51,342 research outputs found
Optimal allocation sequences of two processes sharing a resource
Disponible dans les fichiers attachés à ce documen
Contracts, relationships and innovation in business-to-business exchanges
Purpose:
â This paper aims to contrast two approaches to the study of contracts in business and industrial marketing: first, as a legal document in shaping at the outset exchanges and interactions, for instance in projects; and second, as relational norms in becoming integrated into a business relationship through interactions, for instance as a resource.
Design/methodology/approach:
â The paper draws on cross-case comparison of three projects, as actors develop an engineering service for optimizing the maintenance of large-scale capital equipment by analyzing real-time data from sensors and user records. Comparison is by coding interview and observational data as micro-sequences of interactions among actors.
Findings:
â Preparing contracts allows a project to commence and is an early form of interaction, intensifying new relationships or cutting into and recasting established ones. Relational norms augment and can supersede the early focus on the contract, thus incorporating incremental innovation and absorbing some uncertainties.
Research limitations/implications:
â The research approach benefits from detailed comparison and captures some variety across its three cases, but the discussion is limited to theoretical generalization.
Practical implications:
â The analysis and discussion highlights and focuses on when different approaches to understanding contracting are more apparent across durable business relationships. Transitions from a contractual document to a view of relational norms are subtle, vulnerable and not always made successfully.
Originality/value:
â This paperâs originality is in it comparison of overlapping approaches to understanding businessesâ uses of contacts in business and industrial marketing, of contract and relational norms. It develops a valuable research proposition, in the transition from a mainly contractual to a mainly relational uses of contracts, thus identifying contract as a particular business resource, to be deployed and embedded
Trade & Cap: A Customer-Managed, Market-Based System for Trading Bandwidth Allowances at a Shared Link
We propose Trade & Cap (T&C), an economics-inspired mechanism that incentivizes users to voluntarily coordinate their consumption of the bandwidth of a shared resource (e.g., a DSLAM link) so as to converge on what they perceive to be an equitable allocation, while ensuring efficient resource utilization. Under T&C, rather than acting as an arbiter, an Internet Service Provider (ISP) acts as an enforcer of what the community of rational users sharing the resource decides is a fair allocation of that resource. Our T&C mechanism proceeds in two phases. In the first, software agents acting on behalf of users engage in a strategic trading game in which each user agent selfishly chooses bandwidth slots to reserve in support of primary, interactive network usage activities. In the second phase, each user is allowed to acquire additional bandwidth slots in support of presumed open-ended need for fluid bandwidth, catering to secondary applications. The acquisition of this fluid bandwidth is subject to the remaining "buying power" of each user and by prevalent "market prices" â both of which are determined by the results of the trading phase and a desirable aggregate cap on link utilization. We present analytical results that establish the underpinnings of our T&C mechanism, including game-theoretic results pertaining to the trading phase, and pricing of fluid bandwidth allocation pertaining to the capping phase. Using real network traces, we present extensive experimental results that demonstrate the benefits of our scheme, which we also show to be practical by highlighting the salient features of an efficient implementation architecture.National Science Foundation (CCF-0820138, CSR-0720604, EFRI-0735974, CNS-0524477, and CNS-0520166); Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana and COLCIENCIASâInstituto Colombiano para el Desarrollo de la Ciencia y la TecnologĂa âFrancisco Jose Ì de Caldasâ
Multiagent Maximum Coverage Problems: The Trade-off Between Anarchy and Stability
The price of anarchy and price of stability are three well-studied
performance metrics that seek to characterize the inefficiency of equilibria in
distributed systems. The distinction between these two performance metrics
centers on the equilibria that they focus on: the price of anarchy
characterizes the quality of the worst-performing equilibria, while the price
of stability characterizes the quality of the best-performing equilibria. While
much of the literature focuses on these metrics from an analysis perspective,
in this work we consider these performance metrics from a design perspective.
Specifically, we focus on the setting where a system operator is tasked with
designing local utility functions to optimize these performance metrics in a
class of games termed covering games. Our main result characterizes a
fundamental trade-off between the price of anarchy and price of stability in
the form of a fully explicit Pareto frontier. Within this setup, optimizing the
price of anarchy comes directly at the expense of the price of stability (and
vice versa). Our second results demonstrates how a system-operator could
incorporate an additional piece of system-level information into the design of
the agents' utility functions to breach these limitations and improve the
system's performance. This valuable piece of system-level information pertains
to the performance of worst performing agent in the system.Comment: 14 pages, 4 figure
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