3,476 research outputs found
Burden Sharing in Climate Change Policy
KlimaverÀnderung, Internationale, Umweltpolitik, Welt, Climate change, International environmental policy, World
Environmental Taxation and Revenue for Development
environment, taxation, carbon tax, consumption
Atmospheric Externalities and Environmental Taxation.
The paper reviews the theory of environmental taxation under first best and second best conditions. It argues that negative environmental externalities lead to reductions of the provision of public goods, while investment in abatement increases the supply of public goods. Together with optimal tax rules, the paper therefore also derives conditions for the optimal use of resources on abatement. After brief discussions of the dimensions of time and uncertainty, tax reform and the double dividend, and taxes versus quotas, the optimal tax model is applied to the problem of global warming with a discussion of the particular incentive problems that arise in designing and implementing global climate policy.Environmental taxation; Public goods
Public Provision and Private Incentives
This paper surveys classical and modern arguments for public production and provision of goods. It reviews the conventional case for public production under conditions of increasing returns and discusses the modifications that have to be made if public production involves a cost inefficiency. It then discusses the causes behind a possible cost inefficiency, such as the difficulty of designing good incentive schemes in agencies with multiple and complex objectives. An alternative to designing better incentives in the public sector is that of contracting out to private firms, and the conditions favourable to this alternative are also discussed.
Bridging the Tax-Expenditure Gap: Green Taxes and the Marginal Cost of Funds
The marginal cost of public funds is usually seen as a number greater than one, reflecting the efficiency cost of distortionary taxes. But economic intuition suggests that since green taxes are efficiency-enhancing the MCF with such taxes will be less than one. The paper demonstrates that this intuition is not necessarily true, even when a green tax is the sole source of funds. The analysis also considers the MCF with a proportional income tax, given the presence of green taxes. It compares the optimization approach to the MCF with that of a balanced budget reform and shows that they lead to equivalent results.
From Farmers to Farm Firms - Some Recent Changes in Norwegian Politics and Implications for Agricultural Statistics
This paper was inspired by some changes in the criteria for being entitled to subsidies in Norwegian agriculture, and the changes this induced in agricultural statistics. Although the paper is concerned with Norway only, the Norwegian experiences might be of interest to a broader audience. It illustrates some of the challenges which can occur when statistics is based on register data, and the register owner make changes in the criteria and thus in the information gathered.Agricultural statistics, agricultural units, Norway, organisational forms, register data, Agricultural and Food Policy,
Taxation and Tournaments
This paper analyzes the effects of progressive taxes on labour supply and income distribution in the context of the rank-order tournament model originally developed by Lazear and Rosen (1981). We show conditions under which a more progressive tax schedule will cause so large general equilibrium effects that the inequality in disposable income will actually increase. We also show that a non-zero redistributive tax is always optimal if societyâs welfare function displays inequality aversion; this result always holds, regardless of behavioral responses and general equilibrium effects.TBA
Good jobs, bad jobs and redistribution
We analyse the question of optimal taxation in a dual economy, when the government is concerned about the distribution of labour income. Income inequality is caused by the presence of sunk capital investments, which creates a .good jobs. sector due to the capture of quasi-rents by trade unions. We find that whether the government should subsidise or tax investments is crucially dependent on union bargaining strength. If unions are weak, the optimal tax policy implies a combination of investment taxes and progressive income taxation. On the other hand, if unions are strong, we find that the best option for the government is to use investment subsidies in combination with either progressive or proportional taxation, the latter being the optimal policy if the government is not too concerned about inequality and if the cost of income taxation is sufficiently high. -- In dem Beitrag wird die Frage der optimalen Besteuerung in einer Wirtschaft mit zwei Sektoren untersucht, in der die Regierung an der Verteilung des Arbeitseinkommens interessiert ist. Einkommensungleichheit wird dann durch versunkene Kapitalinvestitionen verursacht, die einen Sektor mit .guten. ArbeitsplĂ€tzen schaffen, der durch die Aneignung von Quasi-Renten durch Gewerkschaften entsteht. Ob die Regierung Investitionen subventionieren oder besteuern soll, hĂ€ngt entscheidend von der Verhandlungsst Ă€rke der Gewerkschaften ab. Wenn die Gewerkschaften schwach sind, dann sieht die optimale Steuerpolitik eine Kombination aus Investitionssteuern und progressiver Einkommensbesteuerung vor. Im Falle von starken Gewerkschaften zeigt sich, daĂ die beste Handlungsalternative fĂŒr die Regierung aus dem Einsatz von Subventionen in Kombination mit entweder progressiver oder proportionaler Besteuerung besteht, wobei die letztere dann optimal ist, wenn die Regierung nicht zu sehr an Ungleichheit interessiert ist und wenn die Kosten der Einkommensbesteuerung hinreichend hoch sind.Rent sharing,segmented labour markets,optimal taxation,redistribution
Coordinating teamplay using named locations in a multilingual game environment - Playing esports in an educational context
Author's accepted version (postprint).This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Classroom Discourse on 03/02/2022.Available online: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19463014.2021.2024444acceptedVersio
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