Telecommunication Economics

This book constitutes a collaborative and selected documentation of the scientific outcome of the European COST Action IS0605 Econ@Tel "A Telecommunications Economics COST Network" which run from October 2007 to October 2011. Involving experts from around 20 European countries, the goal of Econ@Tel was to develop a strategic research and training network among key people and organizations in order to enhance Europe's competence in the field of telecommunications economics. Reflecting the organization of the COST Action IS0605 Econ@Tel in working groups the following four major research areas are addressed: - evolution and regulation of communication ecosystems; - social and policy implications of communication technologies; - economics and governance of future networks; - future networks management architectures and mechanisms

Business Ecosystem and Reverse Salient: The Development of the Mobile Music Business in Japan and Korea

This paper aims at exploring a mechanism of new business development. To understand how a business develops, we move our analytical focus from the level of a focal business to the level of the “business ecosystem,†a collection of related businesses and institutions. We pay special attention to a slowly advancing component as a “reverse salient.†We comparatively examine the developmental process of the mobile music business in Japan and Korea, and show how the interactions among related businesses and music copyright institutions as a reverse salient shaped the directions and speed of the development in each country

Technoligical Life Cycles Regional Clusters Facing Disruption

The phenomenon of technological life cycles is argued to be of great importance in the development of regional clusters. New 'disruptive' technologies may initiate the emergence of new regional industrial clusters and/or create new opportunities for further development of existing ones. However, they may also result in stagnation and decline of the latter. The term disruptive refers to such significant changes in the basic technologies that may change the industrial landscape, even in the shorter run. The paper examines the key features of a regional cluster, where the economic development patterns are quite closely related to the emergence of new key technologies.Technological life cycles, regional clusters, communication technology

Joint Beacon Power and Beacon Rate Control Based on Game Theoretic Approach in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks

In vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs), each vehicle broadcasts its information periodically in its beacons to create awareness for surrounding vehicles aware of their presence. But, the wireless channel is congested by the increase beacons number, packet collision lost a lot of beacons. This paper tackles the problem of joint beaconing power and a beaconing rate in VANETs. A joint utilitybased beacon power and beacon rate game are formulated as a non-cooperative game and a cooperative game. A three distributed and iterative algorithm (Nash Seeking Algorithm, Best Response Algorithm, Cooperative Bargaining Algorithm) for computing the desired equilibrium is introduced, where the optimal values of each vehicle beaconing power and beaconing rate are simultaneously updated at the same step. Extensive simulations show the convergence of a proposed algorithm to the equilibrium and give some insights on how the game parameters may vary the game outcome. It is demonstrated that the Cooperative Bargaining Algorithm is a fast algorithm that converges the equilibrium

Telecommunication Economics

This book constitutes a collaborative and selected documentation of the scientific outcome of the European COST Action IS0605 Econ@Tel "A Telecommunications Economics COST Network" which run from October 2007 to October 2011. Involving experts from around 20 European countries, the goal of Econ@Tel was to develop a strategic research and training network among key people and organizations in order to enhance Europe's competence in the field of telecommunications economics. Reflecting the organization of the COST Action IS0605 Econ@Tel in working groups the following four major research areas are addressed: - evolution and regulation of communication ecosystems; - social and policy implications of communication technologies; - economics and governance of future networks; - future networks management architectures and mechanisms

Strategies of media companies in Asia Pacific region.

by Yau Chui-Man Catherina.Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1997.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 62-63).ABSTRACT --- p.iTABLE OF CONTENT --- p.iiLIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS --- p.ivLIST OF TABLES --- p.vChapterChapter I --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1Definition of Media --- p.1Reasons for Choosing Television Broadcasting --- p.1Hong Kong's Aspiration to become a Broadcasting Hub in Asia --- p.2"Objective, Scope and Methodology of Study" --- p.3Brief Introduction of the Company in Profile --- p.5Chapter II --- INFLUENCES OF CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR AND INTERDEPENDENCE OF PLAYERS ON STRATEGY SETTING --- p.9Introduction --- p.9Changing Consumer Values --- p.10Marketplace versus Marketspace --- p.12The Value Net --- p.13Essence of the Value Net to Strategy Setting --- p.14Chapter III --- ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF MASS MEDIA --- p.15The Good --- p.15A Public Good --- p.15An Intangible Good --- p.16Cultural Value --- p.17Demand and Supply of Television --- p.17Interest Groups --- p.17The Economics of Free Television --- p.18Ratings and Advertising Revenues --- p.18Paradox of Viewership Maximization and Non-maximization of Societal Welfare in Commercial Television --- p.20The Under-served Segments by Free Terrestrial Television… --- p.22The Nature of Television Supply --- p.22Chapter IV --- STRUCTURAL CHANGES TO THE INDUSTRY IN THE REGION --- p.24Overview --- p.24From Local to Regional --- p.26Chapter V --- TVB's VALUE NET --- p.28Scope --- p.28Strategy and the Added Value --- p.28The Players --- p.31Customers --- p.31Substitutors --- p.32Suppliers --- p.33Complementors --- p.34The Rules --- p.35Tactics --- p.37Chapter VI --- FUTURE TRENDS --- p.39From Regional to Local --- p.39Converging Technologies --- p.42Chapter VII --- RECOMMENDATIONS --- p.44Lobbying : Changing Rules of the Game --- p.45Alliances : Changing Roles of the Players --- p.47Conclusion --- p.48Chapter APPENDIX 1 --- "Media Coverage Summary, Covergae Trends and Advertising Expenditure by Medium" --- p.50Chapter APPENDIX 2 --- Three Types of Fit and the Importance of Trade-offs --- p.52Chapter APPENDIX 3 --- The Three Types of Positioning --- p.55Chapter APPENDIX 4 --- Increase in TV Penetration Rate in Asia Pacific --- p.57Chapter APPENDIX 5 --- Viewership Profile --- p.61BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.6

Tensions in managerial attention in a company in crisis : How tightening budget control resulted in discomfort zones for line managers

Author's accepted version (post-print).acceptedVersio

A Non-cooperative Game-Theoretic Framework for Sponsoring Content in the Internet Market

Data traffic demand over the Internet is increasing rapidly, and it is changing the pricing model between internet service providers (ISPs), content providers (CPs) and end users. One recent pricing proposal is sponsored data plan, i.e., when CP negotiates with the ISP on behalf of the users to remove the network subscription fees so as to attract more users and increase the number of advertisements. As such, a key challenge is how to provide proper sponsorship in the situation of complex interactions among the telecommunication actors, namely, the advertisers, the content provider, and users. To answer those questions, we explore the potential economic impacts of this new pricing model by modeling the interplay among the advertiser, users, and the CPs in a game theoretic framework. The CP may have either a subscription revenue model (charging end-users) or an advertisement revenue model (charging advertisers). In this work, we design and analyze the interaction among CPs having an advertisement revenue as a non-cooperative game, where each CP determines the proportion of data to sponsor and a level of credibility of content. In turn, the end-users demand for the content of a CP depends not only on their strategies but also upon those proposed by all of its competitors. Through rigorous mathematical analysis, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Based on the analysis of the game properties, we propose an iterative algorithm, which guarantees to converge to the Nash equilibrium point in a distributed manner. Numerical investigation shows the convergence of a proposed algorithm to the Nash equilibrium point and corroborates the fact that sponsoring content may improve the CPs outcome