923 research outputs found
Software Defined Networks based Smart Grid Communication: A Comprehensive Survey
The current power grid is no longer a feasible solution due to
ever-increasing user demand of electricity, old infrastructure, and reliability
issues and thus require transformation to a better grid a.k.a., smart grid
(SG). The key features that distinguish SG from the conventional electrical
power grid are its capability to perform two-way communication, demand side
management, and real time pricing. Despite all these advantages that SG will
bring, there are certain issues which are specific to SG communication system.
For instance, network management of current SG systems is complex, time
consuming, and done manually. Moreover, SG communication (SGC) system is built
on different vendor specific devices and protocols. Therefore, the current SG
systems are not protocol independent, thus leading to interoperability issue.
Software defined network (SDN) has been proposed to monitor and manage the
communication networks globally. This article serves as a comprehensive survey
on SDN-based SGC. In this article, we first discuss taxonomy of advantages of
SDNbased SGC.We then discuss SDN-based SGC architectures, along with case
studies. Our article provides an in-depth discussion on routing schemes for
SDN-based SGC. We also provide detailed survey of security and privacy schemes
applied to SDN-based SGC. We furthermore present challenges, open issues, and
future research directions related to SDN-based SGC.Comment: Accepte
Assessing and augmenting SCADA cyber security: a survey of techniques
SCADA systems monitor and control critical infrastructures of national importance such as power generation and distribution, water supply, transportation networks, and manufacturing facilities. The pervasiveness, miniaturisations and declining costs of internet connectivity have transformed these systems from strictly isolated to highly interconnected networks. The connectivity provides immense benefits such as reliability, scalability and remote connectivity, but at the same time exposes an otherwise isolated and secure system, to global cyber security threats. This inevitable transformation to highly connected systems thus necessitates effective security safeguards to be in place as any compromise or downtime of SCADA systems can have severe economic, safety and security ramifications. One way to ensure vital asset protection is to adopt a viewpoint similar to an attacker to determine weaknesses and loopholes in defences. Such mind sets help to identify and fix potential breaches before their exploitation. This paper surveys tools and techniques to uncover SCADA system vulnerabilities. A comprehensive review of the selected approaches is provided along with their applicability
MiniCPS: A toolkit for security research on CPS Networks
In recent years, tremendous effort has been spent to modernizing
communication infrastructure in Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) such as Industrial
Control Systems (ICS) and related Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) systems. While a great amount of research has been conducted on network
security of office and home networks, recently the security of CPS and related
systems has gained a lot of attention. Unfortunately, real-world CPS are often
not open to security researchers, and as a result very few reference systems
and topologies are available. In this work, we present MiniCPS, a CPS
simulation toolbox intended to alleviate this problem. The goal of MiniCPS is
to create an extensible, reproducible research environment targeted to
communications and physical-layer interactions in CPS. MiniCPS builds on
Mininet to provide lightweight real-time network emulation, and extends Mininet
with tools to simulate typical CPS components such as programmable logic
controllers, which use industrial protocols (Ethernet/IP, Modbus/TCP). In
addition, MiniCPS defines a simple API to enable physical-layer interaction
simulation. In this work, we demonstrate applications of MiniCPS in two example
scenarios, and show how MiniCPS can be used to develop attacks and defenses
that are directly applicable to real systems.Comment: 8 pages, 6 figures, 1 code listin
On Ladder Logic Bombs in Industrial Control Systems
In industrial control systems, devices such as Programmable Logic Controllers
(PLCs) are commonly used to directly interact with sensors and actuators, and
perform local automatic control. PLCs run software on two different layers: a)
firmware (i.e. the OS) and b) control logic (processing sensor readings to
determine control actions). In this work, we discuss ladder logic bombs, i.e.
malware written in ladder logic (or one of the other IEC 61131-3-compatible
languages). Such malware would be inserted by an attacker into existing control
logic on a PLC, and either persistently change the behavior, or wait for
specific trigger signals to activate malicious behaviour. For example, the LLB
could replace legitimate sensor readings with manipulated values. We see the
concept of LLBs as a generalization of attacks such as the Stuxnet attack. We
introduce LLBs on an abstract level, and then demonstrate several designs based
on real PLC devices in our lab. In particular, we also focus on stealthy LLBs,
i.e. LLBs that are hard to detect by human operators manually validating the
program running in PLCs. In addition to introducing vulnerabilities on the
logic layer, we also discuss countermeasures and we propose two detection
techniques.Comment: 11 pages, 14 figures, 2 tables, 1 algorith
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