Tietoturva auton sisäisissä CAN-verkoissa

Tiivistelmä. Tämä tutkielma käsittelee autojen sisäisten CAN-verkkoja sekä niihin liittyviä tietoturvakysymyksiä. Tutkielmassa käsitellään autoissa yleisesti käytetyn CAN-väyläjärjestelmän perusteita, historiaa sekä myös autojen tietoturvaan liittyviä periaatteita teoreettisella tasolla tasolla. Tämän jälkeen tarkastellaan jo olemassa olevan kirjallisuuden ja tutkimuksen pohjalta CAN-väylään liittyviä konkreettisia tietoturvaongelmia, sekä joissain tapauksissa myös tapoja, joilla niitä voidaan poistaa tai vähentää. Tutkielmassa pohditaan myös tietoturvan merkitystä autoissa, sekä sen mahdollisia suuntauksia autoteollisudessa tulevaisuudessa

Attacks on self-driving cars and their countermeasures : a survey

Intelligent Traffic Systems (ITS) are currently evolving in the form of a cooperative ITS or connected vehicles. Both forms use the data communications between Vehicle-To-Vehicle (V2V), Vehicle-To-Infrastructure (V2I/I2V) and other on-road entities, and are accelerating the adoption of self-driving cars. The development of cyber-physical systems containing advanced sensors, sub-systems, and smart driving assistance applications over the past decade is equipping unmanned aerial and road vehicles with autonomous decision-making capabilities. The level of autonomy depends upon the make-up and degree of sensor sophistication and the vehicle's operational applications. As a result, self-driving cars are being compromised perceived as a serious threat. Therefore, analyzing the threats and attacks on self-driving cars and ITSs, and their corresponding countermeasures to reduce those threats and attacks are needed. For this reason, some survey papers compiling potential attacks on VANETs, ITSs and self-driving cars, and their detection mechanisms are available in the current literature. However, up to our knowledge, they have not covered the real attacks already happened in self-driving cars. To bridge this research gap, in this paper, we analyze the attacks that already targeted self-driving cars and extensively present potential cyber-Attacks and their impacts on those cars along with their vulnerabilities. For recently reported attacks, we describe the possible mitigation strategies taken by the manufacturers and governments. This survey includes recent works on how a self-driving car can ensure resilient operation even under ongoing cyber-Attack. We also provide further research directions to improve the security issues associated with self-driving cars. © 2013 IEEE

Towards a systematic security evaluation of the automotive Bluetooth interface

In-cabin connectivity and its enabling technologies have increased dramatically in recent years. Security was not considered an essential property, a mind-set that has shifted significantly due to the appearance of demonstrated vulnerabilities in these connected vehicles. Connectivity allows the possibility that an external attacker may compromise the security - and therefore the safety - of the vehicle. Many exploits have already been demonstrated in literature. One of the most pervasive connective technologies is Bluetooth, a short-range wireless communication technology. Security issues with this technology are well-documented, albeit in other domains. A threat intelligence study was carried out to substantiate this motivation and finds that while the general trend is towards increasing (relative) security in automotive Bluetooth implementations, there is still significant technological lag when compared to more traditional computing systems. The main contribution of this thesis is a framework for the systematic security evaluation of the automotive Bluetooth interface from a black-box perspective (as technical specifications were loose or absent). Tests were performed through both the vehicle’s native connection and through Bluetoothenabled aftermarket devices attached to the vehicle. This framework is supported through the use of attack trees and principles as outlined in the Penetration Testing Execution Standard. Furthermore, a proof-of-concept tool was developed to implement this framework in a semi-automated manner, to carry out testing on real-world vehicles. The tool also allows for severity classification of the results acquired, as outlined in the SAE J3061 Cybersecurity Guidebook for Cyber-Physical Vehicle Systems. Results of the severity classification are validated through domain expert review. Finally, how formal methods could be integrated into the framework and tool to improve confidence and rigour, and to demonstrate how future iterations of design could be improved is also explored. In conclusion, there is a need for systematic security testing, based on the findings of the threat intelligence study. The systematic evaluation and the developed tool successfully found weaknesses in both the automotive Bluetooth interface and in the vehicle itself through Bluetooth-enabled aftermarket devices. Furthermore, the results of applying this framework provide a focus for counter-measure development and could be used as evidence in a security assurance case. The systematic evaluation framework also allows for formal methods to be introduced for added rigour and confidence. Demonstrations of how this might be performed (with case studies) were presented. Future recommendations include using this framework with more test vehicles and expanding on the existing attack trees that form the heart of the evaluation. Further work on the tool chain would also be desirable. This would enable further accuracy of any testing or modelling required, and would also take automation of the entire process further

Improved Internet Security Protocols Using Cryptographic One-Way Hash Chains

In this dissertation, new approaches that utilize the one-way cryptographic hash functions in designing improved network security protocols are investigated. The proposed approaches are designed to be scalable and easy to implement in modern technology. The first contribution explores session cookies with emphasis on the threat of session hijacking attacks resulting from session cookie theft or sniffing. In the proposed scheme, these cookies are replaced by easily computed authentication credentials using Lamport\u27s well-known one-time passwords. The basic idea in this scheme revolves around utilizing sparse caching units, where authentication credentials pertaining to cookies are stored and fetched once needed, thereby, mitigating computational overhead generally associated with one-way hash constructions. The second and third proposed schemes rely on dividing the one-way hash construction into a hierarchical two-tier construction. Each tier component is responsible for some aspect of authentication generated by using two different hash functions. By utilizing different cryptographic hash functions arranged in two tiers, the hierarchical two-tier protocol (our second contribution) gives significant performance improvement over previously proposed solutions for securing Internet cookies. Through indexing authentication credentials by their position within the hash chain in a multi-dimensional chain, the third contribution achieves improved performance. In the fourth proposed scheme, an attempt is made to apply the one-way hash construction to achieve user and broadcast authentication in wireless sensor networks. Due to known energy and memory constraints, the one-way hash scheme is modified to mitigate computational overhead so it can be easily applied in this particular setting. The fifth scheme tries to reap the benefits of the sparse cache-supported scheme and the hierarchical scheme. The resulting hybrid approach achieves efficient performance at the lowest cost of caching possible. In the sixth proposal, an authentication scheme tailored for the multi-server single sign-on (SSO) environment is presented. The scheme utilizes the one-way hash construction in a Merkle Hash Tree and a hash calendar to avoid impersonation and session hijacking attacks. The scheme also explores the optimal configuration of the one-way hash chain in this particular environment. All the proposed protocols are validated by extensive experimental analyses. These analyses are obtained by running simulations depicting the many scenarios envisioned. Additionally, these simulations are supported by relevant analytical models derived by mathematical formulas taking into consideration the environment under investigation

Securing the in-vehicle network

Recent research into automotive security has shown that once a single electronic vehicle component is compromised, it is possible to take control of the vehicle. These components, called Electronic Control Units, are embedded systems which manage a significant part of the functionality of a modern car. They communicate with each other via the in-vehicle network, known as the Controller Area Network, which is the most widely used automotive bus. In this thesis, we introduce a series of novel proposals to improve the security of both the Controller Area Network bus and the Electronic Control Units. The Controller Area Network suffers from a number of shortfalls, one of which is the lack of source authentication. We propose a protocol that mitigates this fundamental shortcoming in the Controller Area Network bus design, and protects against a number of high profile media attacks that have been published. We derive a set of desirable security and compatibility properties which an authentication protocol for the Controller Area Network bus should possess. We evaluate our protocol, along with other proposed protocols in the literature, with respect to the defined properties. Our systematic analysis of the protocols allows the automotive industry to make an informed choice regarding the adoption suitability of these solutions. However, it is not only the communication of Electronic Control Units that needs to be secure, but the firmware running on them as well. The growing number of Electronic Control Units in a vehicle, together with their increasing complexity, prompts the need for automated tools to test their security. Part of the challenge in designing such a tool is the diversity of Electronic Control Unit architectures. To this end, this thesis presents a methodology for extracting the Control Flow Graph from the Electronic Control Unit firmware. The Control Flow Graph is a platform independent representation of the firmware control flow, allowing us to abstract from the underlying architecture. We present a fuzzer for Electronic Control Unit firmware fuzz-testing via Controller Area Network. The extracted Control Flow Graph is tagged with static data used in instructions which influence the control flow of the firmware. It is then used to create a set of input seeds for the fuzzer, and in altering the inputs during the fuzzing process. This approach represents a step towards an efficient fuzzing methodology for Electronic Control Units. To our knowledge, this is the first proposal that uses static analysis to guide the fuzzing of Electronic Control Units

Project BeARCAT : Baselining, Automation and Response for CAV Testbed Cyber Security : Connected Vehicle & Infrastructure Security Assessment

Connected, software-based systems are a driver in advancing the technology of transportation systems. Advanced automated and autonomous vehicles, together with electrification, will help reduce congestion, accidents and emissions. Meanwhile, vehicle manufacturers see advanced technology as enhancing their products in a competitive market. However, as many decades of using home and enterprise computer systems have shown, connectivity allows a system to become a target for criminal intentions. Cyber-based threats to any system are a problem; in transportation, there is the added safety implication of dealing with moving vehicles and the passengers within

Implementing Cryptographic Hash Functions on CAN Bus

This project is a proof-of-concept for the use of cryptography on the Controller Area Network in automotive vehicles as a message verification standard. The project was implemented by creating four electrical control units that could implement the behavior of a car on a physical CAN Harness