Competitive Charging Station Pricing for Plug-in Electric Vehicles

This paper considers the problem of charging station pricing and plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) station selection. When a PEV needs to be charged, it selects a charging station by considering the charging prices, waiting times, and travel distances. Each charging station optimizes its charging price based on the prediction of the PEVs' charging station selection decisions and the other station's pricing decision, in order to maximize its profit. To obtain insights of such a highly coupled system, we consider a one-dimensional system with two competing charging stations and Poisson arriving PEVs. We propose a multi-leader-multi-follower Stackelberg game model, in which the charging stations (leaders) announce their charging prices in Stage I, and the PEVs (followers) make their charging station selections in Stage II. We show that there always exists a unique charging station selection equilibrium in Stage II, and such equilibrium depends on the charging stations' service capacities and the price difference between them. We then characterize the sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the pricing equilibrium in Stage I. We also develop a low complexity algorithm that efficiently computes the pricing equilibrium and the subgame perfect equilibrium of the two-stage Stackelberg game.Comment: 15 pages, 21 figure

Prospects of electric vehicles in the developing countries : a literature review

Electric mobility offers a low cost of travel along with energy and harmful emissions savings. Nevertheless, a comprehensive literature review is missing for the prospects of electric vehicles in developing countries. Such an overview would be instrumental for policymakers to understand the barriers and opportunities related to different types of electric vehicles (EVs). Considering the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-analysis (PRISMA) guidelines, a systematic review was performed of the electronic databases Google Scholar and Web of Science for the years 2010–2020. The electric four-wheelers, hybrid electric vehicles and electric two-wheeler constituted the electric vehicles searched in the databases. Initially, 35 studies identified in the Web of Science that matched the criteria were studied. Later, 105 other relevant reports and articles related to barriers and opportunities were found by using Google Scholar and studied. Results reveal that electric four-wheelers are not a feasible option in developing countries due to their high purchase price. On the contrary, electric two-wheelers may be beneficial as they come with a lower purchase price

Fast Charging Stations: Simulating Entry and Location in a Game of Strategic Interaction [WP]

This paper uses a game of strategic interaction to simulate entry and location of fast charging stations for electric vehicles. It evaluates the equilibria obtained in terms of social welfare and firm spatial differentiation. Using Barcelona mobility survey, demographic data and the street graph we find that only at an electric vehicle penetration rate above 3% does a dense network of stations appear as the equilibrium outcome of a market with no fiscal transfers. We also find that price competition drives location differentiation measured not only in Euclidean distances but also in consumer travel distances

Fast Charging Stations: Simulating Entry and Location in a Game of Strategic Interaction

This paper uses a game of strategic interaction to simulate entry and location of fast charging stations for electric vehicles. It evaluates the equilibria obtained in terms of social welfare and firm spatial differentiation. Using Barcelona mobility survey, demographic data and the street graph we find that only at an electric vehicle penetration rate above 3% does a dense network of stations appear as the equilibrium outcome of a market with no fiscal transfers. We also find that price competition drives location differentiation measured not only in Euclidean distances but also in consumer travel distances

Sharing economy of electric vehicle private charge posts

The increasing popularity of electric vehicles (EVs) leads to heightened demand for the charging infrastructure. More and more EV drivers install private charge posts, which can now be shared with others through certain mobile apps. This emerging phenomenon is becoming a prominent part of the sharing economy. To examine the impacts of post sharing on EV charging market, this study establishes game theory models on consumer choices among private, public, and shared options. Such peer-to-peer sharing and collaborative consumption redistribute the installation and operation costs of private charge posts in proportion to their increased utilization. Numerical analyses suggest that the sharing mode provides a win-win solution for charge post owners and non-owner consumers, as well as electricity distributors and public charging infrastructure operators. In the case of China, the estimated saving for charge post owners is between 20% and 50%, which can be translated into more non-government investment in the EV industry chain. The findings provide supporting evidence for policy-makers to promote private charge post sharing, especially with certain consumer subsidization at a reasonable level

Generalized Wardrop Equilibrium for Charging Station Selection and Route Choice of Electric Vehicles in Joint Power Distribution and Transportation Networks

This paper presents the equilibrium analysis of a game composed of heterogeneous electric vehicles (EVs) and a power distribution system operator (DSO) as the players, and charging station operators (CSOs) and a transportation network operator (TNO) as coordinators. Each EV tries to pick a charging station as its destination and a route to get there at the same time. However, the traffic and electrical load congestion on the roads and charging stations lead to the interdependencies between the optimal decisions of EVs. CSOs and the TNO need to apply some tolling to control such congestion. On the other hand, the pricing at charging stations depends on real-time distributional locational marginal pricing, which is determined by the DSO after solving the optimal power flow over the power distribution network. This paper also takes into account the local and the coupling/infrastructure constraints of EVs, transportation and distribution networks. This problem is modeled as a generalized aggregative game, and then a decentralized learning method is proposed to obtain an equilibrium point of the game, which is known as variational generalized Wardrop equilibrium. The existence of such an equilibrium point and the convergence of the proposed algorithm to it are proven. We undertake numerical studies on the Savannah city model and the IEEE 33-bus distribution network and investigate the impact of various characteristics on demand and prices

Strategies for shifting technological systems : the case of the automobile system

Californian and Dutch efforts to produce electric vehicles are explored and compared. Three strategies are put forward that could turn electric vehicles from an elusive legend, a plaything, into a marketable product: technology forcing creating a market of early promises, experiments geared towards niche development and upscaling (strategic niche management), and the creation of new alliances (technological nexus) which bring technology, the market, regulation and many other factors together. These strategies deployed in the Californian and Dutch context are analysed in detail to explore their relative strengths and weaknesses and to argue in the end that a combined use of all three will increase the chances that the dominant technological system will change. The succesful workings of these strategies crucially depend on the coupling of the variation and selection processes, building blocks for any evolutionary theory of technical change. Evolutionary theory lacks understanding of these coupling processes. Building on recent insights from the sociology of technology, the authors propose a quasi-evolutionary model which underpins the analysis of suggested strategies