KEMNAD: A Knowledge Engineering Methodology for Negotiating Agent Development

Automated negotiation is widely applied in various domains. However, the development of such systems is a complex knowledge and software engineering task. So, a methodology there will be helpful. Unfortunately, none of existing methodologies can offer sufficient, detailed support for such system development. To remove this limitation, this paper develops a new methodology made up of: (1) a generic framework (architectural pattern) for the main task, and (2) a library of modular and reusable design pattern (templates) of subtasks. Thus, it is much easier to build a negotiating agent by assembling these standardised components rather than reinventing the wheel each time. Moreover, since these patterns are identified from a wide variety of existing negotiating agents(especially high impact ones), they can also improve the quality of the final systems developed. In addition, our methodology reveals what types of domain knowledge need to be input into the negotiating agents. This in turn provides a basis for developing techniques to acquire the domain knowledge from human users. This is important because negotiation agents act faithfully on the behalf of their human users and thus the relevant domain knowledge must be acquired from the human users. Finally, our methodology is validated with one high impact system

Jackpot Justice: The Value of Inefficient Litigation

Litigation seems to be a Pareto-ineffcient outcome of pretrial bargaining; however, this paper shows that litigation can be the outcome of rational behavior by a litigant and her attorney. If the attorney has more information than his client concerning the characteristics of the lawsuit, the client can use litigation as a way of extracting information. I show that, counterintuitively, litigation will occur only when the plaintiff is pessimistic about her prospects at trial. Even if the plaintiff could obtain a higher payoff from bargaining than from litigation-without-bargaining, bargaining may not occur in equilibrium. The plaintiff is more likely to sue if she is more pessimistic about winning damage in court and if litigation is more risky. Litigation is less likely to occur if the plaintiff receives third party financing for litigation

A Generic Conceptual Model for Risk Analysis in a Multi-agent Based Collaborative Design Environment

Organised by: Cranfield UniversityThis paper presents a generic conceptual model of risk evaluation in order to manage the risk through related constraints and variables under a multi-agent collaborative design environment. Initially, a hierarchy constraint network is developed to mapping constraints and variables. Then, an effective approximation technique named Risk Assessment Matrix is adopted to evaluate risk level and rank priority after probability quantification and consequence validation. Additionally, an Intelligent Data based Reasoning Methodology is expanded to deal with risk mitigation by combining inductive learning methods and reasoning consistency algorithms with feasible solution strategies. Finally, two empirical studies were conducted to validate the effectiveness and feasibility of the conceptual model.Mori Seiki – The Machine Tool Compan

Trust Strategies for the Semantic Web

Everyone agrees on the importance of enabling trust on the SemanticWebto ensure more efficient agent interaction. Current research on trust seems to focus on developing computational models, semantic representations, inference techniques, etc. However, little attention has been given to the plausible trust strategies or tactics that an agent can follow when interacting with other agents on the Semantic Web. In this paper we identify five most common strategies of trust and discuss their envisaged costs and benefits. The aim is to provide some guidelines to help system developers appreciate the risks and gains involved with each trust strategy

Derivation of Morality from Prudence

This chapter derives and refines a novel normative moral theory and descriptive theory of moral psychology--Rightness as Fairness--from the theory of prudence defended in Chapter 2. It briefly summarizes Chapter 2’s finding that prudent agents typically internalize ‘moral risk-aversion’. It then outlines how this prudential psychology leads prudent agents to want to know how to act in ways they will not regret in morally salient cases, as well as to regard moral actions as the only types of actions that satisfy this prudential interest. It then uses these findings to defend a new derivation of my (2016) theory of morality, Rightness as Fairness, showing how the derivation successfully defends Rightness as Fairness against a variety of objections. The chapter also details how this book’s theory helps to substantiate the claim that Rightness as Fairness unifies a variety of competing moral frameworks: deontology, consequentialism, contractualism, and virtue ethics. Finally, the chapter shows how Chapter 2’s theory of prudence entails some revisions to Rightness as Fairness, including the adoption of a series of Rawlsian original positions to settle moral and social-political issues under ideal and nonideal circumstances—thus entailing a unified normative and descriptive psychological framework for prudence, morality, and justice

Risk assessment and relationship management: practical approach to supply chain risk management

The literature suggests the need for incorporating the risk construct into the measurement of organisational performance, although few examples are available as to how this might be undertaken in relation to supply chains. A conceptual framework for the development of performance and risk management within the supply chain is evolved from the literature and empirical evidence. The twin levels of dyadic performance/risk management and the management of a portfolio of performance/risks is addressed, employing Agency Theory to guide the analysis. The empirical evidence relates to the downstream management of dealerships by a large multinational organisation. Propositions are derived from the analysis relating to the issues and mechanisms that may be employed to effectively manage a portfolio of supply chain performance and risks

Human-Agent Decision-making: Combining Theory and Practice

Extensive work has been conducted both in game theory and logic to model strategic interaction. An important question is whether we can use these theories to design agents for interacting with people? On the one hand, they provide a formal design specification for agent strategies. On the other hand, people do not necessarily adhere to playing in accordance with these strategies, and their behavior is affected by a multitude of social and psychological factors. In this paper we will consider the question of whether strategies implied by theories of strategic behavior can be used by automated agents that interact proficiently with people. We will focus on automated agents that we built that need to interact with people in two negotiation settings: bargaining and deliberation. For bargaining we will study game-theory based equilibrium agents and for argumentation we will discuss logic-based argumentation theory. We will also consider security games and persuasion games and will discuss the benefits of using equilibrium based agents.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2015, arXiv:1606.0729

Uncertainty and ratification failure

I study a game where two agents bargain on an agreement to replace the status quo. For their agreement to come into e¤ect, they need the approval of a third agent. The preferences of this third agent is private information, but there is communication among agents. I study this game in the context of international agreements to provide an explanation for involuntary rati�cation failures. I show that under certain assumptions, the informational de�ciency is incurable due to incentives to misrepresent preferences, and that a parliament whose majority is more hawkish than their executive prefers the executive to be risk averse

Modelling iteration in engineering design

This paper examines design iteration and its modelling in the simulation of New Product Development (NPD) processes. A framework comprising six perspectives of iteration is proposed and it is argued that the importance of each perspective depends upon domain-specific factors. Key challenges of modelling iteration in process simulation frameworks such as the Design Structure Matrix are discussed, and we argue that no single model or framework can fully capture the iterative dynamics of an NPD process. To conclude, we propose that consideration of iteration and its representation could help identify the most appropriate modelling framework for a given process and modelling objective, thereby improving the fidelity of design process simulation models and increasing their utility