105,739 research outputs found
- AGGREGATION IN A MODEL OF PRICE COMPETITION.
In a model of price competition single-product ¯rms compete for consumers. Consumerspurchase a variable quantity of one of the di®erentiated goods. The paper provides results onequilibrium existence when consumers are heterogeneous in their evaluation of the di®erentiatedgoods among each other, their evaluation of the di®erentiated goods relative to the outside good,and heterogeneous in income. Furthermore, I provide su±cient conditions for dominance solvabilityand monotone comparative statics.Price Competition; Imperfect Competition; Heterogeneous Demand;
Fairs for e-commerce: the benefits of aggregating buyers and sellers
In recent years, many new and interesting models of successful online
business have been developed. Many of these are based on the competition
between users, such as online auctions, where the product price is not fixed
and tends to rise. Other models, including group-buying, are based on
cooperation between users, characterized by a dynamic price of the product that
tends to go down. There is not yet a business model in which both sellers and
buyers are grouped in order to negotiate on a specific product or service. The
present study investigates a new extension of the group-buying model, called
fair, which allows aggregation of demand and supply for price optimization, in
a cooperative manner. Additionally, our system also aggregates products and
destinations for shipping optimization. We introduced the following new
relevant input parameters in order to implement a double-side aggregation: (a)
price-quantity curves provided by the seller; (b) waiting time, that is, the
longer buyers wait, the greater discount they get; (c) payment time, which
determines if the buyer pays before, during or after receiving the product; (d)
the distance between the place where products are available and the place of
shipment, provided in advance by the buyer or dynamically suggested by the
system. To analyze the proposed model we implemented a system prototype and a
simulator that allow to study effects of changing some input parameters. We
analyzed the dynamic price model in fairs having one single seller and a
combination of selected sellers. The results are very encouraging and motivate
further investigation on this topic
Information Aggregation in Auctions with an Unknown Number of Bidders
Information aggregation, a key concern for uniform-price, common-value auctions with many bidders, has been characterized in models where bidders know exactly how many rivals they face. A model allowing for uncertainty over the number of bidders is essential for capturing a critical condition for information to aggregate: as the numbers of winning and losing bidders grow large, information aggregates if and only if uncertainty about the fraction of winning bidders vanishes. It is possible for the seller to impart this information by precommitting to a specified fraction of winning bidders, via a proportional selling policy. Intuitively, this makes the proportion of winners known, and thus provides all the information that bidders need to make winners curse corrections.information aggregation, common-value auctions, uncertain level of competition
Oligopolies in private spectrum commons: analysis and regulatory implications
In an effort to make more spectrum available, recent initiatives by the FCC let mobile providers offer spot service of their licensed spectrum to secondary users, hence paving the way to dynamic secondary spectrum markets. This dissertation investigates secondary spectrum markets under different regulatory regimes by identifying profitability conditions and possible competitive outcomes in an oligopoly model. We consider pricing in a market where multiple providers compete for secondary demand.
First, we analyze the market outcomes when providers adopt a coordinated access policy, where, besides pricing, a provider can elect to apply admission control on secondary users based on the state of its network. We next consider a competition when providers implement an uncoordinated access policy (i.e., no admission control). Through our analysis, we identify profitability conditions and fundamental price thresholds, including break-even and market sharing prices. We prove that regardless of the specific form of the secondary demand function, competition under coordinated access always leads to a price war outcome. In contrast, under uncoordinated access, market sharing becomes a viable market outcome if the intervals of prices for which the providers are willing to share the market overlap.
We then turn our attention to how a network provider use carrier (spectrum) aggregation in order to lower its break-even price and gain an edge over its competition. To this end, we determine the optimal (minimum) level of carrier aggregation that a smaller provider needs. Under a quality-driven (QD) regime, we establish an efficient way of numerically calculating the optimal carrier aggregation and derive scaling laws. We extend the results to delay-related metrics and show their applications to profitable pricing in secondary spectrum markets.
Finally, we consider the problem of profitability over a spatial topology, where identifying system behavior suffers from the curse of dimensionality. Hence, we propose an approximation model that captures system behavior to the first-order and provide an expression to calculate the break-even price at each network location and provide simulation results for accuracy comparison. All of our results hold for general forms of demand, thus avoid restricting assumptions of customer preferences and the valuation of the spectrum
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Municipal Aggregation and Retail Competition in the Ohio Energy Sector
We study incumbency advantage in a dynamic game with incomplete information between an incumbent and a voter. The incumbent knows the true state of the world, e.g., the severity of an economic recession or the level of criminal activities, and can choose the quality of his policy. This quality and the state of the world determine the policy outcome, i.e., the economic growth rate or the number of crimes committed. The voter only observes the policy outcome and then decides whether to reelect the incumbent or not. Her preferences are such that she would reelect the incumbent under full information if and only if the state of the world is above a given threshold level. In equilibrium, the incumbent is reelected in more states of the world than he would be under full information. In particular, he chooses inefficient policies and generates mediocre policy outcomes whenever the voter's induced belief distribution will be such that her expected utility of reelecting the incumbent exceeds her expected utility of electing the opposition candidate. Hence, there is an incumbency advantage through inefficient policies. We provide empirical evidence consistent with the prediction that reelection concerns may induce incumbents to generate mediocre outcomes
Q investment models, factor complementary and monopolistic competition
The observed fact that firms invest even if capacities are not fully employed does not fit well into most standard formalizations of optimal firm behavior. In this paper, the q investment approach is adapted to an imperfectly competitive economy where the representative firm is assumed to face demand uncertainty. Nominal rigidities and short-run factor complementarity are imposed as sufficient conditions to allow for the coexistence of investment and excess capacity. Since capacities are underemployed, marginal q is shown to diverge from average q. Finally, excess capacity subsists at steady state which makes it more than a shortrun
phenomeno
Asymmetric-valued Spectrum Auction and Competition in Wireless Broadband Services
We study bidding and pricing competition between two spiteful mobile network
operators (MNOs) with considering their existing spectrum holdings. Given
asymmetric-valued spectrum blocks are auctioned off to them via a first-price
sealed-bid auction, we investigate the interactions between two spiteful MNOs
and users as a three-stage dynamic game and characterize the dynamic game's
equilibria. We show an asymmetric pricing structure and different market share
between two spiteful MNOs. Perhaps counter-intuitively, our results show that
the MNO who acquires the less-valued spectrum block always lowers his service
price despite providing double-speed LTE service to users. We also show that
the MNO who acquires the high-valued spectrum block, despite charing a higher
price, still achieves more market share than the other MNO. We further show
that the competition between two MNOs leads to some loss of their revenues. By
investigating a cross-over point at which the MNOs' profits are switched, it
serves as the benchmark of practical auction designs
Product differentiation and intra-industrial trade: Quantitative assessment in the case of Tunisia
In this article we try to analyze the extend of product differentiation in the Tunisian’s context, by relying on an investigation drived at a sufficiently disaggregated level of sectors. In the first section, we tend to expose the relationship between market structure, product differentiation and intra-industrial trade. Then, we reexamine in the second section some operational proxies of products variety that were previously analyzed by the empirical literature. In the third section, we tend to appreciate the strength of products differentiation in the specific case of Tunisia and in 8 different sectors
Assessing the Competitive Behaviour of Firms in the Single Market: A Micro-based Approach
This Report analyses and compares a number of indicators related to the evolution of the competitive behaviour of firms in the Single Market, from 1999 to 2007, in a selected number of both manufacturing and services industries and eight EU countries: Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Poland, Romania, Spain and Sweden. A novelty of the approach is that the analysis is derived from firm-level observable data, which allow to grasp not only information on the average changes taking place in each industry and across countries, but also the distribution and sources of these changes in terms of individual firms' pricing behaviour and market shares, an information which is impossible to gather in detail from aggregate, traditional sector-level measure
Assessing the Competitive Behaviour of Firms in the Single Market: A Micro-based Approach
This Report analyses and compares a number of indicators related to the evolution of the competitive behaviour of firms in the Single Market, from 1999 to 2007, in a selected number of both manufacturing and services industries and eight EU countries: Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Poland, Romania, Spain and Sweden. A novelty of the approach is that the analysis is derived from firm-level observable data, which allow to grasp not only information on the average changes taking place in each industry and across countries, but also the distribution and sources of these changes in terms of individual firms' pricing behaviour and market shares, an information which is impossible to gather in detail from aggregate, traditional sector-level measure
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