A formulation and analysis of combat games

Combat which is formulated as a dynamical encounter between two opponents, each of whom has offensive capabilities and objectives is outlined. A target set is associated with each opponent in the event space in which he endeavors to terminate the combat, thereby winning. If the combat terminates in both target sets simultaneously, or in neither, a joint capture or a draw, respectively, occurs. Resolution of the encounter is formulated as a combat game; as a pair of competing event constrained differential games. If exactly one of the players can win, the optimal strategies are determined from a resulting constrained zero sum differential game. Otherwise the optimal strategies are computed from a resulting nonzero sum game. Since optimal combat strategies may frequently not exist, approximate or delta combat games are also formulated leading to approximate or delta optimal strategies. The turret game is used to illustrate combat games. This game is sufficiently complex to exhibit a rich variety of combat behavior, much of which is not found in pursuit evasion games

A formulation and analysis of combat games

Combat is formulated as a dynamical encounter between two opponents, each of whom has offensive capabilities and objectives. With each opponent is associated a target in the event space in which he endeavors to terminate the combat, thereby winning. If the combat terminates in both target sets simultaneously or in neither, a joint capture or a draw, respectively, is said to occur. Resolution of the encounter is formulated as a combat game; namely, as a pair of competing event-constrained differential games. If exactly one of the players can win, the optimal strategies are determined from a resulting constrained zero-sum differential game. Otherwise the optimal strategies are computed from a resulting non-zero-sum game. Since optimal combat strategies frequencies may not exist, approximate of delta-combat games are also formulated leading to approximate or delta-optimal strategies. To illustrate combat games, an example, called the turret game, is considered. This game may be thought of as a highly simplified model of air combat, yet it is sufficiently complex to exhibit a rich variety of combat behavior, much of which is not found in pursuit-evasion games

Cooperative Pursuit with Multi-Pursuer and One Faster Free-moving Evader

This paper addresses a multi-pursuer single-evader pursuit-evasion game where the free-moving evader moves faster than the pursuers. Most of the existing works impose constraints on the faster evader such as limited moving area and moving direction. When the faster evader is allowed to move freely without any constraint, the main issues are how to form an encirclement to trap the evader into the capture domain, how to balance between forming an encirclement and approaching the faster evader, and what conditions make the capture possible. In this paper, a distributed pursuit algorithm is proposed to enable pursuers to form an encirclement and approach the faster evader. An algorithm that balances between forming an encirclement and approaching the faster evader is proposed. Moreover, sufficient capture conditions are derived based on the initial spatial distribution and the speed ratios of the pursuers and the evader. Simulation and experimental results on ground robots validate the effectiveness and practicability of the proposed method

Nonlinear zero-sum differential game analysis by singular perturbation methods

A class of nonlinear, zero-sum differential games, exhibiting time-scale separation properties, can be analyzed by singular-perturbation techniques. The merits of such an analysis, leading to an approximate game solution, as well as the 'well-posedness' of the formulation, are discussed. This approach is shown to be attractive for investigating pursuit-evasion problems; the original multidimensional differential game is decomposed to a 'simple pursuit' (free-stream) game and two independent (boundary-layer) optimal-control problems. Using multiple time-scale boundary-layer models results in a pair of uniformly valid zero-order composite feedback strategies. The dependence of suboptimal strategies on relative geometry and own-state measurements is demonstrated by a three dimensional, constant-speed example. For game analysis with realistic vehicle dynamics, the technique of forced singular perturbations and a variable modeling approach is proposed. Accuracy of the analysis is evaluated by comparison with the numerical solution of a time-optimal, variable-speed 'game of two cars' in the horizontal plane