A new paradigm based on agents applied to free-hand sketch recognition

Important advances in natural calligraphic interfaces for CAD (Computer Aided Design) applications are being achieved, enabling the development of CAS (Computer Aided Sketching) devices that allow facing up to the conceptual design phase of a product. Recognizers play an important role in this field, allowing the interpretation of the user’s intention, but they still present some important lacks. This paper proposes a new recognition paradigm using an agent-based architecture that does not depend on the drawing sequence and takes context information into account to help decisions. Another improvement is the absence of operation modes, that is, no button is needed to distinguish geometry from symbols or gestures, and also “interspersing” and “overtracing” are accomplishedThe Spanish Ministry of Science and Education and the FEDER Funds, through the CUESKETCH project (Ref. DPI2007-66755-C02-01), partially supported this work.Fernández Pacheco, D.; Albert Gil, FE.; Aleixos Borrás, MN.; Conesa Pastor, J. (2012). A new paradigm based on agents applied to free-hand sketch recognition. Expert Systems with Applications. 39(8):7181-7195. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2012.01.063S7181719539

Complexity in city systems: Understanding, evolution, and design

6.4 Exemplars of complex systems There are many signatures of complexity revealed in the space-time patterning of cities (Batty, 2005) and here we will indicate three rather different but nevertheless linked exemplars. Our first deals with ..

Towards Practicality of Sketch-Based Visual Understanding

Sketches have been used to conceptualise and depict visual objects from pre-historic times. Sketch research has flourished in the past decade, particularly with the proliferation of touchscreen devices. Much of the utilisation of sketch has been anchored around the fact that it can be used to delineate visual concepts universally irrespective of age, race, language, or demography. The fine-grained interactive nature of sketches facilitates the application of sketches to various visual understanding tasks, like image retrieval, image-generation or editing, segmentation, 3D-shape modelling etc. However, sketches are highly abstract and subjective based on the perception of individuals. Although most agree that sketches provide fine-grained control to the user to depict a visual object, many consider sketching a tedious process due to their limited sketching skills compared to other query/support modalities like text/tags. Furthermore, collecting fine-grained sketch-photo association is a significant bottleneck to commercialising sketch applications. Therefore, this thesis aims to progress sketch-based visual understanding towards more practicality.Comment: PhD thesis successfully defended by Ayan Kumar Bhunia, Supervisor: Prof. Yi-Zhe Song, Thesis Examiners: Prof Stella Yu and Prof Adrian Hilto

Husserl’s Concept of the ‘Transcendental Person’: Another Look at the Husserl–Heidegger Relationship

This paper offers a further look at Husserl’s late thought on the transcendental subject and the Husserl–Heidegger relationship. It attempts a reconstruction of how Husserl hoped to assert his own thoughts on subjectivity vis-à-vis Heidegger, while also pointing out where Husserl did not reach the new level that Heidegger attained. In his late manuscripts, Husserl employs the term ‘transcendental person’ to describe the transcendental ego in its fullest ‘concretion’. I maintain that although this concept is a consistent development of Husserl’s earlier analyses of constitution, Husserl was also defending himself against Heidegger, who criticized him for framing the subject in terms of transcendental ego rather than as Dasein. Husserl was convinced that he could successfully respond to Heidegger’s critique, but he did not grasp that Heidegger’s fundamental ontology was an immanent development, rather than a scathing criticism, of his own phenomenology

Methodological Anxiety: Heidegger on Moods and Emotions

In the context of a history of the emotions, Martin Heidegger presents an important and yet challenging case. He is important because he places emotional states, broadly construed, at the very heart of his philosophical methodology—in particular, anxiety and boredom. He is challenging because he is openly dismissive of the standard ontologies of emotions, and because he is largely uninterested in many of the canonical debates in which emotions figure. My aim in this chapter is to identify and critique the distinctive role which Heidegger allots to the emotions, focusing on Sein und Zeit's famous treatment of anxiety. Having outlined his position, I close by considering a number of challenges, both methodological and substantive, to Heidegger's approach