We study bidding and pricing competition between two spiteful mobile network
operators (MNOs) with considering their existing spectrum holdings. Given
asymmetric-valued spectrum blocks are auctioned off to them via a first-price
sealed-bid auction, we investigate the interactions between two spiteful MNOs
and users as a three-stage dynamic game and characterize the dynamic game's
equilibria. We show an asymmetric pricing structure and different market share
between two spiteful MNOs. Perhaps counter-intuitively, our results show that
the MNO who acquires the less-valued spectrum block always lowers his service
price despite providing double-speed LTE service to users. We also show that
the MNO who acquires the high-valued spectrum block, despite charing a higher
price, still achieves more market share than the other MNO. We further show
that the competition between two MNOs leads to some loss of their revenues. By
investigating a cross-over point at which the MNOs' profits are switched, it
serves as the benchmark of practical auction designs