Addressing stability issues in mediated complex contract negotiations for constraint-based, non-monotonic utility spaces

Negotiating contracts with multiple interdependent issues may yield non- monotonic, highly uncorrelated preference spaces for the participating agents. These scenarios are specially challenging because the complexity of the agents’ utility functions makes traditional negotiation mechanisms not applicable. There is a number of recent research lines addressing complex negotiations in uncorrelated utility spaces. However, most of them focus on overcoming the problems imposed by the complexity of the scenario, without analyzing the potential consequences of the strategic behavior of the negotiating agents in the models they propose. Analyzing the dynamics of the negotiation process when agents with different strategies interact is necessary to apply these models to real, competitive environments. Specially problematic are high price of anarchy situations, which imply that individual rationality drives the agents towards strategies which yield low individual and social welfares. In scenarios involving highly uncorrelated utility spaces, “low social welfare” usually means that the negotiations fail, and therefore high price of anarchy situations should be avoided in the negotiation mechanisms. In our previous work, we proposed an auction-based negotiation model designed for negotiations about complex contracts when highly uncorrelated, constraint-based utility spaces are involved. This paper performs a strategy analysis of this model, revealing that the approach raises stability concerns, leading to situations with a high (or even infinite) price of anarchy. In addition, a set of techniques to solve this problem are proposed, and an experimental evaluation is performed to validate the adequacy of the proposed approaches to improve the strategic stability of the negotiation process. Finally, incentive-compatibility of the model is studied.Spain. Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (grant TIN2008-06739-C04-04

Social Welfare

"Social Welfare" offers, for the first time, a wide-ranging, internationally-focused selection of cutting-edge work from leading academics. Its interdisciplinary approach and comparative perspective promote examination of the most pressing social welfare issues of the day. The book aims to clarify some of the ambiguity around the term, discuss the pros and cons of privatization, present a range of social welfare paradoxes and innovations, and establish a clear set of economic frameworks with which to understand the conditions under which the change in social welfare can be obtained

A baseline for non-linear bilateral negotiations: the full results of the agents competing in ANAC 2014

In the past few years, there is a growing interest in automated negotiation in which software agents facilitate negotiation on behalf of their users and try to reach joint agreements. The potential value of developing such mechanisms becomes enormous when negotiation domain is too complex for humans to find agreements (e.g. e-commerce) and when software components need to reach agreements to work together (e.g. web-service composition). Here, one of the major challenges is to design agents that are able to deal with incomplete information about their opponents in negotiation as well as to effectively negotiate on their users’ behalves. To facilitate the research in this field, an automated negotiating agent competition has been organized yearly. This paper introduces the research challenges in Automated Negotiating Agent Competition (ANAC) 2014 and explains the competition set up and results. Furthermore, a detailed analysis of the best performing five agents has been examined

Distributed Work and Travel Behaviour: The Dynamics of Interactive Agency Choices between Employers and Employees

This paper develops a framework within which multiple agents make discrete choices in respect of a common objective - the determination of participation in distributed work, especially the opportunities and constraints associated with telecommuting. Ideas in discrete choice theory and game theory are combined to define a set of choice experiments in which employees and employers interact in arriving at a choice path in a distributed work context. A stated choice experiment with offers and feedback, known as an interactive agency choice experiment (IACE), is empirically investigated in the context of telecommuting options with an exploratory sample of employees and employers in Sydney, Australia. The approach highlights the role of information and negotiation in breaking down the barriers to more flexible work activity, to deliver potential benefits to the transport system such as reduced traffic congestion and environmental sustainability. The paper identifies the types of incentives that an employee/er has to offer the employer/employee in securing effective telecommuting

Incentives and Two-Sided Matching - Engineering Coordination Mechanisms for Social Clouds

The Social Cloud framework leverages existing relationships between members of a social network for the exchange of resources. This thesis focuses on the design of coordination mechanisms to address two challenges in this scenario. In the first part, user participation incentives are studied. In the second part, heuristics for two-sided matching-based resource allocation are designed and evaluated

Computational intelligence based complex adaptive system-of-systems architecture evolution strategy

The dynamic planning for a system-of-systems (SoS) is a challenging endeavor. Large scale organizations and operations constantly face challenges to incorporate new systems and upgrade existing systems over a period of time under threats, constrained budget and uncertainty. It is therefore necessary for the program managers to be able to look at the future scenarios and critically assess the impact of technology and stakeholder changes. Managers and engineers are always looking for options that signify affordable acquisition selections and lessen the cycle time for early acquisition and new technology addition. This research helps in analyzing sequential decisions in an evolving SoS architecture based on the wave model through three key features namely; meta-architecture generation, architecture assessment and architecture implementation. Meta-architectures are generated using evolutionary algorithms and assessed using type II fuzzy nets. The approach can accommodate diverse stakeholder views and convert them to key performance parameters (KPP) and use them for architecture assessment. On the other hand, it is not possible to implement such architecture without persuading the systems to participate into the meta-architecture. To address this issue a negotiation model is proposed which helps the SoS manger to adapt his strategy based on system owners behavior. This work helps in capturing the varied differences in the resources required by systems to prepare for participation. The viewpoints of multiple stakeholders are aggregated to assess the overall mission effectiveness of the overarching objective. An SAR SoS example problem illustrates application of the method. Also a dynamic programing approach can be used for generating meta-architectures based on the wave model. --Abstract, page iii

Tradespace and Affordability – Phase 2

MOTIVATION AND CONTEXT: One of the key elements of the SERC’s research strategy is transforming the practice of systems engineering – “SE Transformation.” The Grand Challenge goal for SE Transformation is to transform the DoD community’s current systems engineering and management methods, processes, and tools (MPTs) and practices away from sequential, single stovepipe system, hardware-first, outside-in, document-driven, point-solution, acquisition-oriented approaches; and toward concurrent, portfolio and enterprise-oriented, hardware-software-human engineered, balanced outside-in and inside-out, model-driven, set-based, full life cycle approaches.This material is based upon work supported, in whole or in part, by the U.S. Department of Defense through the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (ASD(R&E)) under Contract H98230-08- D-0171 (Task Order 0031, RT 046).This material is based upon work supported, in whole or in part, by the U.S. Department of Defense through the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (ASD(R&E)) under Contract H98230-08- D-0171 (Task Order 0031, RT 046)