Transparent government, not transparent citizens: a report on privacy and transparency for the Cabinet Office

1. Privacy is extremely important to transparency. The political legitimacy of a transparency programme will depend crucially on its ability to retain public confidence. Privacy protection should therefore be embedded in any transparency programme, rather than bolted on as an afterthought. 2. Privacy and transparency are compatible, as long as the former is carefully protected and considered at every stage. 3. Under the current transparency regime, in which public data is specifically understood not to include personal data, most data releases will not raise privacy concerns. However, some will, especially as we move toward a more demand-driven scheme. 4. Discussion about deanonymisation has been driven largely by legal considerations, with a consequent neglect of the input of the technical community. 5. There are no complete legal or technical fixes to the deanonymisation problem. We should continue to anonymise sensitive data, being initially cautious about releasing such data under the Open Government Licence while we continue to take steps to manage and research the risks of deanonymisation. Further investigation to determine the level of risk would be very welcome. 6. There should be a focus on procedures to output an auditable debate trail. Transparency about transparency – metatransparency – is essential for preserving trust and confidence. Fourteen recommendations are made to address these conclusions

A Proposal for a Comprehensive Restructuring of the Public Information System

After more than ten years of legislative, judicial and bureaucratic tinkering, the public information system created by the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is still far from satisfactory. The present public information system has not been successful because its drafters lacked imagination and failed to do the basic work necessary to create a sound foundation for such a comprehensive program. They failed to analyze the realistic goals of a public information system; they ignored the ultimate goals of improved government performance; they misrepresented the system\u27s costs, both in monetary expense to taxpayers and in diminished government performance. They considered neither alternative techniques nor the problem of designing the public information system as an integral part of the total governmental structure. Actual open government for the benefit of the general populace will be possible only if the basic weaknesses of the present system are explored in depth. This Article is an appeal to Congress to undertake the careful analysis necessary to construct a workable, useful public information system

Quantum surveillance and 'shared secrets'. A biometric step too far? CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe, July 2010

It is no longer sensible to regard biometrics as having neutral socio-economic, legal and political impacts. Newer generation biometrics are fluid and include behavioural and emotional data that can be combined with other data. Therefore, a range of issues needs to be reviewed in light of the increasing privatisation of ‘security’ that escapes effective, democratic parliamentary and regulatory control and oversight at national, international and EU levels, argues Juliet Lodge, Professor and co-Director of the Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence at the University of Leeds, U

More than a Feeling: Emotion and the First Amendment

First Amendment law has generally been leery of government attempts to change the marketplace of emotions—except when it has not been. Scientific evidence indicates that emotion and rationality are not opposed, as the law often presumes, but rather inextricably linked. There is no judgment, whether moral or otherwise, without emotions to guide our choices. Judicial failure to grapple with this reality has produced some puzzles in the law. Part I of this Symposium contribution examines the intersection of private law, the First Amendment, and attempts to manipulate and control emotions. Only false factual statements can defame, not mere derogatory opinions. Yet trademark law allows exactly the kind of control over nonfactual, emotional appeals that modern defamation law precludes. These two bodies of law thus stand in contrast, one constrained by the First Amendment to cover only facts and the other allowed to reach much further into the dark heart of emotional manipulation. Part II turns to compelled speech, and again finds two contrasting regulations united by their emotional mechanisms, but divided by their constitutional fates. Courts have struck down mandatory smoking warnings in visual form, but have approved mandatory abortion disclosures and ultrasound requirements that operate in the same emotional register. Regardless of whether the regulation involves a direct government mandate or private parties claiming competing rights to influence the audience’s emotional state, then, current First Amendment law doesn’t have a consistent account of the proper role of emotion in speech regulation. Part III suggests that the contradictions of current doctrine could be ameliorated by less distrust of emotion and more acceptance that where information is being conveyed, emotion will regularly follow. Our focus then should not be on whether deployment of emotion is “manipulative,” but whether it is part of a discriminatory or factually misleading regulation. When the government can otherwise constitutionally mandate disclosure, the fact that these disclosures have emotional resonance is not an independent constitutional barrier