Spectrum Coordination in Energy Efficient Cognitive Radio Networks

Device coordination in open spectrum systems is a challenging problem, particularly since users experience varying spectrum availability over time and location. In this paper, we propose a game theoretical approach that allows cognitive radio pairs, namely the primary user (PU) and the secondary user (SU), to update their transmission powers and frequencies simultaneously. Specifically, we address a Stackelberg game model in which individual users attempt to hierarchically access to the wireless spectrum while maximizing their energy efficiency. A thorough analysis of the existence, uniqueness and characterization of the Stackelberg equilibrium is conducted. In particular, we show that a spectrum coordination naturally occurs when both actors in the system decide sequentially about their powers and their transmitting carriers. As a result, spectrum sensing in such a situation turns out to be a simple detection of the presence/absence of a transmission on each sub-band. We also show that when users experience very different channel gains on their two carriers, they may choose to transmit on the same carrier at the Stackelberg equilibrium as this contributes enough energy efficiency to outweigh the interference degradation caused by the mutual transmission. Then, we provide an algorithmic analysis on how the PU and the SU can reach such a spectrum coordination using an appropriate learning process. We validate our results through extensive simulations and compare the proposed algorithm to some typical scenarios including the non-cooperative case and the throughput-based-utility systems. Typically, it is shown that the proposed Stackelberg decision approach optimizes the energy efficiency while still maximizing the throughput at the equilibrium.Comment: 12 pages, 10 figures, to appear in IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technolog

Stackelberg Game for Distributed Time Scheduling in RF-Powered Backscatter Cognitive Radio Networks

In this paper, we study the transmission strategy adaptation problem in an RF-powered cognitive radio network, in which hybrid secondary users are able to switch between the harvest-then-transmit mode and the ambient backscatter mode for their communication with the secondary gateway. In the network, a monetary incentive is introduced for managing the interference caused by the secondary transmission with imperfect channel sensing. The sensing-pricing-transmitting process of the secondary gateway and the transmitters is modeled as a single-leader-multi-follower Stackelberg game. Furthermore, the follower sub-game among the secondary transmitters is modeled as a generalized Nash equilibrium problem with shared constraints. Based on our theoretical discoveries regarding the properties of equilibria in the follower sub-game and the Stackelberg game, we propose a distributed, iterative strategy searching scheme that guarantees the convergence to the Stackelberg equilibrium. The numerical simulations show that the proposed hybrid transmission scheme always outperforms the schemes with fixed transmission modes. Furthermore, the simulations reveal that the adopted hybrid scheme is able to achieve a higher throughput than the sum of the throughput obtained from the schemes with fixed transmission modes

A Pricing-Based Cooperative Spectrum Sharing Stackelberg Game

We consider the problem of cooperative spectrum sharing among a primary user (PU) and multiple secondary users (SUs) under quality of service (QoS) constraints. The SUs network is controlled by the PU through a relay which gets a revenue for amplifying and forwarding the SUs signals to their respective destinations. The relay charges each SU a different price depending on its received signal-to-interference and-noise ratio (SINR). The relay can control the SUs network and maximize any desired PU utility function. The PU utility function represents its rate, which is affected by the SUs access, and its gained revenue to allow the access of the SUs. The SU network can be formulated as a game in which each SU wants to maximize its utility function; the problem is formulated as a Stackelberg game. Finally, the problem of maximizing the primary utility function is solved through three different approaches, namely, the optimal, the heuristic and the suboptimal algorithms.Comment: 7 pages. IEEE, WiOpt 201

Spectrum sharing models in cognitive radio networks

Spectrum scarcity demands thinking new ways to manage the distribution of radio frequency bands so that its use is more effective. The emerging technology that can enable this paradigm shift is the cognitive radio. Different models for organizing and managing cognitive radios have emerged, all with specific strategic purposes. In this article we review the allocation spectrum patterns of cognitive radio networks and analyse which are the common basis of each model.We expose the vulnerabilities and open challenges that still threaten the adoption and exploitation of cognitive radios for open civil networks.L'escassetat de demandes d'espectre fan pensar en noves formes de gestionar la distribució de les bandes de freqüència de ràdio perquè el seu ús sigui més efectiu. La tecnologia emergent que pot permetre aquest canvi de paradigma és la ràdio cognitiva. Han sorgit diferents models d'organització i gestió de les ràdios cognitives, tots amb determinats fins estratègics. En aquest article es revisen els patrons d'assignació de l'espectre de les xarxes de ràdio cognitiva i s'analitzen quals són la base comuna de cada model. S'exposen les vulnerabilitats i els desafiaments oberts que segueixen amenaçant l'adopció i l'explotació de les ràdios cognitives per obrir les xarxes civils.La escasez de demandas de espectro hacen pensar en nuevas formas de gestionar la distribución de las bandas de frecuencia de radio para que su uso sea más efectivo. La tecnología emergente que puede permitir este cambio de paradigma es la radio cognitiva. Han surgido diferentes modelos de organización y gestión de las radios cognitivas, todos con determinados fines estratégicos. En este artículo se revisan los patrones de asignación del espectro de las redes de radio cognitiva y se analizan cuales son la base común de cada modelo. Se exponen las vulnerabilidades y los desafíos abiertos que siguen amenazando la adopción y la explotación de las radios cognitivas para abrir las redes civiles

Coalition Formation Game for Cooperative Cognitive Radio Using Gibbs Sampling

This paper considers a cognitive radio network in which each secondary user selects a primary user to assist in order to get a chance of accessing the primary user channel. Thus, each group of secondary users assisting the same primary user forms a coaltion. Within each coalition, sequential relaying is employed, and a relay ordering algorithm is used to make use of the relays in an efficient manner. It is required then to find the optimal sets of secondary users assisting each primary user such that the sum of their rates is maximized. The problem is formulated as a coalition formation game, and a Gibbs Sampling based algorithm is used to find the optimal coalition structure.Comment: 7 pages, 2 figure

A Hierarchical Spectrum Access Scheme for TV White Space Coexistence in Hetergeneous Networks

Among current techniques for dynamic access to television (TV) white space (TVWS), geolocation database-based access provides a promising performance in protecting the TV-band incumbents from interference that cannot be efficiently achieved in other license-exempt models. However, in heterogeneous wireless networks, most portable devices do not have such access and may cause interference to TV incumbents. We propose a hierarchical model for spectrum sharing in TVWS that includes a wide range of fixed and portable devices. In the first tier, the TV broadcaster can lease the spectrum bands to local fixed users based on a soft license agreement. The fixed users are allowed to share access to this spectrum with some mobile users in their proximity in exchange for cooperative relaying. We consider a practical scenario, where only partial channel state information (CSI) is available at the users\u27 transmitters, and we propose a robust algorithm against such uncertainties in CSI values. We also propose a reputation-based relay selection mechanism to identify selfish portable users. The proposed spectrum sharing framework can provide a practical model for TVWS-coexistence that prevents undesired interference to the incumbents while restricting interference among the unlicensed devices. The simulation results show the enhancement of fixed users\u27 rate compared with alternative relay selection methods

Price-Based Resource Allocation for Spectrum-Sharing Femtocell Networks: A Stackelberg Game Approach

This paper investigates the price-based resource allocation strategies for the uplink transmission of a spectrum-sharing femtocell network, in which a central macrocell is underlaid with distributed femtocells, all operating over the same frequency band as the macrocell. Assuming that the macrocell base station (MBS) protects itself by pricing the interference from the femtocell users, a Stackelberg game is formulated to study the joint utility maximization of the macrocell and the femtocells subject to a maximum tolerable interference power constraint at the MBS. Especially, two practical femtocell channel models: sparsely deployed scenario for rural areas and densely deployed scenario for urban areas, are investigated. For each scenario, two pricing schemes: uniform pricing and non-uniform pricing, are proposed. Then, the Stackelberg equilibriums for these proposed games are studied, and an effective distributed interference price bargaining algorithm with guaranteed convergence is proposed for the uniform-pricing case. Finally, numerical examples are presented to verify the proposed studies. It is shown that the proposed algorithms are effective in resource allocation and macrocell protection requiring minimal network overhead for spectrum-sharing-based two-tier femtocell networks.Comment: 27 pages, 7 figures, Submitted to JSA