A New Approach to Electricity Market Clearing With Uniform Purchase Price and Curtailable Block Orders

The European market clearing problem is characterized by a set of heterogeneous orders and rules that force the implementation of heuristic and iterative solving methods. In particular, curtailable block orders and the uniform purchase price (UPP) pose serious difficulties. A block is an order that spans over multiple hours, and can be either fully accepted or fully rejected. The UPP prescribes that all consumers pay a common price, i.e., the UPP, in all the zones, while producers receive zonal prices, which can differ from one zone to another. The market clearing problem in the presence of both the UPP and block orders is a major open issue in the European context. The UPP scheme leads to a non-linear optimization problem involving both primal and dual variables, whereas block orders introduce multi-temporal constraints and binary variables into the problem. As a consequence, the market clearing problem in the presence of both blocks and the UPP can be regarded as a non-linear integer programming problem involving both primal and dual variables with complementary and multi-temporal constraints. The aim of this paper is to present a non-iterative and heuristic-free approach for solving the market clearing problem in the presence of both curtailable block orders and the UPP. The solution is exact, with no approximation up to the level of resolution of current market data. By resorting to an equivalent UPP formulation, the proposed approach results in a mixed-integer linear program, which is built starting from a non-linear integer bilevel programming problem. Numerical results using real market data are reported to show the effectiveness of the proposed approach. The model has been implemented in Python, and the code is freely available on a public repository.Comment: 15 pages, 7 figure

A compensation-based pricing scheme in marketswith non-convexities

A compensation-based pricing scheme is a market clearing mechanism that may be applied when a uniform, linear pricing scheme cannot support equilibrium allocations in the auction markets. We analyze extensions of our previously proposed pricing scheme [14] to include various possible representations of bids that reflect some non-convex costs and constraints. We conclude with a discussion on directions for future research.auction design, electricity market, non-convex bids, minimum profit condition, unit commitment constraints

Comments on the RGGI Market Design

Auctions, carbon auctions, greenhouse gas auctions

Distributed Stochastic Market Clearing with High-Penetration Wind Power

Integrating renewable energy into the modern power grid requires risk-cognizant dispatch of resources to account for the stochastic availability of renewables. Toward this goal, day-ahead stochastic market clearing with high-penetration wind energy is pursued in this paper based on the DC optimal power flow (OPF). The objective is to minimize the social cost which consists of conventional generation costs, end-user disutility, as well as a risk measure of the system re-dispatching cost. Capitalizing on the conditional value-at-risk (CVaR), the novel model is able to mitigate the potentially high risk of the recourse actions to compensate wind forecast errors. The resulting convex optimization task is tackled via a distribution-free sample average based approximation to bypass the prohibitively complex high-dimensional integration. Furthermore, to cope with possibly large-scale dispatchable loads, a fast distributed solver is developed with guaranteed convergence using the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM). Numerical results tested on a modified benchmark system are reported to corroborate the merits of the novel framework and proposed approaches.Comment: To appear in IEEE Transactions on Power Systems; 12 pages and 9 figure

Probabilistic Model and Solution Algorithm for the Electricity Retailers in the Italian Market

The paper considers the problem of maximizing the profits of a retailer operating in the Italian electricity market. The problem consists in selecting the contracts portfolio and in defining the bidding strategy in the wholesales market while respecting the technical and regulatory constraints. A novel solution method based on a enhanced discovery of the search domain in the simulated annealing technique has been developed for its solution and a set of realistic test problems have been generated for its validation. The experimental results show that our method outperforms the standard simulated annealing by an improvement gap of 20,48% in average

Scenario-based Economic Dispatch with Uncertain Demand Response

This paper introduces a new computational framework to account for uncertainties in day-ahead electricity market clearing process in the presence of demand response providers. A central challenge when dealing with many demand response providers is the uncertainty of its realization. In this paper, a new economic dispatch framework that is based on the recent theoretical development of the scenario approach is introduced. By removing samples from a finite uncertainty set, this approach improves dispatch performance while guaranteeing a quantifiable risk level with respect to the probability of violating the constraints. The theoretical bound on the level of risk is shown to be a function of the number of scenarios removed. This is appealing to the system operator for the following reasons: (1) the improvement of performance comes at the cost of a quantifiable level of violation probability in the constraints; (2) the violation upper bound does not depend on the probability distribution assumption of the uncertainty in demand response. Numerical simulations on (1) 3-bus and (2) IEEE 14-bus system (3) IEEE 118-bus system suggest that this approach could be a promising alternative in future electricity markets with multiple demand response providers

FlexAuc: Serving Dynamic Demands in a Spectrum Trading Market with Flexible Auction

In secondary spectrum trading markets, auctions are widely used by spectrum holders (SHs) to redistribute their unused channels to secondary wireless service providers (WSPs). As sellers, the SHs design proper auction schemes to stimulate more participants and maximize the revenue from the auction. As buyers, the WSPs determine the bidding strategies in the auction to better serve their end users. In this paper, we consider a three-layered spectrum trading market consisting of the SH, the WSPs and the end users. We jointly study the strategies of the three parties. The SH determines the auction scheme and spectrum supplies to optimize its revenue. The WSPs have flexible bidding strategies in terms of both demands and valuations considering the strategies of the end users. We design FlexAuc, a novel auction mechanism for this market to enable dynamic supplies and demands in the auction. We prove theoretically that FlexAuc not only maximizes the social welfare but also preserves other nice properties such as truthfulness and computational tractability.Comment: 11 pages, 7 figures, Preliminary version accepted in INFOCOM 201