Modal Truths from an Analytic-Synthetic Kantian Distinction

In the article of 1965 Are logical truths analytic? Hintikka deals with the problem of establishing whether the logical truths of first-order logic areanalytic or synthetic. In order to provide an answer to this issue, Hintikka firstly distinguishes two different notions of analyticity, and then he showsthat the sentences of first-order logic are analytic in one sense, but synthetic in another. This interesting result clearly illustrates the non-triviality of thequestion. In this paper we aim at answering the question Are modal truths analytic? In order to elaborate a satisfactory answer to this question, wewill follow the strategy of Hintikka and we will exploit some recent results on the proof theory for modal logic. Finally, our conclusions will shed newlights on the links between first-order logic and modal logic

On Quine's Ontology: quantification, extensionality and naturalism (or from commitment to indifference)

Much of the ontology made in the analytic tradition of philosophy nowadays is founded on some of Quine’s proposals. His naturalism and the binding between existence and quantification are respectively two of his very influential metaphilosophical and methodological theses. Nevertheless, many of his specific claims are quite controversial and contemporaneously have few followers. Some of them are: (a) his rejection of higher-order logic; (b) his resistance in accepting the intensionality of ontological commitments; (c) his rejection of first-order modal logic; and (d) his rejection of the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. I intend to argue that these controversial negative claims are just interconnected consequences of those much more accepted and apparently less harmful metaphilosophical and methodological theses, and that the glue linking all these consequences to its causes is the notion of extensionality

Analisi - sintesi

A short reconstruction of the analytic-synthetic method, a key idea in Medieval and Early Modern Logic

Synthetic Completeness for a Terminating Seligman-Style Tableau System

Hybrid logic extends modal logic with nominals that name worlds. Seligman-style tableau systems for hybrid logic divide branches into blocks named by nominals to achieve a local proof style. We present a Seligman-style tableau system with a formalization in the proof assistant Isabelle/HOL. Our system refines an existing system to simplify formalization and we claim termination from this relationship. Existing completeness proofs that account for termination are either analytic or based on translation, but synthetic proofs have been shown to generalize to richer logics and languages. Our main result is the first synthetic completeness proof for a terminating hybrid logic tableau system. It is also the first formalized completeness proof for any hybrid logic proof system

Transcendental Logic Redefined

Traditionally transcendental logic has been set apart from formal logic. Transcendental logic had to deal with the conditions of possibility of judgements, which were presupposed by formal logic. Defined as a purely philosophical enterprise transcendental logic was considered as being a priori delivering either analytic or even synthetic a priori results. In this paper it is argued that this separation from the (empirical) cognitive sciences should be given up. Transcendental logic should be understood as focusing on specific questions. These do not, as some recent analytic philosophy has it, include a refutation of scepticism. And they are not to be separated from meta-logical investigations. Transcendental logic properly understood, and redefined along these theses, should concern itself with the (formal) re-construction of the presupposed necessary conditions and rules of linguistic communication in general. It aims at universality and reflexive closure

Synthetic Logic as the Philosophical Underpinning for Apophatic Theology Commentary on A Philosophy of the Unsayable

This is a review article based on William Franke's book, A Philosophy of the Unsayable. After contrasting standard "analytic" logic with its paradoxical alternative, "synthetic" logic, this article introduces three basic laws of synthetic logic that can help to clarify how it is possible to talk about the so-called "unsayable". Keeping these laws in mind as one reads a book such as Franke's enables one to understand the range of strategies one can employ in the attempt to use words to evoke an experience of the unsayable. This article together with several others responding to Franke's book, and Franke's replies to the whole set of articles

Is the Private Language Argument a Transcendental Argument?

Comparisons between Kant´s critique of pure reason and Wittgenstein´s critique of language, which became current in analytic philosophy (Cf. e.g Hacker 1972, 30.) seem not far-fetched in view of the impetus for the destruction of dogmatic metaphysics both philosophers share. Their relevance would gain though by an elaboration of their dissimilarities rather than by just stressing similarities. An example of the former approach, Weinert (1983, 412) contrasts the tools both critics of metaphysics employ: the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, and the description of the logic of languageuse and in particular the ´Argument from Epistemic Operators´ (Wittgenstein 1961, sects. 6.5, 6.51; 1958, §§ 246, 247, 251, 303; references in the form of paragraphnumbers are to the latter text) respectively. The analysis of the employment of those tools in anti-metaphysical arguments -and Weinert treats the Private Language Argument (PLA) as such (427-429)- enables to uncover underlying assumptions, e.g. the implicit assumption in Kant of a prior conceptual relation between concepts to which his notion of analysis is to be applied (430-431) and Wittgenstein´s explicit doctrine that "ordinary language is alright� (434)

Is Geometry Analytic?

In this paper I present critical evaluations of Ayer and Putnam's views on the analyticity of geometry. By drawing on the historico-philosophical work of Michael Friedman on the relativized apriori; and Roberto Torretti on the foundations of geometry, I show how we can make sense of the assertion that pure geometry is analytic in Carnap's sense

The Eightfold Way: Why Analyticity, Apriority and Necessity are Independent

This paper concerns the three great modal dichotomies: (i) the necessary/contingent dichotomy; (ii) the a priori/empirical dichotomy; and (iii) the analytic/synthetic dichotomy. These can be combined to produce a tri-dichotomy of eight modal categories. The question as to which of the eight categories house statements and which do not is a pivotal battleground in the history of analytic philosophy, with key protagonists including Descartes, Hume, Kant, Kripke, Putnam and Kaplan. All parties to the debate have accepted that some categories are void. This paper defends the contrary view that all eight categories house statements—a position I dub ‘octopropositionalism’. Examples of statements belonging to all eight categories are given

Two Squares of Opposition: for Analytic and Synthetic Propositions

In the paper I prove that there are two squares of opposition. The unconventional one is built up for synthetic propositions. There a, i are contrary, a, o (resp. e, i) are contradictory, e, o are subcontrary, a, e (resp. i, o) are said to stand in the subalternation