Extensional and Intensional Strategies

This paper is a contribution to the theoretical foundations of strategies. We first present a general definition of abstract strategies which is extensional in the sense that a strategy is defined explicitly as a set of derivations of an abstract reduction system. We then move to a more intensional definition supporting the abstract view but more operational in the sense that it describes a means for determining such a set. We characterize the class of extensional strategies that can be defined intensionally. We also give some hints towards a logical characterization of intensional strategies and propose a few challenging perspectives

Subjects, Models, Languages, Transformations

Discussions about model-driven approaches tend to be hampered by terminological confusion. This is at least partially caused by a lack of formal precision in defining the basic concepts, including that of "model" and "thing being modelled" - which we call subject in this paper. We propose a minimal criterion that a model should fulfill: essentially, it should come equipped with a clear and unambiguous membership test; in other words, a notion of which subjects it models. We then go on to discuss a certain class of models of models that we call languages, which apart from defining their own membership test also determine membership of their members. Finally, we introduce transformations on each of these layers: a subject transformation is essentially a pair of subjects, a model transformation is both a pair of models and a model of pairs (namely, subject transformations), and a language transformation is both a pair of languages and a language of model transformations. We argue that our framework has the benefits of formal precision (there can be no doubt about whether something satifies our criteria for being a model, a language or a transformation) and minimality (it is hard to imagine a case of modelling or transformation not having the characterstics that we propose)

Modal Ω-Logic: Automata, Neo-Logicism, and Set-Theoretic Realism

This essay examines the philosophical significance of $\Omega$-logic in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with choice (ZFC). The duality between coalgebra and algebra permits Boolean-valued algebraic models of ZFC to be interpreted as coalgebras. The modal profile of $\Omega$-logical validity can then be countenanced within a coalgebraic logic, and $\Omega$-logical validity can be defined via deterministic automata. I argue that the philosophical significance of the foregoing is two-fold. First, because the epistemic and modal profiles of $\Omega$-logical validity correspond to those of second-order logical consequence, $\Omega$-logical validity is genuinely logical, and thus vindicates a neo-logicist conception of mathematical truth in the set-theoretic multiverse. Second, the foregoing provides a modal-computational account of the interpretation of mathematical vocabulary, adducing in favor of a realist conception of the cumulative hierarchy of sets

Coinductive Formal Reasoning in Exact Real Arithmetic

In this article we present a method for formally proving the correctness of the lazy algorithms for computing homographic and quadratic transformations -- of which field operations are special cases-- on a representation of real numbers by coinductive streams. The algorithms work on coinductive stream of M\"{o}bius maps and form the basis of the Edalat--Potts exact real arithmetic. We use the machinery of the Coq proof assistant for the coinductive types to present the formalisation. The formalised algorithms are only partially productive, i.e., they do not output provably infinite streams for all possible inputs. We show how to deal with this partiality in the presence of syntactic restrictions posed by the constructive type theory of Coq. Furthermore we show that the type theoretic techniques that we develop are compatible with the semantics of the algorithms as continuous maps on real numbers. The resulting Coq formalisation is available for public download.Comment: 40 page

Property Theories

Revised and reprinted; originally in Dov Gabbay & Franz Guenthner (eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Volume IV. Kluwer 133-251. -- Two sorts of property theory are distinguished, those dealing with intensional contexts property abstracts (infinitive and gerundive phrases) and proposition abstracts (‘that’-clauses) and those dealing with predication (or instantiation) relations. The first is deemed to be epistemologically more primary, for “the argument from intensional logic” is perhaps the best argument for the existence of properties. This argument is presented in the course of discussing generality, quantifying-in, learnability, referential semantics, nominalism, conceptualism, realism, type-freedom, the first-order/higher-order controversy, names, indexicals, descriptions, Mates’ puzzle, and the paradox of analysis. Two first-order intensional logics are then formulated. Finally, fixed-point type-free theories of predication are discussed, especially their relation to the question whether properties may be identified with propositional functions