Mixture of easy trials enables transient and sustained perceptual improvements through priming and perceptual learning.

The sense of vision allows us to discriminate fine details across a wide range of tasks. How to improve this perceptual skill, particularly within a short training session, is of substantial interest. Emerging evidence suggests that mixing easy trials can quickly improve performance in hard trials, but it is equivocal whether the improvement is short-lived or long-lasting, and additionally what accounts for this improvement. Here, by tracking objective performance (accuracy) and subjective experience (ratings of target visibility and choice confidence) over time and in a large sample of participants, we demonstrate the coexistence of transient and sustained effects of mixing easy trials, which differ markedly in their timescales, in their effects on subjective awareness, and in individual differences. In particular, whereas the transient effect was found to be ubiquitous and manifested similarly across objective and subjective measures, the sustained effect was limited to a subset of participants with weak convergence from objective and subjective measures. These results indicate that mixture of easy trials enables two distinct, co-existing forms of rapid perceptual improvements in hard trials, as mediated by robust priming and fragile learning. Placing constraints on theory of brain plasticity, this finding may also have implications for alleviating visual deficits

Modeling Subjective Experience-Based Learning under Uncertainty and Frames

In this paper we computationally examine how subjective experience may help or harm the decision maker's learning under uncertain outcomes, frames and their interactions. To model subjective experience, we propose the "experienced-utility function" based on a prospect theory (PT)-based parameterized subjective value function. Our analysis and simulations of two-armed bandit tasks present that the task domain (underlying outcome distributions) and framing (reference point selection) influence experienced utilities and in turn, the "subjective discriminability" of choices under uncertainty. Experiments demonstrate that subjective discriminability improves on objective discriminability by the use of the experienced-utility function with appropriate framing for a given task domain, and that bigger subjective discriminability leads to more optimal decisions in learning under uncertainty.Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Media Laborator

Half empty, half full and the possibility of agreeing to disagree

Aumann (1976) derives his famous we cannot agree to disagree result under the assumption of rational Bayesian learning. Motivated by psychological evidence against this assumption, we develop formal models of optimistically, resp. pessimistically, biased Bayesian learning within the framework of Choquet expected utility theory. As a key feature of our approach the posterior subjective beliefs do, in general, not converge to "true" probabilities. Moreover, the posteriors of different people can converge to different beliefs even if these people receive the same information. As our main contribution we show that people may well agree to disagree if their Bayesian learning is psychologically biased in our sense. Remarkably, this finding holds regardless of whether people with identical priors apply the same psychologically biased Bayesian learning rule or not. A simple example about the possibility of ex-post trading in a financial asset illustrates our formal findings. Finally, our analysis settles a discussion in the no-trade literature (cf. Dow, Madrigal, and Werlang 1990, Halevy 1998) in that it clarifies that ex-post trade between agents with common priors and identical learning rules is only possible under asymmetric information.Common Knowledge, No-Trade Results, Rational Bayesian Learning, Bounded Rationality, Choquet Expected Utility Theory, Bayesian Updating, Dynamic Inconsistency

WHY ADULTS LEARN: INTERPRETING ADULTS’ REASONS TO PARTICIPATE IN EDUCATION IN TERMS OF ECCLES’ SUBJECTIVE TASK VALUE

Psychological research shows that subjective task value, a basic component of expectancy-value theory as outlined by Eccles, predicts task choice (e.g., going to graduate school). However, Eccles’ approach has not been used to investigate adult learning so far. Therefore, the present study investigated a specific form of subjective task value and task choice, namely adults’ subjective task value of participation in education. Based on expectancy-value theory, qualitative content analyses of 16 interviews with adult learners (aged between 21 and 67) from varying age groups and educational backgrounds show a differentiation of positive value according to points of reference and a revised conceptualisation of cost as an independent component of subjective task value with four subcomponents. Apparently people estimate positive value and cost separately at first and only later weigh these components against each other to arrive at an overall evaluation of subjective task value, which, in turn, predicts participation in education. Moreover, results suggest a distinction between anticipated subjective task value prior to participation and subjective task value based on experience (i.e., in hindsight). Benefits of using expectancy-value theory for future research on adults’ participation in education are discussed

Theory and Practice within HE Professional Education Courses: Integration of Academic Knowledge and Experiential Knowledge .

If we look historically at professional education we can see a movement from what Bines and Watson (1992) call a ‘technocratic’ (or technical-rational) model to what they call a ‘post-technocratic’model - one primarily concerned with professional knowledge and action/process rather than academic knowledge and content. Emphasis is placed on professional development, a practitioner’s theories-in-use, knowledge for practice, and on the skills required to use reflection, observation, analysis and evaluation to develop practice. Particular methods of learning and teaching concerned with enquiry, analysis, experience and reflection are advocated. If this model is fully embraced, the type of learning involved (especially when undertaken by qualified workers) is quite different from that of a more traditional, discipline-based, technocratic model. Firstly, it encompasses different ways of knowing, i.e. more subjective, reflexive, and implicit practice-based understanding. Secondly, it can also produce a different type of knowledge in the form of practice theory. The associated learning processes tend to be interpretive and inductive (Nixon and Murr 2006) and can form a more integrative relationship between practice knowledge and theory that encompasses ‘being’ and a personal ethical stance (Margetson 2000; Tynjala et al 2003)

Beliefs and Voting Decisions: A Test of the Pivotal Voter Model

We report results from a laboratory experiment that provides the first direct test of the pivotal voter model. This model predicts that voters will rationally choose to vote only if their expected benefit from voting outweighs the cost. The expected benefit calculation involves the use of the voter’s subjective probability that s/he will be pivotal to the election outcome; this probability is typically unobservable. In one of our experimental treatments we elicit these subjective probabilities using a proper scoring rule that induces truthful revelation of beliefs. The cost of voting and the payoff to the election winner are known constants, so the subjective probabilities allow us to directly test the pivotal voter model. We find some support for the model: While a higher subjective probability of being pivotal does increase the likelihood that an individual chooses to vote, the decisiveness probability thresholds used by subjects are not as crisp as the theory would predict. We find some evidence that individuals learn over time to adjust their probabilities of being pivotal so that they are more consistent with the historical frequency of decisiveness, although such learning appears slow; many subjects\' assessments of their pivotalness remain substantially higher than is warranted by the electoral history.