Optimal Attack against Cyber-Physical Control Systems with Reactive Attack Mitigation

This paper studies the performance and resilience of a cyber-physical control system (CPCS) with attack detection and reactive attack mitigation. It addresses the problem of deriving an optimal sequence of false data injection attacks that maximizes the state estimation error of the system. The results provide basic understanding about the limit of the attack impact. The design of the optimal attack is based on a Markov decision process (MDP) formulation, which is solved efficiently using the value iteration method. Using the proposed framework, we quantify the effect of false positives and mis-detections on the system performance, which can help the joint design of the attack detection and mitigation. To demonstrate the use of the proposed framework in a real-world CPCS, we consider the voltage control system of power grids, and run extensive simulations using PowerWorld, a high-fidelity power system simulator, to validate our analysis. The results show that by carefully designing the attack sequence using our proposed approach, the attacker can cause a large deviation of the bus voltages from the desired setpoint. Further, the results verify the optimality of the derived attack sequence and show that, to cause maximum impact, the attacker must carefully craft his attack to strike a balance between the attack magnitude and stealthiness, due to the simultaneous presence of attack detection and mitigation

Towards a minimal order distributed observer for linear systems

In this paper we consider the distributed estimation problem for continuous-time linear time-invariant (LTI) systems. A single linear plant is observed by a network of local observers. Each local observer in the network has access to only part of the output of the observed system, but can also receive information on the state estimates of its neigbours. Each local observer should in this way generate an estimate of the plant state. In this paper we study the problem of existence of a reduced order distributed observer. We show that if the observed system is observable and the network graph is a strongly connected directed graph, then a distributed observer exists with state space dimension equal to $Nn - \sum_{i =1}^N p_i$, where $N$ is the number of network nodes, $n$ is the state space dimension of the observed plant, and $p_i$ is the rank of the output matrix of the observed output received by the $i$th local observer. In the case of a single observer, this result specializes to the well-known minimal order observer in classical observer design.Comment: 12 pages, 1 figur

An Unknown Input Multi-Observer Approach for Estimation, Attack Isolation, and Control of LTI Systems under Actuator Attacks

We address the problem of state estimation, attack isolation, and control for discrete-time Linear Time Invariant (LTI) systems under (potentially unbounded) actuator false data injection attacks. Using a bank of Unknown Input Observers (UIOs), each observer leading to an exponentially stable estimation error in the attack-free case, we propose an estimator that provides exponential estimates of the system state and the attack signals when a sufficiently small number of actuators are attacked. We use these estimates to control the system and isolate actuator attacks. Simulations results are presented to illustrate the performance of the results