The CHREST model of active perception and its role in problem solving

We discuss the relation of TEC to a computational model of expert perception, CHREST, based on the chunking theory. TEC’s status as a verbal theory leaves several questions unanswerable, such as the precise nature of internal representations used, or the degree of learning required to obtain a particular level of competence: CHREST may help answer such questions

Discrimination nets, production systems and semantic networks: Elements of a unified framework

A number of formalisms have been used in cognitive science to account for cognition in general and learning in particular. While this variety denotes a healthy state of theoretical development, it somewhat hampers communication between researchers championing different approaches and makes comparison between theories difficult. In addition, it has the consequence that researchers tend to study cognitive phenomena best suited to their favorite formalism. It is therefore desirable to propose frameworks which span traditional formalisms. In this paper, we pursue two goals: first, to show how three (symbolic) formalisms widely used in theorizing about and in simulating human cognition—discrimination nets, semantic networks and production systems—may be used in a single, conceptually unified framework; and second to show how this framework can be used to develop a comprehensive theory of learning. Within this theory, learning is construed as (a) developing perceptual and conceptual discrimination nets, (b) adding semantic links, and (c) creating productions. We start by giving a brief description of each of these formalisms; we then describe a theoretical framework that incorporates the three formalisms, and show how these may coexist. Throughout this description, examples from chess, a highly studied field of expertise and a classical object of study in cognitive science, will be provided. These examples will illustrate how the framework can be worked out into a more detailed cognitive theory. Finally, we draw some theoretical consequences of the framework proposed here

The Roles of recognition processes and look-ahead search in time-constrained expert problem solving: Evidence from grandmaster level chess.

Chess has long served as an important standard task environment for research on human memory and problem-solving abilities and processes. In this paper, we report evidence on the relative importance of recognition processes and planning (look-ahead) processes in very high level expert performance in chess. The data show that the rated skill of a top-level grandmaster is only slightly lower when he is playing simultaneously against a half dozen grandmaster opponents than under tournament conditions that allow much more time for each move. As simultaneous play allows little time for look-ahead processes, the data indicate that recognition, based on superior chess knowledge, plays a much larger part in high-level skill in this task than does planning by looking ahead

CHREST+: A simulation of how humans learn to solve problems using diagrams.

This paper describes the underlying principles of a computer model, CHREST+, which learns to solve problems using diagrammatic representations. Although earlier work has determined that experts store domain-specific information within schemata, no substantive model has been proposed for learning such representations. We describe the different strategies used by subjects in constructing a diagrammatic representation of an electric circuit known as an AVOW diagram, and explain how these strategies fit a theory for the learnt representations. Then we describe CHREST+, an extended version of an established model of human perceptual memory. The extension enables the model to relate information learnt about circuits with that about their associated AVOW diagrams, and use this information as a schema to improve its efficiency at problem solving

The CHREST architecture of cognition : the role of perception in general intelligence

Original paper can be found at: http://www.atlantis-press.com/publications/aisr/AGI-10/ Copyright Atlantis Press. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits non-commercial use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.This paper argues that the CHREST architecture of cognition can shed important light on developing artificial general intelligence. The key theme is that "cognition is perception." The description of the main components and mechanisms of the architecture is followed by a discussion of several domains where CHREST has already been successfully applied, such as the psychology of expert behaviour, the acquisition of language by children, and the learning of multiple representations in physics. The characteristics of CHREST that enable it to account for empirical data include: self-organisation, an emphasis on cognitive limitations, the presence of a perception-learning cycle, and the use of naturalistic data as input for learning. We argue that some of these characteristics can help shed light on the hard questions facing theorists developing artificial general intelligence, such as intuition, the acquisition and use of concepts and the role of embodiment

Structure and stimulus familiarity: A study of memory in chess-players with functional magnetic resonance imaging.

A grandmaster and an international chess master were compared with a group of novices in a memory task with chess and non-chess stimuli, varying the structure and familiarity of the stimuli, while functional magnetic resonance images were acquired. The pattern of brain activity in the masters was different from that of the novices. Masters showed no differences in brain activity when different degrees of structure and familiarity where compared; however, novices did show differences in brain activity in such contrasts. The most important differences were found in the contrast of stimulus familiarity with chess positions. In this contrast, there was an extended brain activity in bilateral frontal areas such as the anterior cingulate and the superior, middle, and inferior frontal gyri; furthermore, posterior areas, such as posterior cingulate and cerebellum, showed great bilateral activation. These results strengthen the hypothesis that when performing a domain-specific task, experts activate different brain systems from that of novices. The use of the expertsversus- novices paradigm in brain imaging contributes towards the search for brain systems involved in cognitive processes

Chunks hierarchies and retrieval structures: Comments on Saariluoma and Laine

The empirical results of Saariluoma and Laine (in press) are discussed and their computer simulations are compared with CHREST, a computational model of perception, memory and learning in chess. Mathematical functions such as power functions and logarithmic functions account for Saariluoma and Laine's (in press) correlation heuristic and for CHREST very well. However, these functions fit human data well only with game positions, not with random positions. As CHREST, which learns using spatial proximity, accounts for the human data as well as Saariluoma and Laine's (in press) correlation heuristic, their conclusion that frequency-based heuristics match the data better than proximity-based heuristics is questioned. The idea of flat chunk organisation and its relation to retrieval structures is discussed. In the conclusion, emphasis is given to the need for detailed empirical data, including information about chunk structure and types of errors, for discriminating between various learning algorithms

Attention mechanisms in the CHREST cognitive architecture

In this paper, we describe the attention mechanisms in CHREST, a computational architecture of human visual expertise. CHREST organises information acquired by direct experience from the world in the form of chunks. These chunks are searched for, and verified, by a unique set of heuristics, comprising the attention mechanism. We explain how the attention mechanism combines bottom-up and top-down heuristics from internal and external sources of information. We describe some experimental evidence demonstrating the correspondence of CHREST’s perceptual mechanisms with those of human subjects. Finally, we discuss how visual attention can play an important role in actions carried out by human experts in domains such as chess

Expertise effects in memory recall: A reply to Vicente and Wang

This article may not exactly replicate the final version published in the APA journal. It is not the copy of record.In the January 1998 Psychological Review, Vicente and Wang propose a "constraint attunement hypothesis" to explain the large effects of domain expertise upon memory recall observed in a number of task domains. They claim to find serious defects in alternative explanations of these effects which their theory overcomes. Re-examination of the evidence shows that their theory is not novel, but has been anticipated by those they criticize, and that other current published theories of the phenomena do not have the defects Vicente and Wang attribute to them. Vicente and Wang's views reflect underlying differences (a) about emphasis upon performance versus process in psychology, and (b) about how theories and empirical knowledge interact and progress with the development of a science

A pattern-recognition theory of search in expert problem solving

Understanding how look-ahead search and pattern recognition interact is one of the important research questions in the study of expert problem-solving. This paper examines the implications of the template theory (Gobet & Simon, 1996a), a recent theory of expert memory, on the theory of problem solving in chess. Templates are "chunks" (Chase & Simon, 1973) that have evolved into more complex data structures and that possess slots allowing values to be encoded rapidly. Templates may facilitate search in three ways: (a) by allowing information to be stored into LTM rapidly; (b) by allowing a search in the template space in addition to a search in the move space; and (c) by compensating loss in the "mind's eye" due to interference and decay. A computer model implementing the main ideas of the theory is presented, and simulations of its search behaviour are discussed. The template theory accounts for the slight skill difference in average depth of search found in chess players, as well as for other empirical data