Völkerpsychologie and the Origins of Hermann Cohen’s Antipsychologism

Some commentators on Hermann Cohen have remarked on what they take to be a puzzle about the origins of his mature anti-psychologism. When Cohen was young, he studied a kind of psychology, the Völkerpsychologie of Moritz Lazarus and Heymann Steinthal, and wrote apparently psycholgistic accounts of knowledge almost up until the moment he first articulated his anti-psychologistic neo-Kantianism. To be sure, Cohen's mature anti psycholgism does constitute a rejection of certain central commitments of Völkerpsychologie. However, the relation between Völkerpsychologie and Cohen's mature anti-psychologism is not one of straightforward opposition. This paper argues that Cohen had significantly less distance to travel than it appears to get from his early Völkerpsychologie to his mature anti-psychologism. In particular, this paper argues that Cohen always had an anti-psychologistic account of knowledge, even during the period when he was studying Völkerpsychologie, and further, that key features of his Völkerpsychologie partly shaped his mature account of knowledge. Finally, the paper identifies how Cohen’s views did change over the transition from his völkerpsychological period to his later anti-psychologism. It thus identifies what changes in Cohen’s views do need to be explained

Anti-Psychologism and Neutrality

Both the phenomenology of Husserl and the pragmatist phenomenology of James can be categorized by the formula “radical empiricism,” which is explicit in James and implicit, but no less pervasive, in Husserl. For both of them, radical empiricism is additionally conjoined with an equally radical anti-psychologism. The problem is that the two terms “radical empiricism” and “anti-psychologism” take on a radically different meaning in the two authors. This essay aims to investigate the structural differences between two perspectives that, while following completely different courses, seem to share the same objective: to elaborate a philosophy which at no point moves away from the experiential plane

The logical anti-psychologism of Frege and Husserl

Frege and Husserl are both recognized for their significant contributions to the overthrowing of logical psychologism, at least in its 19th century forms. Between Frege's profound impact on modern logic that extended the influence of his anti-psychologism and Husserl's extensive attempts at the refutation of logical psychologism in the Prolegomena to Logical Investigations, these arguments are generally understood as successful. This paper attempts to account for the development of these two anti-psychologistic conceptions of logical objects and for some of the basic differences between them. It identifies some problems that are common to strongly anti-psychologistic conceptions of logic and compares the extent to which Frege's and Husserl's views are open to these problems. Accordingly, this paper is divided into two parts. Part I develops a conception of the problems of logical psychologism as they are distinctively understood by each philosopher, out of the explicit arguments and criticisms made against the view in the texts. This conception is in each case informed by the overall historical trajectories of each philosopher's philosophical development. Part II examines the two views in light of common problems of anti-psychologism

Security as Completeness

Peirce’s anti-psychologism hinges on two main assumptions. First, logic and psychology belong to two separate disciplines – respectively, the normative sciences and the experimental sciences. Second, externalism must be understood as a crucial and inescapable epistemological criterion. The introspectionist illusion, according to which individuals have direct and epistemologically flawless access to their own internal states, should be dismissed. As Colapietro (2003) and Calcaterra (2006) observe, Peirce’s standpoint is far different from the Kantian classical account of anti-psychologism. This original take on anti-psychologism leaves room for a functional distinction between logic and psychology, emerging from a semiotic and communicative continuity. This means that psychology, unlike logic as a formal doctrine of signs, will be epistemologically appropriate for dealing with internal psychological states, on the condition that this inquiry be focused on the communicative processes through which these internal states are expressed and conveyed. Such a Peircean account of anti-psychologism forms the epistemological background of this paper. My goal is to show how Peirce’s approach to communication and semiosis can be applied in order to discuss a specific psychological theory, in this case, attachment theory. Specifically, I propose employing Giovanni Maddalena’s Peircean distinction between complete and incomplete gestures (Maddalena 2015) to account for the distinction between secure, dismissing and preoccupied attachment patterns. To this end, I will be discussing three different measurements of attachment: the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI, George, Kaplan & Main 1985), the Adult Attachment Projection (AAP, George & West 2006), and the Patient Attachment Coding System (PACS, Talia, Miller-Bottome & Daniel 2015). Throughout this discussion, I will examine the connection between the semiotic and phenomenological category of completeness, and the psychological category of security. This connection involves an interesting normative import, which I briefly discuss in the conclusions

Durkheim's Ambivalence towards Psychology and the Foundations of Sociology as a Discipline

The paper explores Durkheim’s ambivalent position towards psychology, drawing on his debates with Comte, Tarde, and Wundt. In addressing this issue, we propose different types of anti-psychologism in sociology: epistemological (excluding psychological dimensions from sociological explanations), institutional (denying psychology the status of science), and strategic (establishing sociology as a scientific field). The analysis shows that Durkheim’s strategic anti-psychologism was more prominent and comprehensive than his epistemological anti-psychologism. Durkheim was against psychologism in sociology, but he incorporated psychological dimensions into his theory (cognitivism). He opted for a clear distinction between sociological and psychological fields, but he accepted psychology as an academic discipline (unlike Comte) and even incorporated some ideas from Wundt’s psychology. Durkheim’s position was determined by historical developments in the emerging social sciences. The competition between the neighbouring academic fields asked for ’distinction’. At the same time, shifting paradigms in psychology resulted in converging positions (Durkheim and Wundt). We argue that a common perception of Durkheim’s anti-psychologism has overshadowed his nuanced approach to psychological factors in his work. It has also determined the long-term ’fear of psychologism’ and a lack of relevant psychological perspective in sociology

A Defence of Anti-Psychologism About Reasons

My concern is the ongoing debate regarding the relationship between the reasons for which an agent acted (motivating reasons) and the reasons which count in favour of that action (normative reasons). Normative reasons seem to be facts, whereas motivating reasons seem to be psychological states. Agents look to be capable for acting for the reasons that favour an action, which would require that motivating reasons are capable of being the same kind of thing as normative reasons, which in turn is in conflict with the different natures of normative and motivating reasons. My object in my dissertation is to resolve this conflict. I examine Bernard Williams’ “reasons internalism” and Michael Smith’s Humean account of motivating reasons. Both argue that motivating reasons are psychological states. I disagree. I argue, based on Smith\u27s position, that the right account of the psychological states that make up motivation is not identical to our theory of motivating reasons. I then discuss Dancy\u27s argument for an anti-psychological account of reasons, according to which no reasons are necessarily psychological states of the agent. His position is unable to account for agents acting in the light of false beliefs. Drawing on McDowell\u27s epistemological disjunctivism, I conclude that the correct account of reasons is that when an agent is acting in the light of true beliefs, an agent\u27s reasons are anti-psychological, whereas when an agent acts in the light of false beliefs, the agent\u27s reasons are psychological

Husserlian Aspects of Wittgenstein"s Middle Period

It is not immediately obvious that there was anything\ud connecting Husserl or phenomenology with Wittgenstein"s\ud work, but with an examination of the evidence, this attitude\ud can be changed. I will establish the modest probability that\ud Wittgenstein had contact with the ideas of Husserl, and\ud that the ideas of Husserl were either directly or indirectly\ud influential in Wittgenstein"s work. Wittgenstein"s concern\ud with phenomenology is most explicitly expressed in his\ud Philosophical Remarks (hereafter Remarks), however\ud there is tacit concern throughout most of his writing

In Defence of Psychologism

The term ‘psychologism’ is normally used for the doctrine that logical and mathematical truths must be explained in terms of psychological truths (see Kusch 1995 and 2011). As such, the term is typically pejorative: the widespread consensus is that psychologism in this sense is a paradigm of philosophical error, a gross mistake that was identified and conclusively refuted by Frege and Husserl

Two Orders of Things: Wittgenstein on Reasons and Causes

This paper situates Wittgenstein in what is known as the causalism/anti-causalism debate in the philosophy of mind and action and reconstructs his arguments to the effect that reasons are not a species of causes. On the one hand, the paper aims to reinvigorate the question of what these arguments are by offering a historical sketch of the debate showing that Wittgenstein's arguments were overshadowed by those of the people he influenced, and that he came to be seen as an anti-causalist for reasons that are in large part extraneous to his thought. On the other hand, the paper aims to recover the arguments scattered in Wittgenstein's own writings by detailing and defending three lines of argument distinguishing reasons from causes. The paper concludes that Wittgenstein's arguments differ from those of his immediate successors; that he anticipates current anti-psychologistic trends; and that he is perhaps closer to Davidson than historical dialectics suggest