Fair and Sound Secret Sharing from Homomorphic Time-Lock Puzzles

Achieving fairness and soundness in non-simultaneous rational secret sharing schemes has proved to be challenging. On the one hand, soundness can be ensured by providing side information related to the secret as a check, but on the other, this can be used by deviant players to compromise fairness. To overcome this, the idea of incorporating a time delay was suggested in the literature: in particular, time-delay encryption based on memory-bound functions has been put forth as a solution. In this paper, we propose a different approach to achieve such delay, namely using homomorphic time-lock puzzles (HTLPs), introduced at CRYPTO 2019, and construct a fair and sound rational secret sharing scheme in the non-simultaneous setting from HTLPs. HTLPs are used to embed sub-shares of the secret for a predetermined time. This allows to restore fairness of the secret reconstruction phase, despite players having access to information related to the secret which is required to ensure soundness of the scheme. Key to our construction is the fact that the time-lock puzzles are homomorphic so that players can compactly evaluate sub-shares. Without this efficiency improvement, players would have to independently solve each puzzle sent from the other players to obtain a share of the secret, which would be computationally inefficient. We argue that achieving both fairness and soundness in a non-simultaneous scheme using a time delay based on CPU-bound functions rather than memory-bound functions is more cost effective and realistic in relation to the implementation of the construction

ARPA Whitepaper

We propose a secure computation solution for blockchain networks. The correctness of computation is verifiable even under malicious majority condition using information-theoretic Message Authentication Code (MAC), and the privacy is preserved using Secret-Sharing. With state-of-the-art multiparty computation protocol and a layer2 solution, our privacy-preserving computation guarantees data security on blockchain, cryptographically, while reducing the heavy-lifting computation job to a few nodes. This breakthrough has several implications on the future of decentralized networks. First, secure computation can be used to support Private Smart Contracts, where consensus is reached without exposing the information in the public contract. Second, it enables data to be shared and used in trustless network, without disclosing the raw data during data-at-use, where data ownership and data usage is safely separated. Last but not least, computation and verification processes are separated, which can be perceived as computational sharding, this effectively makes the transaction processing speed linear to the number of participating nodes. Our objective is to deploy our secure computation network as an layer2 solution to any blockchain system. Smart Contracts\cite{smartcontract} will be used as bridge to link the blockchain and computation networks. Additionally, they will be used as verifier to ensure that outsourced computation is completed correctly. In order to achieve this, we first develop a general MPC network with advanced features, such as: 1) Secure Computation, 2) Off-chain Computation, 3) Verifiable Computation, and 4)Support dApps' needs like privacy-preserving data exchange

Secret Sharing for Cloud Data Security

Cloud computing helps reduce costs, increase business agility and deploy solutions with a high return on investment for many types of applications. However, data security is of premium importance to many users and often restrains their adoption of cloud technologies. Various approaches, i.e., data encryption, anonymization, replication and verification, help enforce different facets of data security. Secret sharing is a particularly interesting cryptographic technique. Its most advanced variants indeed simultaneously enforce data privacy, availability and integrity, while allowing computation on encrypted data. The aim of this paper is thus to wholly survey secret sharing schemes with respect to data security, data access and costs in the pay-as-you-go paradigm

On the Impossibility of Surviving (Iterated) Deletion of Weakly Dominated Strategies in Rational MPC

Rational multiparty computation (rational MPC) provides a framework for analyzing MPC protocols through the lens of game theory. One way to judge whether an MPC protocol is rational is through weak domination: Rational players would not adhere to an MPC protocol if deviating never decreases their utility, but sometimes increases it. Secret reconstruction protocols are of particular importance in this setting because they represent the last phase of most (rational) MPC protocols. We show that most secret reconstruction protocols from the literature are not, in fact, stable with respect to weak domination. Furthermore, we formally prove that (under certain assumptions) it is impossible to design a secret reconstruction protocol which is a Nash equlibrium but not weakly dominated if (1) shares are authenticated or (2) half of all players may form a coalition

On Fairness in Secure Computation

Secure computation is a fundamental problem in modern cryptography in which multiple parties join to compute a function of their private inputs without revealing anything beyond the output of the function. A series of very strong results in the 1980's demonstrated that any polynomial-time function can be computed while guaranteeing essentially every desired security property. The only exception is the fairness property, which states that no player should receive their output from the computation unless all players receive their output. While it was shown that fairness can be achieved whenever a majority of players are honest, it was also shown that fairness is impossible to achieve in general when half or more of the players are dishonest. Indeed, it was proven that even boolean XOR cannot be computed fairly by two parties The fairness property is both natural and important, and as such it was one of the first questions addressed in modern cryptography (in the context of signature exchange). One contribution of this thesis is to survey the many approaches that have been used to guarantee different notions of partial fairness. We then revisit the topic of fairness within a modern security framework for secure computation. We demonstrate that, despite the strong impossibility result mentioned above, certain interesting functions can be computed fairly, even when half (or more) of the parties are malicious. We also provide a new notion of partial fairness, demonstrate feasibility of achieving this notion for a large class of functions, and show impossibility for certain functions outside this class. We consider fairness in the presence of rational adversaries, and, finally, we further study the difficulty of achieving fairness by exploring how much external help is necessary for enabling fair secure computation

Rational Multiparty Computation

The field of rational cryptography considers the design of cryptographic protocols in the presence of rational agents seeking to maximize local utility functions. This departs from the standard secure multiparty computation setting, where players are assumed to be either honest or malicious. ^ We detail the construction of both a two-party and a multiparty game theoretic framework for constructing rational cryptographic protocols. Our framework specifies the utility function assumptions necessary to realize the privacy, correctness, and fairness guarantees for protocols. We demonstrate that our framework correctly models cryptographic protocols, such as rational secret sharing, where existing work considers equilibrium concepts that yield unreasonable equilibria. Similarly, we demonstrate that cryptography may be applied to the game theoretic domain, constructing an auction market not realizable in the original formulation. Additionally, we demonstrate that modeling players as rational agents allows us to design a protocol that destabilizes coalitions. Thus, we establish a mutual benefit from combining the two fields, while demonstrating the applicability of our framework to real-world market environments.^ We also give an application of game theory to adversarial interactions where cryptography is not necessary. Specifically, we consider adversarial machine learning, where the adversary is rational and reacts to the presence of a data miner. We give a general extension to classification algorithms that returns greater expected utility for the data miner than existing classification methods