Abduction and Dialogical Proof in Argumentation and Logic Programming

We develop a model of abduction in abstract argumentation, where changes to an argumentation framework act as hypotheses to explain the support of an observation. We present dialogical proof theories for the main decision problems (i.e., finding hypothe- ses that explain skeptical/credulous support) and we show that our model can be instantiated on the basis of abductive logic programs.Comment: Appears in the Proceedings of the 15th International Workshop on Non-Monotonic Reasoning (NMR 2014

Argumentation and Abduction in Dialogical Logic

This chapter advocates for a reconciliation of argumentation theory and formal logic in an agent-centered theory of reasoning, that is, a theory in which inferences are studied as human activities. First, arguments in favor of a divorce between the two fields are presented. Those arguments are not so controversial. However, rather than forcing a radical separation, they urge logicians to rethink the object of their studies. Arguments cannot be analyzed as objects independent from human activity, whether it is dealt with deductive or nondeductive reasoning. The present analysis naturally takes place in the context of dialogical logic in which the proof process and the semantics are conceived in terms of argumentative games, which involve the agents, their commitments and their actions. This work focuses first on deductive reasoning and then takes abduction as a case of nondeductive reasoning. By relying on some relevant ideas of the Gabbay–Woods (GW) schema of abduction and Aliseda’s approach, a new dialogical explanation of abduction in terms of concession-problem is proposed. This notion of concession problem will be defined thereafter. With respect to the topics of the model-based sciences, the question of the specificity of the speech act by means of which a hypothesis is conjectured is set more specifically.Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México PAPIIT, IN400514-3Junta de Andalucía P10- HUM-584

Conductive arguments and the ‘inference to the best explanation’

I will demonstrate that conductive arguments are found in the inference to the best explana-tion as it is used in science. Conductive arguments, I argue, operate on two levels: the first is in the con-struction of hypotheses; the second is through the competition of hypotheses. By constructing arguments based on observations of facts, all possible (conceivable) factors are taken into account and a judgment is made based on our weighing of considerations: conductive argumentation

Subjective Logic and Arguing with Evidence

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In memoriam Douglas N. Walton: the influence of Doug Walton on AI and law

Doug Walton, who died in January 2020, was a prolific author whose work in informal logic and argumentation had a profound influence on Artificial Intelligence, including Artificial Intelligence and Law. He was also very interested in interdisciplinary work, and a frequent and generous collaborator. In this paper seven leading researchers in AI and Law, all past programme chairs of the International Conference on AI and Law who have worked with him, describe his influence on their work