Stochastic joint replenishment problem : a new policy and analysis for single location and two eclehon inventory systems

Cataloged from PDF version of article.In this study we examine replenishment coordination strategies for multiple item or multiple location inventory systems In particular we propose a new parsimonious control policy for the stochastic joint replenishment problem We rst study the single location setting with multiple items under this policy An extensive numerical study indicates that the proposed policy achieves signi cant cost improvements in comparison with the existing policies The single location model also represents a two echelon supply chain for a single item with multiple locations where the upper echelon employs cross docking We then extend our model to incorporate multi location settings where the upper echelon also holds inventory Our modeling methodology based on the development of the ordering process by the lower echelon provides an analytical tool to investigate various joint replenishment policies An extensive numerical study is conducted to determine the performance of the system and identify regions of dominance across policies Keywords SÖzkaya, Banu YükselPh.D

A coordination mechanism with fair cost allocation for divergent multi-echelon inventory systems

This paper is concerned with the coordination of inventory control in divergent multiechelon inventory systems under periodic review and decentralized control. All the installations track echelon inventories. Under decentralized control the installations will decide upon replenishment policies that minimize their individual inventory costs. In general these policies do not coincide with the optimal policies of the system under centralized control. Hence, the total cost under decentralized control is larger than under centralized control.\ud To remove this cost inefficiency, a simple coordination mechanism is presented that is initiated by the most downstream installations. The upstream installation increases its base stock level while the downstream installation compensates the upstream one for increased costs and provides it with additional side payments. We show that this mechanism coordinates the system; the global optimal policy of the system is the unique Nash equilibrium of the corresponding strategic game. Furthermore, the mechanism results in a fair allocation of the costs; all installations enjoy cost savings

The value of coordination in a two echelon supply chain: Sharing information, policies and parameters.

We study a coordination scheme in a two echelon supply chain. It involves sharing details of replenishment rules, lead-times, demand patterns and tuning the replenishment rules to exploit the supply chain's cost structure. We examine four different coordination strategies; naïve operation, local optimisation, global optimisation and altruistic behaviour on behalf of the retailer. We assume the retailer and the manufacturer use the Order-Up-To policy to determine replenishment orders and end consumers demand is a stationary i.i.d. random variable. We derive the variance of the retailer's order rate and inventory levels and the variance of the manufacturer's order rate and inventory levels. We initially assume that costs in the supply chain are directly proportional to these variances (and later the standard deviations) and investigate the options available to the supply chain members for minimising costs. Our results show that if the retailer takes responsibility for supply chain cost reduction and acts altruistically by dampening his order variability, then the performance enhancement is robust to both the actual costs in the supply chain and to a naïve or uncooperative manufacturer. Superior performance is achievable if firms coordinate their actions and if they find ways to re-allocate the supply chain gain.Bullwhip; Global optimisation; Inventory variance; Local optimisation; Supply chains; Studies; Coordination; Supply chain; IT; Replenishment rule; Rules; Demand; Patterns; Cost; Structure; Strategy; Retailer; Policy; Order; Variance; Inventory; Costs; Options; Variability; Performance; Performance enhancement; Firms;

Coordination mechanisms for inventory control in three-echelon serial and distribution systems

This paper is concerned with the coordination of inventory control in three-echelon serial and distribution systems under decentralized control. All installations in these supply chains track echelon inventories. Under decentralized control the installations will decide upon base stock levels that minimize their own inventory costs. In general these levels do not coincide with the optimal base stock levels in the global optimum of the chain under centralized control. Hence, the total cost under decentralized control is larger than under centralized control. \ud To remove this cost inefficiency, two simple coordination mechanisms are presented: one for serial systems and one for distribution systems. Both mechanisms are initiated by the most downstream installation(s). The upstream installation increases its base stock level while the downstream installation compensates the upstream one for the increase of costs and provides it with a part of its gain from coordination. It is shown that both coordination mechanisms result in the global optimum of the chain being the unique Nash equilibrium of the corresponding strategic game. Furthermore, all installations agree upon the use of these mechanisms because they result in lower costs per installation. The practical implementation of these mechanisms is discussed

Coordination mechanisms for inventory control in three-echelon serial and distribution systems

This paper is concerned with the coordination of inventory control in three-echelon serial and distribution systems under decentralized control. All installations in these supply chains track echelon inventories. Under decentralized control the installations will decide upon base stock levels that minimize their own inventory costs. In general these levels do not coincide with the optimal base stock levels in the global optimum of the chain under centralized control. Hence, the total cost under decentralized control is larger than under centralized control. To remove this cost inefficiency, two simple coordination mechanisms are presented: one for serial systems and one for distribution systems. Both mechanisms are initiated by the most downstream installation(s). The upstream installation increases its base stock level while the downstream installation compensates the upstream one for the increase of costs and provides it with a part of its gain from coordination. It is shown that both coordination mechanisms result in the global optimum of the chain being the unique Nash equilibrium of the corresponding strategic game. Furthermore, all installations agree upon the use of these mechanisms because they result in lower costs per installation. The practical implementation of these mechanisms is discussed. \u

The impact of nonlinear dynamics on the resilience of a grocery supply chain

Purpose of this paper: In an effort to improve operational and logistical efficiencies, UK grocery retailers combined primary and secondary distribution increasing the importance of designing resilient replenishment systems in the distribution centre. This paper has the purpose to analyse the resilience performance of the distribution centre stock ordering system within a grocery retailer. Design/methodology/approach: A system dynamics approach is used for framing and building a credible representation of the real system. Mathematical analysis of the nonlinear model based on nonlinear control engineering techniques in combination with system dynamics simulation have been used to understand the behaviour of stock and shipment output responses in the distribution centre given step and periodic demand signals. Findings: Preliminary mathematical analysis through nonlinear control theory techniques has been undertaken in order to gain initial insights in the understanding of the replenishment control model. This practice allowed the researcher to identify specific behaviour change in the DC stock and shipment responses, which are key indicators for assessing supply chain resilience, without going through a time-consuming simulation process. Transfer function analysis and describing function serve as a guideline for undertaking system dynamics simulation. Value: This paper aims to fill the gap in the literature of supply chain resilience by using quantitative system dynamics methods to assess the resilience performance of a grocery retailer. In this way, we also supplement the literature with empirical data. Moreover, we explore different analytical methods since simulation is the predominant method for quantitative analysis of system dynamics. Research limitations/implications (if applicable): This research is limited to the dynamics of single-echelon supply chain systems. Although the EPOS sales data and the store replenishment system have been considered in the validation process, this study has focused on analysing the resilience performance of the DC replenishment system only. Considering the multi-echelon supply chain is intended for further research activities. Practical implications (if applicable): The findings suggest that the distribution centre replenishment system can be re-designed in order to improve the supply chain resilience performance. The ‘As Is’ scenario produces slow response of stock levels and inventory targets are never recovered due to a permanent offset

On two-echelon inventory systems with Poisson demand and lost sales

We derive approximations for the service levels of two-echelon inventory systems with lost sales and Poisson demand. Our method is simple and accurate for a very broad range of problem instances, including cases with both high and low service levels. In contrast, existing methods only perform well for limited problem settings, or under restrictive assumptions.\u