Security Management System for 4G Heterogeneous Networks

There is constant demand for the development of mobile networks to meet the service requirements of users, and their development is a significant topic of research. The current fourth generation (4G) of mobile networks are expected to provide high speed connections anywhere at any time. Various existing 4G architectures such as LTE and WiMax support only wireless technologies, while an alternative architecture, Y-Comm, has been proposed to combine both existing wired and wireless networks. Y-Comm seeks to meet the main service requirements of 4G by converging the existing networks, so that the user can get better service anywhere and at any time. One of the major characteristics of Y-Comm is heterogeneity, which means that networks with different topologies work together to provide seamless communication to the end user. However, this heterogeneity leads to technical issues which may compromise quality of service, vertical handover and security. Due to the convergence characteristic of Y-Comm, security is considered more significant than in the existing LTE and WiMax networks. These security concerns have motivated this research study to propose a novel security management system. The research aims to meet the security requirements of 4G mobile networks, e.g. preventing end user devices from being used as attack tools. This requirement has not been met clearly in previous studies of Y-Comm, but this study proposes a security management system which does this. This research follows the ITU-T recommendation M.3400 dealing with security violations within Y-Comm networks. It proposes a policy-based security management system to deal with events that trigger actions in the system and uses Ponder2 to implement it. The proposed system, located in the top layer of the Y-Comm architecture, interacts with components of Y-Comm to enforce the appropriate policies. Its four main components are the Intelligent Agent, the Security Engine, the Security Policies Database and the Security Administrator. These are represented in this research as managed objects to meet design considerations such as extensibility and modifiability. This research demonstrates that the proposed system meets the security requirements of the Y-Comm environment. Its deployment is possible with managed objects built with Ponder2 for all of the components of Y-Comm, which means that the security management system is able to prevent end user devices from being used as attack tools. It can also achieve other security goals of Y-Comm networks

Survey on detecting and preventing web application broken access control attacks

Web applications are an essential component of the current wide range of digital services proposition including financial and governmental services as well as social networking and communications. Broken access control vulnerabilities pose a huge risk to that echo system because they allow the attacker to circumvent the allocated permissions and rights and perform actions that he is not authorized to perform. This paper gives a broad survey of the current research progress on approaches used to detect access control vulnerabilities exploitations and attacks in web application components. It categorizes these approaches based on their key techniques and compares the different detection methods in addition to evaluating their strengths and weaknesses. We also spotted and elaborated on some exciting research gaps found in the current literature, Finally, the paper summarizes the general detection approaches and suggests potential research directions for the future

Towards understanding and mitigating attacks leveraging zero-day exploits

Zero-day vulnerabilities are unknown and therefore not addressed with the result that they can be exploited by attackers to gain unauthorised system access. In order to understand and mitigate against attacks leveraging zero-days or unknown techniques, it is necessary to study the vulnerabilities, exploits and attacks that make use of them. In recent years there have been a number of leaks publishing such attacks using various methods to exploit vulnerabilities. This research seeks to understand what types of vulnerabilities exist, why and how these are exploited, and how to defend against such attacks by either mitigating the vulnerabilities or the method / process of exploiting them. By moving beyond merely remedying the vulnerabilities to defences that are able to prevent or detect the actions taken by attackers, the security of the information system will be better positioned to deal with future unknown threats. An interesting finding is how attackers exploit moving beyond the observable bounds to circumvent security defences, for example, compromising syslog servers, or going down to lower system rings to gain access. However, defenders can counter this by employing defences that are external to the system preventing attackers from disabling them or removing collected evidence after gaining system access. Attackers are able to defeat air-gaps via the leakage of electromagnetic radiation as well as misdirect attribution by planting false artefacts for forensic analysis and attacking from third party information systems. They analyse the methods of other attackers to learn new techniques. An example of this is the Umbrage project whereby malware is analysed to decide whether it should be implemented as a proof of concept. Another important finding is that attackers respect defence mechanisms such as: remote syslog (e.g. firewall), core dump files, database auditing, and Tripwire (e.g. SlyHeretic). These defences all have the potential to result in the attacker being discovered. Attackers must either negate the defence mechanism or find unprotected targets. Defenders can use technologies such as encryption to defend against interception and man-in-the-middle attacks. They can also employ honeytokens and honeypots to alarm misdirect, slow down and learn from attackers. By employing various tactics defenders are able to increase their chance of detecting and time to react to attacks, even those exploiting hitherto unknown vulnerabilities. To summarize the information presented in this thesis and to show the practical importance thereof, an examination is presented of the NSA's network intrusion of the SWIFT organisation. It shows that the firewalls were exploited with remote code execution zerodays. This attack has a striking parallel in the approach used in the recent VPNFilter malware. If nothing else, the leaks provide information to other actors on how to attack and what to avoid. However, by studying state actors, we can gain insight into what other actors with fewer resources can do in the future

Shining Light On Shadow Stacks

Control-Flow Hijacking attacks are the dominant attack vector against C/C++ programs. Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) solutions mitigate these attacks on the forward edge,i.e., indirect calls through function pointers and virtual calls. Protecting the backward edge is left to stack canaries, which are easily bypassed through information leaks. Shadow Stacks are a fully precise mechanism for protecting backwards edges, and should be deployed with CFI mitigations. We present a comprehensive analysis of all possible shadow stack mechanisms along three axes: performance, compatibility, and security. For performance comparisons we use SPEC CPU2006, while security and compatibility are qualitatively analyzed. Based on our study, we renew calls for a shadow stack design that leverages a dedicated register, resulting in low performance overhead, and minimal memory overhead, but sacrifices compatibility. We present case studies of our implementation of such a design, Shadesmar, on Phoronix and Apache to demonstrate the feasibility of dedicating a general purpose register to a security monitor on modern architectures, and the deployability of Shadesmar. Our comprehensive analysis, including detailed case studies for our novel design, allows compiler designers and practitioners to select the correct shadow stack design for different usage scenarios.Comment: To Appear in IEEE Security and Privacy 201

Privacy-preserving and Privacy-attacking Approaches for Speech and Audio -- A Survey

In contemporary society, voice-controlled devices, such as smartphones and home assistants, have become pervasive due to their advanced capabilities and functionality. The always-on nature of their microphones offers users the convenience of readily accessing these devices. However, recent research and events have revealed that such voice-controlled devices are prone to various forms of malicious attacks, hence making it a growing concern for both users and researchers to safeguard against such attacks. Despite the numerous studies that have investigated adversarial attacks and privacy preservation for images, a conclusive study of this nature has not been conducted for the audio domain. Therefore, this paper aims to examine existing approaches for privacy-preserving and privacy-attacking strategies for audio and speech. To achieve this goal, we classify the attack and defense scenarios into several categories and provide detailed analysis of each approach. We also interpret the dissimilarities between the various approaches, highlight their contributions, and examine their limitations. Our investigation reveals that voice-controlled devices based on neural networks are inherently susceptible to specific types of attacks. Although it is possible to enhance the robustness of such models to certain forms of attack, more sophisticated approaches are required to comprehensively safeguard user privacy

Towards Modular and Flexible Access Control on Smart Mobile Devices

Smart mobile devices, such as smartphones and tablets, have become an integral part of our daily personal and professional lives. These devices are connected to a wide variety of Internet services and host a vast amount of applications, which access, store and process security- and privacy-sensitive data. A rich set of sensors, ranging from microphones and cameras to location and acceleration sensors, allows these applications and their back end services to reason about user behavior. Further, enterprise administrators integrate smart mobile devices into their IT infrastructures to enable comfortable work on the go. Unsurprisingly, this abundance of available high-quality information has made smart mobile devices an interesting target for attackers, and the number of malicious and privacy-intrusive applications has steadily been rising. Detection and mitigation of such malicious behavior are in focus of mobile security research today. In particular, the Android operating system has received special attention by both academia and industry due to its popularity and open-source character. Related work has scrutinized its security architecture, analyzed attack vectors and vulnerabilities and proposed a wide variety of security extensions. While these extensions have diverse goals, many of them constitute modifications of the Android operating system and extend its default permission-based access control model. However, they are not generic and only address specific security and privacy concerns. The goal of this dissertation is to provide generic and extensible system-centric access control architectures, which can serve as a solid foundation for the instantiation of use-case specific security extensions. In doing so, we enable security researchers, enterprise administrators and end users to design, deploy and distribute security extensions without further modification of the underlying operating system. To achieve this goal, we first analyze the mobile device ecosystem and discuss how Android's security architecture aims to address its inherent threats. We proceed to survey related work on Android security, focusing on system-centric security extensions, and derive a set of generic requirements for extensible access control architectures targeting smart mobile devices. We then present two extensible access control architectures, which address these requirements by providing policy-based and programmable interfaces for the instantiation of use-case specific security solutions. By implementing a set of practical use-cases, ranging from context-aware access control, dynamic application behavior analysis to isolation of security domains we demonstrate the advantages of system-centric access control architectures over application-layer approaches. Finally, we conclude this dissertation by discussing an alternative approach, which is based on application-layer deputies and can be deployed whenever practical limitations prohibit the deployment of system-centric solutions

Selecting Root Exploit Features Using Flying Animal-Inspired Decision

Malware is an application that executes malicious activities to a computer system, including mobile devices. Root exploit brings more damages among all types of malware because it is able to run in stealthy mode. It compromises the nucleus of the operating system known as kernel to bypass the Android security mechanisms. Once it attacks and resides in the kernel, it is able to install other possible types of malware to the Android devices. In order to detect root exploit, it is important to investigate its features to assist machine learning to predict it accurately. This study proposes flying animal-inspired (1) bat, 2) firefly, and 3) bee) methods to search automatically the exclusive features, then utilizes these flying animal-inspired decision features to improve the machine learning prediction. Furthermore, a boosting method (Adaboost) boosts the multilayer perceptron (MLP) potential to a stronger classification. The evaluation jotted the best result is from bee search, which recorded 91.48 percent in accuracy, 82.2 percent in true positive rate, and 0.1 percent false positive rate