A formulation and analysis of combat games

Abstract

Combat is formulated as a dynamical encounter between two opponents, each of whom has offensive capabilities and objectives. With each opponent is associated a target in the event space in which he endeavors to terminate the combat, thereby winning. If the combat terminates in both target sets simultaneously or in neither, a joint capture or a draw, respectively, is said to occur. Resolution of the encounter is formulated as a combat game; namely, as a pair of competing event-constrained differential games. If exactly one of the players can win, the optimal strategies are determined from a resulting constrained zero-sum differential game. Otherwise the optimal strategies are computed from a resulting non-zero-sum game. Since optimal combat strategies frequencies may not exist, approximate of delta-combat games are also formulated leading to approximate or delta-optimal strategies. To illustrate combat games, an example, called the turret game, is considered. This game may be thought of as a highly simplified model of air combat, yet it is sufficiently complex to exhibit a rich variety of combat behavior, much of which is not found in pursuit-evasion games