The war between Russia and Ukraine has been ongoing since Russia’s illegal occupation of Crimea nine years ago. In February 2022, Russia launched ‘a special military operation’ against Ukraine. To support its military operations, Russia used asymmetric and indirect methods and non-military measures as a part of its strategy. These three, heavily intertwined concepts form the basis for understanding Russia’s ‘strategy of indirect actions’ as seen by Russian academics and military leaders.
As part of this strategy, Russia employed indirect military and non-military measures against Ukraine until 2021 when it became clear that Ukraine would not comply with Russia’s views of the Minsk II agreement. Consequently, Russia used non-violent military measures and multiple non-military means, including diplomatic, economic, and information means first to prepare and then to support its direct and violent military operation against Ukraine. Russia used indirect and asymmetric methods in its operational plan to support its traditional warfare efforts, including special forces and separatist troops, cyber-attacks and information warfare, and long-range precision weapons against civilian targets. Russia has varied these methods during the duration of conflict.
Russia’s strategy of indirect actions has resulted in both failures and successes. Initially Russia’s operational plan to occupy Ukraine was based on wrong premises, and it lacked necessary resources. Russia lacked situational understanding and underestimated its adversaries. Russia was also unable to shape the strategic environment in its favour due to a failure to synchronize military and non-military measures. Indirect methods failed when joint warfare failed, and no new or novel ‘asymmetric’ technology or doctrine was successfully deployed to produce surprise.
However, indirect methods also had successful elements, and as the war continues, some of Russia’s methods might still produce desired effects. Russia managed to manipulate its opponents enough to achieve limited surprise, and partially managed to force Ukraine to fight a war that will eventually favour Russia. Although tactical indirect and asymmetric methods largely failed, Russia has managed to turn asymmetry to its favour through mobilization and the use of non-military measures, as the war has proceeded.
An important lesson from Russia’s ‘special military operation’ for countries sharing a border with Russia is that Russia will use geography, economic linkages, information tools, subversion, and strategic movements of its armed forces to create an asymmetric, strategic situation where the weaker opponent must sacrifice almost everything to order to survive. The implications for Russia’s small neighbouring states are clear. Military and economic alliances and great power support are required for deterrence by denial to withstand Russian non-military and military use of force. Resilience, readiness, and capabilities to counter Russian influence are required to resists Russia’s indirect methods and non-military measures. Core identity and interests should always be protected against Russia’s pursuit to alter them. Finally, continuous intelligence collection and an understanding of Russia’s strategic culture is critical for acquiring situational awareness and anticipating Russia’s potential actions
