14,094 research outputs found
Physical Layer Security: Coalitional Games for Distributed Cooperation
Cooperation between wireless network nodes is a promising technique for
improving the physical layer security of wireless transmission, in terms of
secrecy capacity, in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. While existing
physical layer security literature answered the question "what are the
link-level secrecy capacity gains from cooperation?", this paper attempts to
answer the question of "how to achieve those gains in a practical decentralized
wireless network and in the presence of a secrecy capacity cost for information
exchange?". For this purpose, we model the physical layer security cooperation
problem as a coalitional game with non-transferable utility and propose a
distributed algorithm for coalition formation. Through the proposed algorithm,
the wireless users can autonomously cooperate and self-organize into disjoint
independent coalitions, while maximizing their secrecy capacity taking into
account the security costs during information exchange. We analyze the
resulting coalitional structures, discuss their properties, and study how the
users can self-adapt the network topology to environmental changes such as
mobility. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm allows the users
to cooperate and self-organize while improving the average secrecy capacity per
user up to 25.32% relative to the non-cooperative case.Comment: Best paper Award at Wiopt 200
Coalition Formation Games for Collaborative Spectrum Sensing
Collaborative Spectrum Sensing (CSS) between secondary users (SUs) in
cognitive networks exhibits an inherent tradeoff between minimizing the
probability of missing the detection of the primary user (PU) and maintaining a
reasonable false alarm probability (e.g., for maintaining a good spectrum
utilization). In this paper, we study the impact of this tradeoff on the
network structure and the cooperative incentives of the SUs that seek to
cooperate for improving their detection performance. We model the CSS problem
as a non-transferable coalitional game, and we propose distributed algorithms
for coalition formation. First, we construct a distributed coalition formation
(CF) algorithm that allows the SUs to self-organize into disjoint coalitions
while accounting for the CSS tradeoff. Then, the CF algorithm is complemented
with a coalitional voting game for enabling distributed coalition formation
with detection probability guarantees (CF-PD) when required by the PU. The
CF-PD algorithm allows the SUs to form minimal winning coalitions (MWCs), i.e.,
coalitions that achieve the target detection probability with minimal costs.
For both algorithms, we study and prove various properties pertaining to
network structure, adaptation to mobility and stability. Simulation results
show that CF reduces the average probability of miss per SU up to 88.45%
relative to the non-cooperative case, while maintaining a desired false alarm.
For CF-PD, the results show that up to 87.25% of the SUs achieve the required
detection probability through MWCComment: IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, to appea
Coalition Formation Games for Distributed Cooperation Among Roadside Units in Vehicular Networks
Vehicle-to-roadside (V2R) communications enable vehicular networks to support
a wide range of applications for enhancing the efficiency of road
transportation. While existing work focused on non-cooperative techniques for
V2R communications between vehicles and roadside units (RSUs), this paper
investigates novel cooperative strategies among the RSUs in a vehicular
network. We propose a scheme whereby, through cooperation, the RSUs in a
vehicular network can coordinate the classes of data being transmitted through
V2R communications links to the vehicles. This scheme improves the diversity of
the information circulating in the network while exploiting the underlying
content-sharing vehicle-to-vehicle communication network. We model the problem
as a coalition formation game with transferable utility and we propose an
algorithm for forming coalitions among the RSUs. For coalition formation, each
RSU can take an individual decision to join or leave a coalition, depending on
its utility which accounts for the generated revenues and the costs for
coalition coordination. We show that the RSUs can self-organize into a
Nash-stable partition and adapt this partition to environmental changes.
Simulation results show that, depending on different scenarios, coalition
formation presents a performance improvement, in terms of the average payoff
per RSU, ranging between 20.5% and 33.2%, relative to the non-cooperative case.Comment: accepted and to appear in IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in
Communications (JSAC), Special issue on Vehicular Communications and Network
A Coalition-Formation Game Model for Energy-Efficient Routing in Mobile Ad-hoc Network
One of the most routing problems in Mobile Ad-hoc Network is the node’s selfishness. Nodes are generally selfish and try to maximize their own benefit; hence these nodes refuse to forward packet on behalf of others to preserve their limited energy resources. This selfishness may lead to a low efficiency of routing. Therefore, it is important to study mechanisms which can be used encourage cooperation among nodes, to maintain the network efficiency. In this paper, we propose a cooperative game theoretic model to support more energy-aware and available bandwidth routing in MANET. We introduce a novel framework from coalitional-formation game theory, called hedonic coalition-formation game. We integrate this model to OLSR protocol that is an optimization over the classical link state protocol for the MANETs. Within each coalition, a coalition coordinator acts as a special MPR node to improve the energy efficient and the packet success rate of the transmission. Simulation results show how the proposed algorithm improve the performance in terms of the percentage of selected MPR nodes in the network, the percentage of alive nodes by time, and the Packet Delivery Ratio. Which prove that our proposed model leads, to better results compared to the classical OLSR
Applications of Repeated Games in Wireless Networks: A Survey
A repeated game is an effective tool to model interactions and conflicts for
players aiming to achieve their objectives in a long-term basis. Contrary to
static noncooperative games that model an interaction among players in only one
period, in repeated games, interactions of players repeat for multiple periods;
and thus the players become aware of other players' past behaviors and their
future benefits, and will adapt their behavior accordingly. In wireless
networks, conflicts among wireless nodes can lead to selfish behaviors,
resulting in poor network performances and detrimental individual payoffs. In
this paper, we survey the applications of repeated games in different wireless
networks. The main goal is to demonstrate the use of repeated games to
encourage wireless nodes to cooperate, thereby improving network performances
and avoiding network disruption due to selfish behaviors. Furthermore, various
problems in wireless networks and variations of repeated game models together
with the corresponding solutions are discussed in this survey. Finally, we
outline some open issues and future research directions.Comment: 32 pages, 15 figures, 5 tables, 168 reference
Coalitional Game Theoretic Approach for Cooperative Transmission in Vehicular Networks
Cooperative transmission in vehicular networks is studied by using
coalitional game and pricing in this paper. There are several vehicles and
roadside units (RSUs) in the networks. Each vehicle has a desire to transmit
with a certain probability, which represents its data burtiness. The RSUs can
enhance the vehicles' transmissions by cooperatively relaying the vehicles'
data. We consider two kinds of cooperations: cooperation among the vehicles and
cooperation between the vehicle and RSU. First, vehicles cooperate to avoid
interfering transmissions by scheduling the transmissions of the vehicles in
each coalition. Second, a RSU can join some coalition to cooperate the
transmissions of the vehicles in that coalition. Moreover, due to the mobility
of the vehicles, we introduce the notion of encounter between the vehicle and
RSU to indicate the availability of the relay in space. To stimulate the RSU's
cooperative relaying for the vehicles, the pricing mechanism is applied. A
non-transferable utility (NTU) game is developed to analyze the behaviors of
the vehicles and RSUs. The stability of the formulated game is studied.
Finally, we present and discuss the numerical results for the 2-vehicle and
2-RSU scenario, and the numerical results verify the theoretical analysis.Comment: accepted by IEEE ICC'1
Game-theoretic Resource Allocation Methods for Device-to-Device (D2D) Communication
Device-to-device (D2D) communication underlaying cellular networks allows
mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets to use the licensed spectrum
allocated to cellular services for direct peer-to-peer transmission. D2D
communication can use either one-hop transmission (i.e., in D2D direct
communication) or multi-hop cluster-based transmission (i.e., in D2D local area
networks). The D2D devices can compete or cooperate with each other to reuse
the radio resources in D2D networks. Therefore, resource allocation and access
for D2D communication can be treated as games. The theories behind these games
provide a variety of mathematical tools to effectively model and analyze the
individual or group behaviors of D2D users. In addition, game models can
provide distributed solutions to the resource allocation problems for D2D
communication. The aim of this article is to demonstrate the applications of
game-theoretic models to study the radio resource allocation issues in D2D
communication. The article also outlines several key open research directions.Comment: Accepted. IEEE Wireless Comms Mag. 201
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