Optimal Linear Precoding Strategies for Wideband Non-Cooperative Systems based on Game Theory-Part II: Algorithms

In this two-part paper, we address the problem of finding the optimal precoding/multiplexing scheme for a set of non-cooperative links sharing the same physical resources, e.g., time and bandwidth. We consider two alternative optimization problems: P.1) the maximization of mutual information on each link, given constraints on the transmit power and spectral mask; and P.2) the maximization of the transmission rate on each link, using finite order constellations, under the same constraints as in P.1, plus a constraint on the maximum average error probability on each link. Aiming at finding decentralized strategies, we adopted as optimality criterion the achievement of a Nash equilibrium and thus we formulated both problems P.1 and P.2 as strategic noncooperative (matrix-valued) games. In Part I of this two-part paper, after deriving the optimal structure of the linear transceivers for both games, we provided a unified set of sufficient conditions that guarantee the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. In this Part II, we focus on the achievement of the equilibrium and propose alternative distributed iterative algorithms that solve both games. Specifically, the new proposed algorithms are the following: 1) the sequential and simultaneous iterative waterfilling based algorithms, incorporating spectral mask constraints; 2) the sequential and simultaneous gradient projection based algorithms, establishing an interesting link with variational inequality problems. Our main contribution is to provide sufficient conditions for the global convergence of all the proposed algorithms which, although derived under stronger constraints, incorporating for example spectral mask constraints, have a broader validity than the convergence conditions known in the current literature for the sequential iterative waterfilling algorithm.Comment: Paper submitted to IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, February 22, 2006. Revised March 26, 2007. Accepted June 5, 2007. To appear on IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, 200

Learning Equilibria with Partial Information in Decentralized Wireless Networks

In this article, a survey of several important equilibrium concepts for decentralized networks is presented. The term decentralized is used here to refer to scenarios where decisions (e.g., choosing a power allocation policy) are taken autonomously by devices interacting with each other (e.g., through mutual interference). The iterative long-term interaction is characterized by stable points of the wireless network called equilibria. The interest in these equilibria stems from the relevance of network stability and the fact that they can be achieved by letting radio devices to repeatedly interact over time. To achieve these equilibria, several learning techniques, namely, the best response dynamics, fictitious play, smoothed fictitious play, reinforcement learning algorithms, and regret matching, are discussed in terms of information requirements and convergence properties. Most of the notions introduced here, for both equilibria and learning schemes, are illustrated by a simple case study, namely, an interference channel with two transmitter-receiver pairs.Comment: 16 pages, 5 figures, 1 table. To appear in IEEE Communication Magazine, special Issue on Game Theor

Energy-Aware Competitive Power Allocation for Heterogeneous Networks Under QoS Constraints

This work proposes a distributed power allocation scheme for maximizing energy efficiency in the uplink of orthogonal frequency-division multiple access (OFDMA)-based heterogeneous networks (HetNets). The user equipment (UEs) in the network are modeled as rational agents that engage in a non-cooperative game where each UE allocates its available transmit power over the set of assigned subcarriers so as to maximize its individual utility (defined as the user's throughput per Watt of transmit power) subject to minimum-rate constraints. In this framework, the relevant solution concept is that of Debreu equilibrium, a generalization of Nash equilibrium which accounts for the case where an agent's set of possible actions depends on the actions of its opponents. Since the problem at hand might not be feasible, Debreu equilibria do not always exist. However, using techniques from fractional programming, we provide a characterization of equilibrial power allocation profiles when they do exist. In particular, Debreu equilibria are found to be the fixed points of a water-filling best response operator whose water level is a function of minimum rate constraints and circuit power. Moreover, we also describe a set of sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of Debreu equilibria exploiting the contraction properties of the best response operator. This analysis provides the necessary tools to derive a power allocation scheme that steers the network to equilibrium in an iterative and distributed manner without the need for any centralized processing. Numerical simulations are then used to validate the analysis and assess the performance of the proposed algorithm as a function of the system parameters.Comment: 37 pages, 12 figures, to appear IEEE Trans. Wireless Commu