Algorithms for Manipulating Sequential Allocation

Sequential allocation is a simple and widely studied mechanism to allocate indivisible items in turns to agents according to a pre-specified picking sequence of agents. At each turn, the current agent in the picking sequence picks its most preferred item among all items having not been allocated yet. This problem is well-known to be not strategyproof, i.e., an agent may get more utility by reporting an untruthful preference ranking of items. It arises the problem: how to find the best response of an agent? It is known that this problem is polynomially solvable for only two agents and NP-complete for arbitrary number of agents. The computational complexity of this problem with three agents was left as an open problem. In this paper, we give a novel algorithm that solves the problem in polynomial time for each fixed number of agents. We also show that an agent can always get at least half of its optimal utility by simply using its truthful preference as the response

A study of systems implementation languages for the POCCNET system

The results are presented of a study of systems implementation languages for the Payload Operations Control Center Network (POCCNET). Criteria are developed for evaluating the languages, and fifteen existing languages are evaluated on the basis of these criteria

Bayesian Incentive Compatibility via Fractional Assignments

Very recently, Hartline and Lucier studied single-parameter mechanism design problems in the Bayesian setting. They proposed a black-box reduction that converted Bayesian approximation algorithms into Bayesian-Incentive-Compatible (BIC) mechanisms while preserving social welfare. It remains a major open question if one can find similar reduction in the more important multi-parameter setting. In this paper, we give positive answer to this question when the prior distribution has finite and small support. We propose a black-box reduction for designing BIC multi-parameter mechanisms. The reduction converts any algorithm into an eps-BIC mechanism with only marginal loss in social welfare. As a result, for combinatorial auctions with sub-additive agents we get an eps-BIC mechanism that achieves constant approximation.Comment: 22 pages, 1 figur

Pointer Race Freedom

We propose a novel notion of pointer race for concurrent programs manipulating a shared heap. A pointer race is an access to a memory address which was freed, and it is out of the accessor's control whether or not the cell has been re-allocated. We establish two results. (1) Under the assumption of pointer race freedom, it is sound to verify a program running under explicit memory management as if it was running with garbage collection. (2) Even the requirement of pointer race freedom itself can be verified under the garbage-collected semantics. We then prove analogues of the theorems for a stronger notion of pointer race needed to cope with performance-critical code purposely using racy comparisons and even racy dereferences of pointers. As a practical contribution, we apply our results to optimize a thread-modular analysis under explicit memory management. Our experiments confirm a speed-up of up to two orders of magnitude