Examining the Society of Mind

This article examines Marvin Minsky's Society of Mind theory of human cognition. We describe some of the history behind the theory, review several of the specific mechanisms and representations that Minsky proposes, and consider related developments in artificial intelligence since the theory's publication

The Mechanistic and Normative Structure of Agency

I develop an interdisciplinary framework for understanding the nature of agents and agency that is compatible with recent developments in the metaphysics of science and that also does justice to the mechanistic and normative characteristics of agents and agency as they are understood in moral philosophy, social psychology, neuroscience, robotics, and economics. The framework I develop is internal perspectivalist. That is to say, it counts agents as real in a perspective-dependent way, but not in a way that depends on an external perspective. Whether or not something counts as an agent depends on whether it is able to have a certain kind of perspective. My approach differs from many others by treating possession of a perspective as more basic than the possession of agency, representational content/vehicles, cognition, intentions, goals, concepts, or mental or psychological states; these latter capabilities require the former, not the other way around. I explain what it means for a system to be able to have a perspective at all, beginning with simple cases in biology, and show how self-contained normative perspectives about proper function and control can emerge from mechanisms with relatively simple dynamics. I then describe how increasingly complex control architectures can become organized that allow for more complex perspectives that approach agency. Next, I provide my own account of the kind of perspective that is necessary for agency itself, the goal being to provide a reference against which other accounts can be compared. Finally, I introduce a crucial distinction that is necessary for understanding human agency: that between inclinational and committal agency, and venture a hypothesis about how the normative perspective underlying committal agency might be mechanistically realized

Form, science, and narrative in the anthropocene

A significant strand of contemporary fiction engages with scientific models that highlight a constitutive interdependency between humanity and material realities such as the climate or the geological history of our planet. This article looks at the ways in which narrative may capture this human-nonhuman interrelation, which occupies the foreground of debates on the so-called Anthropocene. I argue that the formal dimension of scientific knowledge-as manifested by diagrams or metaphors used by scientists-is central to this narrative remediation. I explore two analogical strategies through which narrative may pursue a formal dialogue with science: clusters of metaphorical language and the global structuring of the plot. Rivka Galchen's novel Atmospheric Disturbances (2008), for instance, builds on a visual representation of meteorological patterns in a storm (lifted from an actual scientific paper) to stage the narrator's mental illness. Two other contemporary works (Orfeo by Richard Powers and A Tale for the Time Being by Ruth Ozeki) integrate scientific models through the overall design of the plot. By offering close readings of these novels, I seek to expand work in the area of New Formalism and show how formal choices are crucial to bringing together the human-scale world and more-than-human phenomena

Thinking and Doing: Challenge, Agency, and the Eudaimonic Experience in Video Games

The nascent growth of videogames has led to great leaps in technical understanding in how to create a functional and entertaining play experience. However, the complex, mixed-affect, eudaimonic entertainment experience that is possible when playing a video game—how it is formed, how it is experienced and how to design for it, has been investigated far less than hedonistic emotional experiences focusing on fun, challenge and ‘enjoyment.’ Participants volunteered to be interviewed about their mixed-affect emotional experiences of playing avant-garde videogames. New conceptions of agency emerged (Actual, Interpretive, Fictional, Mechanical) from the analysis of transcripts and were used to produce a framework of four categories of agency. This new framework offers designers and researchers the extra nuance in conversations around agency, and contributes to the discussion of how we can design video games that allow for complex, reflective, eudaimonic emotional experiences

The Strong Story Hypothesis and the Directed Perception Hypothesis

I ask why humans are smarter than other primates, and I hypothesize that an important part of the answer lies in what I call the Strong Story Hypothesis, which holds that story telling and understanding have a central role in human intelligence. Next, I introduce another hypothesis, the Driven Perception Hypothesis, which holds that we derive much of our commonsense, including the commonsense required in story understanding, by deploying our perceptual apparatus on real and imagined events. Then, after discussing methodology, I describe the representations and methods embodied in the Genesis system, a story-understanding system that analyzes stories ranging from precis of Shakespeare's plots to descriptions of conflicts in cyberspace. The Genesis system works with short story summaries, provided in English, together with low-level commonsense rules and higher-level reflection patterns, likewise expressed in English. Using only a small collection of commonsense rules and reflection patterns, Genesis demonstrates several story-understanding capabilities, such as determining that both Macbeth and the 2007 Russia-Estonia Cyberwar involve revenge, even though neither the word revenge nor any of its synonyms are mentioned. Finally, I describe Rao's Visio-Spatial Reasoning System, a system that recognizes activities such as approaching, jumping, and giving, and answers commonsense questions posed by Genesis.National Science Foundation (U.S.) (IIS-0413206)United States. Office of Naval Research (N00014-09-1-0597)United States. Air Force Office of Scientific Research (A9550-05-1-0321)United States. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (FA8750-10-1-0076

Episodic Reasoning for Vision-Based Human Action Recognition

Smart Spaces, Ambient Intelligence, and Ambient Assisted Living are environmental paradigms that strongly depend on their capability to recognize human actions. While most solutions rest on sensor value interpretations and video analysis applications, few have realized the importance of incorporating common-sense capabilities to support the recognition process. Unfortunately, human action recognition cannot be successfully accomplished by only analyzing body postures. On the contrary, this task should be supported by profound knowledge of human agency nature and its tight connection to the reasons and motivations that explain it. The combination of this knowledge and the knowledge about how the world works is essential for recognizing and understanding human actions without committing common-senseless mistakes. This work demonstrates the impact that episodic reasoning has in improving the accuracy of a computer vision system for human action recognition. This work also presents formalization, implementation, and evaluation details of the knowledge model that supports the episodic reasoning

Cyborgian encounters in relationship marketing contexts

The paper discusses the theoretical development and concepts that may apply to a new class of human-robot relationship for marketing contexts. The presentation will discuss the preliminary findings into how firms/brands may integrate cyborgian service actors into their propositions

The anatomy of moral agency: A theological and neuroscience inspired model of virtue ethics

VirtuosA (‘virtuous algorithm’) is introduced, a model in which artificial intelligence (AI) systems learn ethical behaviour based on a framework adapted from Christian philosopher Dallas Willard and brought together with associated neurobiological structures and broader systems thinking. To make the inquiry concrete, the authors present a simple example scenario that illustrates how a robot might acquire behaviour akin to the virtue of kindness that can be attributed to humans. References to philosophical work by Peter Sloterdijk help contextualise Willard’s virtue ethics framework. The VirtuosA architecture can be implemented using state-of-the-art computing practices and plausibly redescribes several concrete scenarios implemented from the computing literature and exhibits broad coverage relative to other work in ethical AI. Strategies are described for using the model for systems evaluation —particularly the role of ‘embedded evaluation’ within the system—and its broader application as a meta-ethical device is discussed