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Approximating evolutionary dynamics on networks using a Neighbourhood Configuration model
Evolutionary dynamics have been traditionally studied on homogeneously mixed and infinitely large populations. However, real populations are usually finite and characterised by complex interactions among individuals. Recent studies have shown that the outcome of the evolutionary process might be significantly affected by the population structure. Although an analytic investigation of the process is possible when the contact structure of the population has a simple form, this is usually infeasible on complex structures and the use of various assumptions and approximations is necessary. In this paper, we adopt an approximation method which has been recently used for the modelling of infectious disease transmission, to model evolutionary game dynamics on complex networks. Comparisons of the predictions of the model constructed with the results of computer simulations reveal the effectiveness of the process and the improved accuracy that it provides when, for example, compared to well-known pair approximation methods. This modelling framework offers a flexible way to carry out a systematic analysis of evolutionary game dynamics on graphs and to establish the link between network topology and potential system behaviours. As an example, we investigate how the Hawk and Dove strategies in a Hawk-Dove game spread in a population represented by a random regular graph, a random graph and a scale-free network, and we examine the features of the graph which affect the evolution of the population in this particular game
Minority Games, Local Interactions, and Endogenous Networks
In this paper we study a local version of the Minority Game where agents are placed on the nodes of a directed graph. Agents care about being in the minority of the group of agents they are currently linked to and employ myopic best-reply rules to choose their next-period state. We show that, in this benchmark case, the smaller the size of local networks, the larger long-run population-average payoffs. We then explore the collective behavior of the system when agents can: (i) assign weights to each link they hold and modify them over time in response to payoff signals; (ii) delete badly-performing links (i.e. opponents) and replace them with randomly chosen ones. Simulations suggest that, when agents are allowed to weight links but cannot delete/replace them, the system self-organizes into networked clusters which attain very high payoff values. These clustered configurations are not stable and can be easily disrupted, generating huge subsequent payoff drops. If however agents can (and are sufficiently willing to) discard badly performing connections, the system quickly converges to stable states where all agents get the highest payoff, independently of the size of the networks initially in place.Minority Games, Local Interactions, Endogenous Networks, Adaptive Agents
How mutation alters fitness of cooperation in networked evolutionary games
Cooperation is ubiquitous in every level of living organisms. It is known
that spatial (network) structure is a viable mechanism for cooperation to
evolve. Until recently, it has been difficult to predict whether cooperation
can evolve at a network (population) level. To address this problem, Pinheiro
et al. proposed a numerical metric, called Average Gradient of Selection (AGoS)
in 2012. AGoS can characterize and forecast the evolutionary fate of
cooperation at a population level. However, stochastic mutation of strategies
was not considered in the analysis of AGoS. Here we analyzed the evolution of
cooperation using AGoS where mutation may occur to strategies of individuals in
networks. Our analyses revealed that mutation always has a negative effect on
the evolution of cooperation regardless of the fraction of cooperators and
network structures. Moreover, we found that mutation affects the fitness of
cooperation differently on different social network structures.Comment: 6 pages, 5 figure
Minority Games, Local Interactions, and Endogenous Networks
In this paper we study a local version of the Minority Game where agents are placed on the nodes of a directed graph. Agents care about beingin the minority of the group of agents they are currently linked to and employ myopic best-reply rules to choose their next-period state. We show that, in this benchmark case, the smaller the size of local networks, the larger long-run population-average payoffs. We then explore the collective behavior of the system when agents can: (i) assign weights to each link they hold and modify them over time in response to payoff signals; (ii) delete badly-performing links (i.e. opponents) and replace them with randomly chosen ones. Simulations suggest that, when agents are allowed to weight links but cannot delete/replace them, the system self-organizes into networked clusters which attain very high payoff values. These clustered configurations are not stable and can be easily disrupted, generating huge subsequent payoff drops. If however agents can (and are sufficiently willing to) discard badly performing connections, the system quickly converges to stable states where all agents get the highest payoff, independently of the size of the networks initially in placeMinority Games, Local Interactions, Non-Directed Graphs, Endogenous Networks, Adaptive Systems.
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