the 2015 Modeling, Simulation, & Visualization Student capstone Conference on April 16th. The Capstone Conference features students in Modeling and Simulation, undergraduates and graduate degree programs, and fields from many colleges and/or universities. Students present their research to an audience of fellow students, faculty, judges, and other distinguished guests. For the students, these presentations afford them the opportunity to impart their innovative research to members of the M&S community from academic, industry, and government backgrounds. Also participating in the conference are faculty and judges who have volunteered their time to impart direct support to their students’ research, facilitate the various conference tracks, serve as judges for each of the tracks, and provide overall assistance to this conference. 2015 marks the ninth year of the VMASC Capstone Conference for Modeling, Simulation and Visualization. This year our conference attracted a number of fine student written papers and presentations, resulting in a total of 51 research works that were presented. This year’s conference had record attendance thanks to the support from the various different departments at Old Dominion University, other local Universities, and the United States Military Academy, at West Point. We greatly appreciated all of the work and energy that has gone into this year’s conference, it truly was a highly collaborative effort that has resulted in a very successful symposium for the M&S community and all of those involved. Below you will find a brief summary of the best papers and best presentations with some simple statistics of the overall conference contribution. Followed by that is a table of contents that breaks down by conference track category with a copy of each included body of work. Thank you again for your time and your contribution as this conference is designed to continuously evolve and adapt to better suit the authors and M&S supporters. Dr.Yuzhong Shen Graduate Program Director, MSVE Capstone Conference Chair John ShullGraduate Student, MSVE Capstone Conference Student Chai

The rise and fall of the Russian strategy of indirect actions in Ukraine

The war between Russia and Ukraine has been ongoing since Russia’s illegal occupation of Crimea nine years ago. In February 2022, Russia launched ‘a special military operation’ against Ukraine. To support its military operations, Russia used asymmetric and indirect methods and non-military measures as a part of its strategy. These three, heavily intertwined concepts form the basis for understanding Russia’s ‘strategy of indirect actions’ as seen by Russian academics and military leaders. As part of this strategy, Russia employed indirect military and non-military measures against Ukraine until 2021 when it became clear that Ukraine would not comply with Russia’s views of the Minsk II agreement. Consequently, Russia used non-violent military measures and multiple non-military means, including diplomatic, economic, and information means first to prepare and then to support its direct and violent military operation against Ukraine. Russia used indirect and asymmetric methods in its operational plan to support its traditional warfare efforts, including special forces and separatist troops, cyber-attacks and information warfare, and long-range precision weapons against civilian targets. Russia has varied these methods during the duration of conflict. Russia’s strategy of indirect actions has resulted in both failures and successes. Initially Russia’s operational plan to occupy Ukraine was based on wrong premises, and it lacked necessary resources. Russia lacked situational understanding and underestimated its adversaries. Russia was also unable to shape the strategic environment in its favour due to a failure to synchronize military and non-military measures. Indirect methods failed when joint warfare failed, and no new or novel ‘asymmetric’ technology or doctrine was successfully deployed to produce surprise. However, indirect methods also had successful elements, and as the war continues, some of Russia’s methods might still produce desired effects. Russia managed to manipulate its opponents enough to achieve limited surprise, and partially managed to force Ukraine to fight a war that will eventually favour Russia. Although tactical indirect and asymmetric methods largely failed, Russia has managed to turn asymmetry to its favour through mobilization and the use of non-military measures, as the war has proceeded. An important lesson from Russia’s ‘special military operation’ for countries sharing a border with Russia is that Russia will use geography, economic linkages, information tools, subversion, and strategic movements of its armed forces to create an asymmetric, strategic situation where the weaker opponent must sacrifice almost everything to order to survive. The implications for Russia’s small neighbouring states are clear. Military and economic alliances and great power support are required for deterrence by denial to withstand Russian non-military and military use of force. Resilience, readiness, and capabilities to counter Russian influence are required to resists Russia’s indirect methods and non-military measures. Core identity and interests should always be protected against Russia’s pursuit to alter them. Finally, continuous intelligence collection and an understanding of Russia’s strategic culture is critical for acquiring situational awareness and anticipating Russia’s potential actions