4 research outputs found
AGM-Like Paraconsistent Belief Change
Two systems of belief change based on paraconsistent logics are introduced in this article by means of AGM-like postulates. The first one, AGMp, is defined over any paraconsistent logic which extends classical logic such that the law of excluded middle holds w.r.t. the paraconsistent negation. The second one, AGMo , is specifically designed for paraconsistent logics known as Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs), which have a formal consistency operator that allows to recover all the classical inferences. Besides the three usual operations over belief sets, namely expansion, contraction and revision (which is obtained from contraction by the Levi identity), the underlying paraconsistent logic allows us to define additional operations involving (non-explosive) contradictions. Thus, it is defined external revision (which is obtained from contraction by the reverse Levi identity), consolidation and semi-revision, all of them over belief sets. It is worth noting that the latter operations, introduced by S. Hansson, involve the temporary acceptance of contradictory beliefs, and so they were originally defined only for belief bases. Unlike to previous proposals in the literature, only defined for specific paraconsistent logics, the present approach can be applied to a general class of paraconsistent logics which are supraclassical, thus preserving the spirit of AGM. Moreover, representation theorems w.r.t. constructions based on selection functions are obtained for all the operations
Belief Revision in Science: Informational Economy and Paraconsistency
In the present paper, our objective is to examine the application of belief revision models to scientific rationality. We begin by considering the standard model AGM, and along the way a number of problems surface that make it seem inadequate for this specific application. After considering three different heuristics of informational economy that seem fit for science, we consider some possible adaptations for it and argue informally that, overall, some paraconsistent models seem to better satisfy these principles, following Testa (2015). These models have been worked out in formal detail by Testa, Cogniglio, & Ribeiro (2015, 2017)
How to construct remainder sets for paraconsistent revisions: preliminary report
Revision operation is the consistent expansion of a theory
by a new belief-representing sentence. We consider that in a
paraconsistent setting this desideratum can be accomplished
in at least three distinct ways: the output of a revision op eration should be either non-trivial or non-contradictory (in
general or relative to the new belief). In this paper those dis tinctions will be explored in the constructive level by showing
how the remainder sets could be refined, capturing the key
concepts of paraconsistency in a dynamical scenario. These
are preliminaries results of a wider project on Paraconsistent
Belief Change conduced by the authors.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio
Belief revision and computational argumentation: a critical comparison
This paper aims at comparing and relating belief revision and argumentation as
approaches to model reasoning processes. Referring to some prominent literature
references in both fields, we will discuss their (implicit or explicit) assumptions on the
modeled processes and hence commonalities and differences in the forms of reason ing they are suitable to deal with. The intended contribution is on one hand assessing
the (not fully explored yet) relationships between two lively research fields in the
broad area of defeasible reasoning and on the other hand pointing out open issues and
potential directions for future research.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio