Distributed drone base station positioning for emergency cellular networks using reinforcement learning

Due to the unpredictability of natural disasters, whenever a catastrophe happens, it is vital that not only emergency rescue teams are prepared, but also that there is a functional communication network infrastructure. Hence, in order to prevent additional losses of human lives, it is crucial that network operators are able to deploy an emergency infrastructure as fast as possible. In this sense, the deployment of an intelligent, mobile, and adaptable network, through the usage of drones—unmanned aerial vehicles—is being considered as one possible alternative for emergency situations. In this paper, an intelligent solution based on reinforcement learning is proposed in order to find the best position of multiple drone small cells (DSCs) in an emergency scenario. The proposed solution’s main goal is to maximize the amount of users covered by the system, while drones are limited by both backhaul and radio access network constraints. Results show that the proposed Q-learning solution largely outperforms all other approaches with respect to all metrics considered. Hence, intelligent DSCs are considered a good alternative in order to enable the rapid and efficient deployment of an emergency communication network

満足化価値関数のバンディット問題における有効性：満足化の保証と期待損失の有限性

東京電機大学201

The Mechanistic and Normative Structure of Agency

I develop an interdisciplinary framework for understanding the nature of agents and agency that is compatible with recent developments in the metaphysics of science and that also does justice to the mechanistic and normative characteristics of agents and agency as they are understood in moral philosophy, social psychology, neuroscience, robotics, and economics. The framework I develop is internal perspectivalist. That is to say, it counts agents as real in a perspective-dependent way, but not in a way that depends on an external perspective. Whether or not something counts as an agent depends on whether it is able to have a certain kind of perspective. My approach differs from many others by treating possession of a perspective as more basic than the possession of agency, representational content/vehicles, cognition, intentions, goals, concepts, or mental or psychological states; these latter capabilities require the former, not the other way around. I explain what it means for a system to be able to have a perspective at all, beginning with simple cases in biology, and show how self-contained normative perspectives about proper function and control can emerge from mechanisms with relatively simple dynamics. I then describe how increasingly complex control architectures can become organized that allow for more complex perspectives that approach agency. Next, I provide my own account of the kind of perspective that is necessary for agency itself, the goal being to provide a reference against which other accounts can be compared. Finally, I introduce a crucial distinction that is necessary for understanding human agency: that between inclinational and committal agency, and venture a hypothesis about how the normative perspective underlying committal agency might be mechanistically realized