Improving BitTorrent's Peer Selection For Multimedia Content On-Demand Delivery

The great efficiency achieved by the BitTorrent protocol for the distribution of large amounts of data inspired its adoption to provide multimedia content on-demand delivery over the Internet. As it is not designed for this purpose, some adjustments have been proposed in order to meet the related QoS requirements like low startup delay and smooth playback continuity. Accordingly, this paper introduces a BitTorrent-like proposal named as Quota-Based Peer Selection (QBPS). This proposal is mainly based on the adaptation of the original peer-selection policy of the BitTorrent protocol. Its validation is achieved by means of simulations and competitive analysis. The final results show that QBPS outperforms other recent proposals of the literature. For instance, it achieves a throughput optimization of up to 48.0% in low-provision capacity scenarios where users are very interactive.Comment: International Journal of Computer Networks & Communications(IJCNC) Vol.7, No.6, November 201

Collusion in Peer-to-Peer Systems

Peer-to-peer systems have reached a widespread use, ranging from academic and industrial applications to home entertainment. The key advantage of this paradigm lies in its scalability and flexibility, consequences of the participants sharing their resources for the common welfare. Security in such systems is a desirable goal. For example, when mission-critical operations or bank transactions are involved, their effectiveness strongly depends on the perception that users have about the system dependability and trustworthiness. A major threat to the security of these systems is the phenomenon of collusion. Peers can be selfish colluders, when they try to fool the system to gain unfair advantages over other peers, or malicious, when their purpose is to subvert the system or disturb other users. The problem, however, has received so far only a marginal attention by the research community. While several solutions exist to counter attacks in peer-to-peer systems, very few of them are meant to directly counter colluders and their attacks. Reputation, micro-payments, and concepts of game theory are currently used as the main means to obtain fairness in the usage of the resources. Our goal is to provide an overview of the topic by examining the key issues involved. We measure the relevance of the problem in the current literature and the effectiveness of existing philosophies against it, to suggest fruitful directions in the further development of the field

Analyzing Peer Selection Policies for BitTorrent Multimedia On-Demand Streaming Systems in Internet

The adaptation of the BitTorrent protocol to multimedia on-demand streaming systems essentially lies on the modification of its two core algorithms, namely the piece and the peer selection policies, respectively. Much more attention has though been given to the piece selection policy. Within this context, this article proposes three novel peer selection policies for the design of BitTorrent-like protocols targeted at that type of systems: Select Balanced Neighbour Policy (SBNP), Select Regular Neighbour Policy (SRNP), and Select Optimistic Neighbour Policy (SONP). These proposals are validated through a competitive analysis based on simulations which encompass a variety of multimedia scenarios, defined in function of important characterization parameters such as content type, content size, and client interactivity profile. Service time, number of clients served and efficiency retrieving coefficient are the performance metrics assessed in the analysis. The final results mainly show that the novel proposals constitute scalable solutions that may be considered for real project designs. Lastly, future work is included in the conclusion of this paper.Comment: 19 PAGE

An Economic Theory of Academic Engagement Norms: The Struggle for Popularity and Normative Hegemony in Secondary Schools

[Excerpt] Why and how do groups create norms? Kenneth Arrow proposed that “norms of social behavior, including ethical and moral codes, ….are reactions of society to compensate for market failure”. This internalize the real externalities explanation for norms is also standard among rational choice theorists in sociology. The situation becomes more complex when we recognize some actions create positive externalities for some individuals and negative externalities for others. Often this results in no norm being established. However, sometimes one segment of a social system has normative hegemony and enforces norms that enhance their power and prestige at the expense of other groups. Norms regarding caste in India, for example, were functional for Brahmins but humiliating for Harijans. Caste and status norms of this type will also be referred to as “Honor us; Not them” norms. Such norms arise when one group is much more powerful (has greater ability to enforce their preferred social norm) than other groups and it imposes its will on others. An additional requirement is that the people who oppose the norm established by the dominant group must be unable or unwilling to leave the social system in which the norm operates

Is Content Publishing in BitTorrent Altruistic or Profit-Driven

BitTorrent is the most popular P2P content delivery application where individual users share various type of content with tens of thousands of other users. The growing popularity of BitTorrent is primarily due to the availability of valuable content without any cost for the consumers. However, apart from required resources, publishing (sharing) valuable (and often copyrighted) content has serious legal implications for user who publish the material (or publishers). This raises a question that whether (at least major) content publishers behave in an altruistic fashion or have other incentives such as financial. In this study, we identify the content publishers of more than 55k torrents in 2 major BitTorrent portals and examine their behavior. We demonstrate that a small fraction of publishers are responsible for 66% of published content and 75% of the downloads. Our investigations reveal that these major publishers respond to two different profiles. On one hand, antipiracy agencies and malicious publishers publish a large amount of fake files to protect copyrighted content and spread malware respectively. On the other hand, content publishing in BitTorrent is largely driven by companies with financial incentive. Therefore, if these companies lose their interest or are unable to publish content, BitTorrent traffic/portals may disappear or at least their associated traffic will significantly reduce