Fair Inputs and Fair Outputs: The Incompatibility of Fairness in Privacy and Accuracy

Fairness concerns about algorithmic decision-making systems have been mainly focused on the outputs (e.g., the accuracy of a classifier across individuals or groups). However, one may additionally be concerned with fairness in the inputs. In this paper, we propose and formulate two properties regarding the inputs of (features used by) a classifier. In particular, we claim that fair privacy (whether individuals are all asked to reveal the same information) and need-to-know (whether users are only asked for the minimal information required for the task at hand) are desirable properties of a decision system. We explore the interaction between these properties and fairness in the outputs (fair prediction accuracy). We show that for an optimal classifier these three properties are in general incompatible, and we explain what common properties of data make them incompatible. Finally we provide an algorithm to verify if the trade-off between the three properties exists in a given dataset, and use the algorithm to show that this trade-off is common in real data

On content-based recommendation and user privacy in social-tagging systems

Recommendation systems and content filtering approaches based on annotations and ratings, essentially rely on users expressing their preferences and interests through their actions, in order to provide personalised content. This activity, in which users engage collectively has been named social tagging, and it is one of the most popular in which users engage online, and although it has opened new possibilities for application interoperability on the semantic web, it is also posing new privacy threats. It, in fact, consists of describing online or offline resources by using free-text labels (i.e. tags), therefore exposing the user profile and activity to privacy attacks. Users, as a result, may wish to adopt a privacy-enhancing strategy in order not to reveal their interests completely. Tag forgery is a privacy enhancing technology consisting of generating tags for categories or resources that do not reflect the user's actual preferences. By modifying their profile, tag forgery may have a negative impact on the quality of the recommendation system, thus protecting user privacy to a certain extent but at the expenses of utility loss. The impact of tag forgery on content-based recommendation is, therefore, investigated in a real-world application scenario where different forgery strategies are evaluated, and the consequent loss in utility is measured and compared.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author’s final draft

Privacy Against Statistical Inference

We propose a general statistical inference framework to capture the privacy threat incurred by a user that releases data to a passive but curious adversary, given utility constraints. We show that applying this general framework to the setting where the adversary uses the self-information cost function naturally leads to a non-asymptotic information-theoretic approach for characterizing the best achievable privacy subject to utility constraints. Based on these results we introduce two privacy metrics, namely average information leakage and maximum information leakage. We prove that under both metrics the resulting design problem of finding the optimal mapping from the user's data to a privacy-preserving output can be cast as a modified rate-distortion problem which, in turn, can be formulated as a convex program. Finally, we compare our framework with differential privacy.Comment: Allerton 2012, 8 page

Recommender systems and their ethical challenges

This article presents the first, systematic analysis of the ethical challenges posed by recommender systems through a literature review. The article identifies six areas of concern, and maps them onto a proposed taxonomy of different kinds of ethical impact. The analysis uncovers a gap in the literature: currently user-centred approaches do not consider the interests of a variety of other stakeholders—as opposed to just the receivers of a recommendation—in assessing the ethical impacts of a recommender system

Revisiting the Economics of Privacy: Population Statistics and Confidentiality Protection as Public Goods

This paper has been replaced with http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ldi/37. We consider the problem of the public release of statistical information about a population–explicitly accounting for the public-good properties of both data accuracy and privacy loss. We first consider the implications of adding the public-good component to recently published models of private data publication under differential privacy guarantees using a Vickery-Clark-Groves mechanism and a Lindahl mechanism. We show that data quality will be inefficiently under-supplied. Next, we develop a standard social planner’s problem using the technology set implied by (ε, δ)-differential privacy with (α, β)-accuracy for the Private Multiplicative Weights query release mechanism to study the properties of optimal provision of data accuracy and privacy loss when both are public goods. Using the production possibilities frontier implied by this technology, explicitly parameterized interdependent preferences, and the social welfare function, we display properties of the solution to the social planner’s problem. Our results directly quantify the optimal choice of data accuracy and privacy loss as functions of the technology and preference parameters. Some of these properties can be quantified using population statistics on marginal preferences and correlations between income, data accuracy preferences, and privacy loss preferences that are available from survey data. Our results show that government data custodians should publish more accurate statistics with weaker privacy guarantees than would occur with purely private data publishing. Our statistical results using the General Social Survey and the Cornell National Social Survey indicate that the welfare losses from under-providing data accuracy while over-providing privacy protection can be substantial