Analysis of the IBM CCA Security API Protocols in Maude-NPA

Standards for cryptographic protocols have long been attractive candidates for formal verification. It is important that such standards be correct, and cryptographic protocols are tricky to design and subject to non-intuitive attacks even when the underlying cryptosystems are secure. Thus a number of general-purpose cryptographic protocol analysis tools have been developed and applied to protocol standards. However, there is one class of standards, security application programming interfaces (security APIs), to which few of these tools have been applied. Instead, most work has concentrated on developing special-purpose tools and algorithms for specific classes of security APIs. However, there can be much advantage gained from having general-purpose tools that could be applied to a wide class of problems, including security APIs. One particular class of APIs that has proven difficult to analyze using general-purpose tools is that involving exclusive-or. In this paper we analyze the IBM 4758 Common Cryptographic Architecture (CCA) protocol using an advanced automated protocol verification tool with full exclusive-or capabilities, the Maude-NPA tool. This is the first time that API protocols have been satisfactorily specified and analyzed in the Maude-NPA, and the first time XOR-based APIs have been specified and analyzed using a general-purpose unbounded session cryptographic protocol verification tool that provides direct support for AC theories. We describe our results and indicate what further research needs to be done to make such protocol analysis generally effective.Antonio González-Burgueño, Sonia Santiago and Santiago Escobar have been partially supported by the EU (FEDER) and the Spanish MINECO under grants TIN 2010-21062-C02-02 and TIN 2013-45732-C4-1-P, and by Generalitat Valenciana PROMETEO2011/052. José Meseguer has been partially supported by NSF Grant CNS 13-10109.González Burgueño, A.; Santiago Pinazo, S.; Escobar Román, S.; Meadows, C.; Meseguer, J. (2014). Analysis of the IBM CCA Security API Protocols in Maude-NPA. En Security Standardisation Research. Springer International Publishing. 111-130. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-14054-4_8S111130Abadi, M., Blanchet, B., Fournet, C.: Just fast keying in the pi calculus. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. 10(3) (2007)Blanchet, B.: An Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Verifier Based on Prolog Rules. In: 14th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW 2014), Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, Canada, June 2001, pp. 82–96. IEEE Computer Society (2014)Bond, M.: Attacks on cryptoprocessor transaction sets. In: Koç, Ç.K., Naccache, D., Paar, C. (eds.) CHES 2001. LNCS, vol. 2162, pp. 220–234. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)Butler, F., Cervesato, I., Jaggard, A.D., Scedrov, A.: A formal analysis of some properties of kerberos 5 using msr. 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Springer, Heidelberg (2003)Cortier, V., Keighren, G., Steel, G.: Automatic analysis of the aecurity of XOR-based key management schemes. In: Grumberg, O., Huth, M. (eds.) TACAS 2007. LNCS, vol. 4424, pp. 538–552. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)Cortier, V., Steel, G.: A generic security API for symmetric key management on cryptographic devices. In: Backes, M., Ning, P. (eds.) ESORICS 2009. LNCS, vol. 5789, pp. 605–620. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)Erbatur, S., et al.: Effective Symbolic Protocol Analysis via Equational Irreducibility Conditions. In: Foresti, S., Yung, M., Martinelli, F. (eds.) ESORICS 2012. LNCS, vol. 7459, pp. 73–90. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)Escobar, S., Meadows, C., Meseguer, J.: Maude-NPA: Cryptographic Protocol Analysis Modulo Equational Properties. In: Aldini, A., Barthe, G., Gorrieri, R. (eds.) FOSAD 2007/2008/2009. LNCS, vol. 5705, pp. 1–50. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)Escobar, S., Meadows, C., Meseguer, J., Santiago, S.: Sequential Protocol Composition in Maude-NPA. 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Protocol analysis modulo exclusive-or theories: a case study in Maude-MPA

[EN] Escobar of the Universitat Politècnica de València in collaboration with José Meseguer (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA) and Catherine Meadows (Naval Research Lab, Washington, DC, USA). We focus on protocols using exclusive-or as the only cryptographic properties of symbols, apart of the standard cancellation of encryption and decryption. The protocols analyzed in this document are borrowed from the paper ”Reducing Protocol Analysis with XOR to the XOR- Free Case in the Horn Theory Based Approach” by Ralf Küesters and Tomasz Truderung published in Journal of Automated Reasoning, volume 46, pages 325-352, Springer 2011. These protocols are divided into two groups, those that can be specified in the Alice-Bob notation and those corresponding to an Application Programming Interface (API). We have proved the same security properties described in Küesters and Truderung paper, but we go beyond that paper in the sense that we have provided protocol specifications that meet all the requirements of the original protocols, whereas Küesters and Truderung paper use simplified versions of these protocols. The main problem that we have encountered is to specify API protocols in Maude-NPA, since this was the first time that this kind of protocols were specified in the tool. Another contribution of this thesis is to confirm that protocols with exclusive-or can be verified in Maude-NPA[ES] El desarrollo de esta tesis final de máster tiene como objetivo verificar diversos protocolos de seguridad existentes utilizando una herramienta de verificación automatizada de protocolos, Maude- NPA, desarrollada por Santiago Escobar, de la Universitat Politècnica de València , en colaboración con José Meseguer (Universidad de Illinois en Urbana- Champaign, EE.UU.) y Catherine Meadows (Naval Research Lab , Washington , DC, EE.UU.). Nos centramos en el uso de protocolos con el operador orexclusivo como propiedad principal criptográfica de símbolos, así como la cancelación estándar de cifrado y descifrado. Los protocolos analizados en esta tesis los tomamos del artículo ”Reducing Protocol Analysis with XOR to the XOR- Free Case in the Horn Theory Based Approach” de Ralf Küesters y Tomasz Truderung publicado en el “Journal of Automated Reasoning”, volumen 46, páginas 325-352 en el 2011 en Springer. Estos protocolos se dividen en dos grupos, los que se pueden especificar en la notación Alice-Bob y los correspondientes a una interfaz de programación de aplicaciones (API) . Hemos probado las mismas propiedades de seguridad descritas en el artículo de Ralf Küesters y Tomasz Truderung , pero yendo más allá, en el sentido de que hemos proporcionado las especificaciones de los protocolos que cumplen con todos los requisitos de los protocolos originales , mientras que en el artículo de Ralf Küesters y Tomasz Truderung utilizan versiones simplificadas de estos protocolos. El principal problema que nos hemos encontrado al especificar los protocolos API, es que esta fue la primera vez que este tipo de protocolos se especificó en Maude-NPA. Otra aportación de esta tesis es la confirmación de que los “protocolos or-exclusivos” pueden ser verificados en Maude-NPA .González Burgueño, A. (2014). Protocol analysis modulo exclusive-or theories: a case study in Maude-MPA. http://hdl.handle.net/10251/51784Archivo delegad

Modeling and Analysis of Advanced Cryptographic Primitives and Security Protocols in Maude-NPA

Tesis por compendio[ES] La herramienta criptográfica Maude-NPA es un verificador de modelos especializado para protocolos de seguridad criptográficos que tienen en cuenta las propiedades algebraicas de un sistema criptográfico. En la literatura, las propiedades criptográficas adicionales han descubierto debilidades de los protocolos de seguridad y, en otros casos, son parte de los supuestos de seguridad del protocolo para funcionar correctamente. Maude-NPA tiene una base teórica en la rewriting logic, la unificación ecuacional y el narrowing para realizar una búsqueda hacia atrás desde un patrón de estado inseguro para determinar si es alcanzable o no. Maude-NPA se puede utilizar para razonar sobre una amplia gama de propiedades criptográficas, incluida la cancelación del cifrado y descifrado, la exponenciación de Diffie-Hellman, el exclusive-or y algunas aproximaciones del cifrado homomórfico. En esta tesis consideramos nuevas propiedades criptográficas, ya sea como parte de protocolos de seguridad o para descubrir nuevos ataques. También hemos modelado diferentes familias de protocolos de seguridad, incluidos los Distance Bounding Protocols or Multi-party key agreement protocolos. Y hemos desarrollado nuevas técnicas de modelado para reducir el coste del análisis en protocolos con tiempo y espacio. Esta tesis contribuye de varias maneras al área de análisis de protocolos criptográficos y muchas de las contribuciones de esta tesis pueden ser útiles para otras herramientas de análisis criptográfico.[CAT] L'eina criptografica Maude-NPA es un verificador de models especialitzats per a protocols de seguretat criptogràfics que tenen en compte les propietats algebraiques d'un sistema criptogràfic. A la literatura, les propietats criptogràfiques addicionals han descobert debilitats dels protocols de seguretat i, en altres casos, formen part dels supòsits de seguretat del protocol per funcionar correctament. Maude-NPA te' una base teòrica a la rewriting lògic, la unificació' equacional i narrowing per realitzar una cerca cap enrere des d'un patró' d'estat insegur per determinar si es accessible o no. Maude-NPA es pot utilitzar per raonar sobre una amplia gamma de propietats criptogràfiques, inclosa la cancel·lació' del xifratge i desxifrat, l'exponenciacio' de Diffie-Hellman, el exclusive-or i algunes aproximacions del xifratge homomòrfic. En aquesta tesi, considerem noves propietats criptogràfiques, ja sigui com a part de protocols de seguretat o per descobrir nous atacs. Tambe' hem modelat diferents famílies de protocols de seguretat, inclosos els Distance Bounding Protocols o Multi-party key agreement protocols. I hem desenvolupat noves tècniques de modelització' de protocols per reduir el cost de l'analisi en protocols amb temps i espai. Aquesta tesi contribueix de diverses maneres a l’àrea de l’anàlisi de protocols criptogràfics i moltes de les contribucions d’aquesta tesi poden ser útils per a altres eines d’anàlisi criptogràfic.[EN] The Maude-NPA crypto tool is a specialized model checker for cryptographic security protocols that take into account the algebraic properties of the cryptosystem. In the literature, additional crypto properties have uncovered weaknesses of security protocols and, in other cases, they are part of the protocol security assumptions in order to function properly. Maude-NPA has a theoretical basis on rewriting logic, equational unification, and narrowing to perform a backwards search from an insecure state pattern to determine whether or not it is reachable. Maude-NPA can be used to reason about a wide range of cryptographic properties, including cancellation of encryption and decryption, Diffie-Hellman exponentiation, exclusive-or, and some approximations of homomorphic encryption. In this thesis, we consider new cryptographic properties, either as part of security protocols or to discover new attacks. We have also modeled different families of security protocols, including Distance Bounding Protocols or Multi-party key agreement protocols. And we have developed new protocol modeling techniques to reduce the time and space analysis effort. This thesis contributes in several ways to the area of cryptographic protocol analysis and many of the contributions of this thesis can be useful for other crypto analysis tools.This thesis would not have been possible without the funding of a set of research projects. The main contributions and derivative works of this thesis have been made in the context of the following projects: - Ministry of Economy and Business of Spain : Project LoBaSS Effective Solutions Based on Logic, Scientific Research under award number TIN2015-69175-C4-1-R, this project was focused on using powerful logic-based technologies to analyze safety-critical systems. - Air Force Office of Scientific Research of United States of America : Project Advanced symbolic methods for the cryptographic protocol analyzer Maude-NPA Scientific Research under award number FA9550-17-1-0286 - State Investigation Agency of Spain : Project FREETech: Formal Reasoning for Enabling and Emerging Technologies Scientific I+D-i Research under award number RTI2018-094403-B-C32Aparicio Sánchez, D. (2022). Modeling and Analysis of Advanced Cryptographic Primitives and Security Protocols in Maude-NPA [Tesis doctoral]. Universitat Politècnica de València. https://doi.org/10.4995/Thesis/10251/190915Compendi

Variant-Based Satisfiability

Although different satisfiability decision procedures can be combined by algorithms such as those of Nelson-Oppen or Shostak, current tools typically can only support a finite number of theories to use in such combinations. To make SMT solving more widely applicable, generic satisfiability algorithms that can allow a potentially infinite number of decidable theories to be user-definable, instead of needing to be built in by the implementers, are highly desirable. This work studies how folding variant narrowing, a generic unification algorithm that offers good extensibility in unification theory, can be extended to a generic variant-based satisfiability algorithm for the initial algebras of its user-specified input theories when such theories satisfy Comon-Delaune's finite variant property (FVP) and some extra conditions. Several, increasingly larger infinite classes of theories whose initial algebras enjoy decidable variant-based satisfiability are identified, and a method based on descent maps to bring other theories into these classes and to improve the generic algorithm's efficiency is proposed and illustrated with examples.Partially supported by NSF Grant CNS 13-19109.Ope