Customer Segmentation Strategy of Crowdfunding Platform with Completion Time Uncertainty

While crowdfunding allows firms to raise external capitals from a large group of audience, firms are often unable to control their production process, and the project may fail without being completed on time. Having this in mind and knowing that consumers are heterogeneous in accepting late completion, fundraising firms often offer multiple reward plans to do customer segmentation to maximize the fund they may raise. Popular segmentation tools include early shipment promise and refund policy. Using a game-theoretic model, we show that the firm should adopt one of the two screening tools, but not both. Which tool a fundraising firm should choose is also examined. Our conclusions offer insights into managerial decisions for firms using crowdfunding in their early project development

Equilibrium and Learning in Queues with Advance Reservations

Consider a multi-class preemptive-resume $M/D/1$ queueing system that supports advance reservations (AR). In this system, strategic customers must decide whether to reserve a server in advance (thereby gaining higher priority) or avoid AR. Reserving a server in advance bears a cost. In this paper, we conduct a game-theoretic analysis of this system, characterizing the equilibrium strategies. Specifically, we show that the game has two types of equilibria. In one type, none of the customers makes reservation. In the other type, only customers that realize early enough that they will need service make reservations. We show that the types and number of equilibria depend on the parameters of the queue and on the reservation cost. Specifically, we prove that the equilibrium is unique if the server utilization is below 1/2. Otherwise, there may be multiple equilibria depending on the reservation cost. Next, we assume that the reservation cost is a fee set by the provider. In that case, we show that the revenue maximizing fee leads to a unique equilibrium if the utilization is below 2/3, but multiple equilibria if the utilization exceeds 2/3. Finally, we study a dynamic version of the game, where users learn and adapt their strategies based on observations of past actions or strategies of other users. Depending on the type of learning (i.e., action learning vs.\ strategy learning), we show that the game converges to an equilibrium in some cases, while it cycles in other cases

Why markdown as a pricing modality?

Markdown as a pricing modality is ubiquitous in retail whereas everyday low price (EDLP) remains relatively rare (despite its several advantages, such as simplicity). This paper explores whether and why retailers can use either of these pricing modalities as an effective defense against a competitor entering the market with the alternative pricing modality. Various studies have shown that consumers are strategic and heterogeneous in their valuation of a product. Consumers are also shown to be regret-prone, and anticipation of regret affects their purchase decisions. Consumers experience availability regret when they are unable to purchase products due to stockouts and high-price regret when they miss an opportunity to purchase products at low prices. Considering such factors, consumers decide whether, when, and from which retailer to purchase the product. In such a market environment, we find that the possible entry of a competitor should deter retailers from using the EDLP pricing modality but not markdown. We also identify a new reason for the markdown retailer to ration stock (in addition to the reason for discouraging consumers to wait for the markdown). In particular, we show that the markdown retailer can use inventory rationing to preclude a cutthroat competition and bankruptcy after the entry of an EDLP retailer. We also quantify how consumer regret affects both retailers' decisions and resulting profits. In particular, in a competitive market, the EDLP retailer cannot simply disregard consumers' availability and high-price regret (even when it stocks ample inventory and does not discount prices). We show that high-price regret and availability regret have complementary effects on the markdown retailer's rationing strategy and the EDLP retailer's price decision. Finally, using a proprietary price data set from a large department store, we show that ignoring regret factors causes the markdown retailer to leave up to 20% of its profits on the table. In addition, in a competitive market, the markdown retailer rations too aggressively when regret is ignored and, as a result, leaves some of the forgone profit to its competitor-the EDLP retailer. The retail industry is often characterized by its slim profit margins. In such an environment, the aforementioned results also suggest that retailers should seriously consider investing in developing the capacity to estimate and quantify the role of regret in consumers' purchase decisions

Online marketing:When to offer a refund for advanced sales

Advance selling is a marketing strategy commonly used by online retailers to increase sales by exploiting consumer valuation uncertainty. Recently, some online retailers have started to allow refunds on products sold in advance. On the one hand this reduces the net advance sales, but on the other hand it allows a higher advance sales price. This research is the first to explore the overall effect of allowing a refund on profits from advance sales, identifying conditions where advance selling with or without refunds (or no advance selling at all) is best. We analytically compare the profits of three advance selling strategies: none, without refund, and with refund. We show that selling in advance and allowing a refund is optimal for products with a relatively small profit margin and small strategic market size, and that the added profit can be considerable. Our results guide managers in selecting the right advance selling strategy. To facilitate this, we graphically display, based on the two dimensions of regular profit margin and strategic market size, under what conditions the different strategies are optimal

Advance Selling and Advertising:A Newsvendor Framework

Many firms offer consumers the opportunity to place advance orders at a discount when introducing a new product to the market. Doing so has two main advantages. First, it can increase total expected sales by exploiting valuation uncertainty of the consumers at the advance ordering stage. Second, total sales can be estimated more accurately based on the observed advance orders, reducing the need for safety stock and thereby obsolescence cost. In this research, we derive new insights into trading off these benefits against the loss in revenue from selling at a discount at the advance stage. In particular, we are the first to explore whether firms should advertise the advance ordering opportunity. We obtain several structural insights into the optimal policy, which we show is driven by two dimensions: the fraction of consumers who potentially buy in advance (i.e., strategic consumers) and the size of the discount needed to make them buy in advance. If the discount is below some threshold, then firms should sell in advance and they should advertise that option if the fraction of strategic consumers is sufficiently large. If the discount is above the threshold, then firms should not advertise and only sell in advance if the fraction of strategic consumers is sufficiently small. Graphical displays based on the two dimensions provide further insights

Dynamic Pricing with Fairness Concerns and a Capacity Constraint

Although some firms use dynamic pricing to respond to demand fluctuations, other firms claim that fairness concerns prevent them from raising prices during periods when demand exceeds capacity. This paper explores conditions in which fairness concerns can or cannot cause shortages. In our model, a firm announces a price policy that states its prices during high and low demand, and customers must travel to a venue to learn the current price. We show that the interaction of fairness concerns with travel costs can cause the firm to set stable prices, which leads to shortages during high demand. However, if the firm is able to inform customers about the current price before they incur any travel costs, then dynamic pricing with no shortages is optimal even with strong fairness concerns

Operations Management of Logistics and Supply Chain: Issues and Directions

There has been consensus that logistics as well as supply chain management is a vital research field, yet with few literature reviews on this topic. This paper sets out to propose some hot issues in the current research, through a review of related literature from the perspective of operations management. In addition, we generate some insights and future research directions in this field

Optimal pricing strategy:How to sell to strategic consumers?

Technological advances are preparing consumers to plan their purchases strategically. Selling to strategic consumers at a fixed price forgoes the profit from salvaging inventory, whereas high-low pricing, as a ubiquitous pricing strategy, is costly due to the offered markdown discount. This research explores the overall impact of consumer's strategic buying behaviour on a pricing strategy, and identifies conditions where fixed pricing, strategic high pricing, or high-low pricing is the best approach by analytically comparing the profits of the three pricing strategies. Our results show that high-low pricing is appropriate only if the offered markdown discount is relatively small. If strategic consumers have a small population and the needed markdown discount is relatively large, retailers can ignore strategic buying behaviour and sell products at a fixed price. Our results emphasize that the markdown discount for clearance sales and the market structure of heterogeneous consumers play vital roles in determining the optimal pricing strategy

Is Advance Selling Desirable with Competition?

It has been shown that a monopolist can use advance selling to increase profits. This paper documents that this may not hold when a firm faces competition. With advance selling a firm offers its service in an advance period, before consumers know their valuations for the firms’ services, or later on in a spot period, when consumers know their valuations. We identify two ways in which competition limits the effectiveness of advance selling. First, while a monopolist can sell to consumers with homogeneous preferences at a high price, this homogeneity intensifies price competition, which lowers profits. However, the firms may nevertheless find themselves in an equilibrium with advance selling. In this sense, advance selling is better described as a competitive necessity rather than as an advantageous tool to raise profits. Second, competition in the spot period is likely to lower spot period prices, thereby forcing firms to lower advance period prices, which is also not favorable to profits. Rational firms anticipate this and curtail or eliminate the use of advance selling. Thus, even though a monopolist fully exploits the practice of advance selling, rational firms facing competition either mitigate it or avoid it completely

Optimal trade-in strategy for advance selling with strategic consumers proportion

Purpose This study aimed to optimize the trade-in pricing strategy. To leverage market share, many sellers adopt trade-in strategy for advance selling, Customers can return their old products at a discount price when they buy new products. This can help increase the market share and decrease natural resource consumption. Design/Methodology/Approach We consider a seller who sells new-generation products over two periods: advance selling and regular selling. Based on the rational expectation equilibrium, we adopt dynamic programming to construct a two-period pricing model with three different trade-in strategies–only in period 2, in both periods, and not at all–explaining the trade-in strategy as a promotion tool used by a monopolist to discriminate for advance selling between new and old customers. Findings The results suggest that the optimal price is determined by the proportion of old customers, discount factor and product innovation level. Whether and when to give a trade-in rebate to old customers depends on these parameters. The seller’s choice of optimal trade-in strategy depends on the threshold value of the new customer demand and trade-in demand. Originality/Value Most existing literature focuses on advance selling strategies and trade-in strategies. To the best of our knowledge, this is a pioneering study that adopts trade-in as part of the advance selling strategy