3,271 research outputs found
MuON: Epidemic based mutual anonymity in unstructured P2P networks
A mutual anonymity system enables communication between a client and a service provider without revealing their identities. In general, the anonymity guarantees made by the protocol are enhanced when a large number of participants are recruited into the anonymity system. Peer-to-peer (P2P) systems are able to attract a large number of nodes and hence are highly suitable for anonymity systems. However, the churn (changes in system membership) within P2P networks, poses a significant challenge for low-bandwidth reliable anonymous communication in these networks.
This paper presents MuON, a protocol to achieve mutual anonymity in unstructured P2P networks. MuON leverages epidemic-style data dissemination to deal with churn. Simulation results and security analysis indicate that MuON provides mutual anonymity in networks with high churn, while maintaining predictable latencies, high reliability, and low communication overhead
Peer-to-peer:is deviant behavior the norm on P2P file-sharing networks?
P2P file-sharing networks such as Kazaa, eDonkey, and Limewire boast millions of users. Because of scalability concerns and legal issues, such networks are moving away from the semicentralized approach that Napster typifies toward more scalable and anonymous decentralized P2P architectures. Because they lack any central authority, these networks provide a new, interesting context for the expression of human social behavior. However, the activities of P2P community members are sometimes at odds with what real-world authorities consider acceptable. One example is the use of P2P networks to distribute illegal pornography. To gauge the form and extent of P2P-based sharing of illegal pornography, we analyzed pornography-related resource-discovery traffic in the Gnutella P2P network. We found that a small yet significant proportion of Gnutella activity relates to illegal pornography: for example, 1.6 percent of searches and 2.4 percent of responses are for this type of material. But does this imply that such activity is widespread in the file-sharing population? On the contrary, our results show that a small yet particularly active subcommunity of users searches for and distributes illegal pornography, but it isn't a behavioral norm
Systematizing Decentralization and Privacy: Lessons from 15 Years of Research and Deployments
Decentralized systems are a subset of distributed systems where multiple
authorities control different components and no authority is fully trusted by
all. This implies that any component in a decentralized system is potentially
adversarial. We revise fifteen years of research on decentralization and
privacy, and provide an overview of key systems, as well as key insights for
designers of future systems. We show that decentralized designs can enhance
privacy, integrity, and availability but also require careful trade-offs in
terms of system complexity, properties provided, and degree of
decentralization. These trade-offs need to be understood and navigated by
designers. We argue that a combination of insights from cryptography,
distributed systems, and mechanism design, aligned with the development of
adequate incentives, are necessary to build scalable and successful
privacy-preserving decentralized systems
Maintaining unlinkability in group based P2P environments
In the wake of the success of Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networking, security has arisen as one of its main concerns, becoming a key issue when evaluating a P2P system. Unfortunately, some systems' design focus targeted issues such as scalabil-ity or overall performance, but not security. As a result, security mechanisms must be provided at a later stage, after the system has already been designed and partially (or even fully) implemented, which may prove a cumbersome proposition. This work exposes how a security layer was provided under such circumstances for a specic Java based P2P framework: JXTA-Overlay.Arran de l'èxit de (P2P) peer-to-peer, la seguretat ha sorgit com una de les seves principals preocupacions, esdevenint una qüestió clau en l'avaluació d'un sistema P2P. Malauradament, alguns sistemes de disseny apunten focus de problemes com l'escalabilitat o l'acompliment general, però no de seguretat. Com a resultat d'això, els mecanismes de seguretat s¿han de proporcionar en una etapa posterior, després que el sistema ja ha estat dissenyat i parcialment (o fins i tot totalment) implementat, la qual cosa pot ser una proposició incòmode. Aquest article exposa com es va proveir una capa de seguretat sota aquestes circumstàncies per un Java específic basat en un marc P2P: JXTA-superposició.A raíz del éxito de (P2P) peer-to-peer, la seguridad ha surgido como una de sus principales preocupaciones, convirtiéndose en una cuestión clave en la evaluación de un sistema P2P. Desgraciadamente, algunos sistemas de diseño apuntan un foco de problemas como la escalabilidad o el desempeño general, pero no de seguridad. Como resultado de ello, los mecanismos de seguridad se proporcionarán en una etapa posterior, después de que el sistema ya ha sido diseñado y parcialmente (o incluso totalmente) implementado, lo que puede ser una proposición incómodo. Este artículo expone cómo se proveyó una capa de seguridad bajo estas circunstancias por un Java específico basado en un marco P2P: JXTA-superposición
Octopus: A Secure and Anonymous DHT Lookup
Distributed Hash Table (DHT) lookup is a core technique in structured
peer-to-peer (P2P) networks. Its decentralized nature introduces security and
privacy vulnerabilities for applications built on top of them; we thus set out
to design a lookup mechanism achieving both security and anonymity, heretofore
an open problem. We present Octopus, a novel DHT lookup which provides strong
guarantees for both security and anonymity. Octopus uses attacker
identification mechanisms to discover and remove malicious nodes, severely
limiting an adversary's ability to carry out active attacks, and splits lookup
queries over separate anonymous paths and introduces dummy queries to achieve
high levels of anonymity. We analyze the security of Octopus by developing an
event-based simulator to show that the attacker discovery mechanisms can
rapidly identify malicious nodes with low error rate. We calculate the
anonymity of Octopus using probabilistic modeling and show that Octopus can
achieve near-optimal anonymity. We evaluate Octopus's efficiency on Planetlab
with 207 nodes and show that Octopus has reasonable lookup latency and
manageable communication overhead
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