Simple scaling of cooperation in donor-recipient games

We present a simple argument which proves a general version of the scaling phenomenon recently observed in donor-recipient games by Tanimoto [Tanimoto, J., 2009. A simple scaling of the effectiveness of supporting mutual cooperation in donor-recipient games by various reciprocity mechanisms. BioSystems 96, 29-34]

Study on Cooperative Mechanism of Prefabricated Producers Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Good cooperation mechanism is an important guarantee for the advancement of industrialization construction. To strengthen the partnership between producers, we analyze the behavior evolution trend of both parties using an evolutionary game theory. Based on the original model, the mechanism of coordination and cooperation between prefabricated producers is explained under the condition of punishment and incentive. The results indicate that stable evolutionary strategies exist under both cooperation and noncooperation, and the evolutionary results are influenced by the initial proportion of both decision-making processes. The government can support the production enterprises to establish a solid partnership through effective punishment and incentive mechanisms to reduce the initial cost in the supply chain of prefabricated construction, resulting in a win-win situation

Mathematics Indicates That an HIV-Style Strategy Could Be Applied to Manage the Coronavirus

We have learned to live with many potentially deadly viruses for which there is no vaccine, no immunity, and no cure. We do not live in constant fear of these viruses, instead, we have learned how to outsmart them and reduce the harm they cause. A new mathematical model that combines the spread of diseases that do not confer immunity together with the evolution of human behaviors indicates that we may be able to fight new diseases with the same type of strategy we use to fight viruses like HIV.Comment: This article is available open access online here: https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F16618_2020_2

Supporting cooperation and coordination in open multi-agent systems

Cooperation and coordination between agents are fundamental processes for increasing aggregate and individual benefit in open Multi-Agent Systems (MAS). The increased ubiquity, size, and complexity of open MAS in the modern world has prompted significant research interest in the mechanisms that underlie cooperative and coordinated behaviour. In open MAS, in which agents join and leave freely, we can assume the following properties: (i) there are no centralised authorities, (ii) agent authority is uniform, (iii) agents may be heterogeneously owned and designed, and may consequently have con icting intentions and inconsistent capabilities, and (iv) agents are constrained in interactions by a complex connecting network topology. Developing mechanisms to support cooperative and coordinated behaviour that remain effective under these assumptions remains an open research problem. Two of the major mechanisms by which cooperative and coordinated behaviour can be achieved are (i) trust and reputation, and (ii) norms and conventions. Trust and reputation, which support cooperative and coordinated behaviour through notions of reciprocity, are effective in protecting agents from malicious or selfish individuals, but their capabilities can be affected by a lack of information about potential partners and the impact of the underlying network structure. Regarding conventions and norms, there are still a wide variety of open research problems, including: (i) manipulating which convention or norm a population adopts, (ii) how to exploit knowledge of the underlying network structure to improve mechanism efficacy, and (iii) how conventions might be manipulated in the middle and latter stages of their lifecycle, when they have become established and stable. In this thesis, we address these issues and propose a number of techniques and theoretical advancements that help ensure the robustness and efficiency of these mechanisms in the context of open MAS, and demonstrate new techniques for manipulating convention emergence in large, distributed populations. Specfically, we (i) show that gossiping of reputation information can mitigate the detrimental effects of incomplete information on trust and reputation and reduce the impact of network structure, (ii) propose a new model of conventions that accounts for limitations in existing theories, (iii) show how to manipulate convention emergence using small groups of agents inserted by interested parties, (iv) demonstrate how to learn which locations in a network have the greatest capacity to in uence which convention a population adopts, and (v) show how conventions can be manipulated in the middle and latter stages of the convention lifecycle

Designing a Bretton Woods Institution to Address Climate Change

The information structure of the climate change policy collaboration problem necessitates the design of institutions to enhance public knowledge about nations’ commitments, policies, and outcomes. The international community has addressed this kind of problem in a wide array of other contexts from which lessons can be drawn and applied to international climate policy. Based on these experiences and the characteristics of a successful international climate policy architecture, this paper proposes the design of a “Bretton Woods Climate Institution” (BWCI). This BWCI should implement a serious system of national and global policy surveillance. This surveillance would include an evaluation by independent experts of the various policy commitments nations make in international negotiations to assess whether nations delivered on their commitments and to examine the impacts of these actions on various climate change risk reduction margins, such as emission abatement and adaptation. Such a surveillance scheme should be consultative in nature, to allow give and take among experts and among nations engaged in the international climate policy effort. Based on this surveillance, the institution should promote best policy practices. In addition, the BWCI should provide a means to channel some financing for investments in climate change risk mitigation activities in developing countries. By making funds conditional on agreeing to policy surveillance, such an approach would create an incentive for transparent evaluations of policies and actions. Moreover, access to market-based climate policy schemes, such as the Clean Development Mechanism and emission trading, could be predicated on countries agreeing to participate in policy surveillance

Global Development Governance in the ‘Interregnum’: Legitimacy and the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation

The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) was created to address two deficits within the field of global development cooperation. First, through its inclusive and multi-stakeholder composition, the GPEDC was created to redress the legitimacy deficit associated with the ‘old' Northern, donor-dominated governance of global development cooperation. Second, by leveraging the strengths of the ‘new’ actors that now comprise the field, the GPEDC was created to enhance the effectiveness of development cooperation. However, the GPEDC has faced consistent criticism, and currently, there is no space where all actors can convene to advance progress on the Sustainable Development Goals. This thesis explores stakeholder perspectives on, and dynamics within, this highly politicised and unique global partnership. This thesis is research-driven, drawing primarily upon interviews with key public, private, and civic representatives, and it is complemented by insider-insight derived from having worked for the GPEDC. The thesis explores: how stakeholders evaluate the legitimacy of the partnership; whether it constitutes a transformative governance arrangement, or whether it re-inscribes power relations, and; what these perspectives tell us about broader prospects for global multilateral cooperation. This thesis finds that the field is characterised by competing dispositions towards multilateralism, approaches to ‘development’, and diverse perspectives on what legitimate and effective governance demands. This thesis contributes to two debates. First, it contributes to debates on the possibility for legitimate governance beyond the nation-state. In this regard, the thesis provides an original framework that can be used to explore diverse stakeholder perspectives. Second, it contributes to debates on the promises and pitfalls of multi-stakeholder governance within the field of development cooperation. Here, the thesis provides several policy recommendations that, if implemented, could provide more legitimate and effective governance in the post-2015 development era

Emerging Economies and the Changing Dynamics of Development Cooperation

Almost two decades have passed since ‘emerging donors’ – new providers of development cooperation – began to attract the attention of ‘traditional donors’. Comprehensive comparisons of the various features of different types of donors have thus been elaborated on as their economic and political roles have solidified. Subsequently, the focus has also expanded to cover the growing significance of cooperation between ‘new donors’ themselves, beyond high-profile groups such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). This issue of the IDS Bulletin is a collaboration between the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Research Institute and the Institute of Development Studies (IDS). The studies are dedicated to highlighting the actual and potential contribution of a wider range of donors, and are intended to help compensate for imbalances in existing literature, contribute to scholarly understanding, and offer informative insights for practical policy deliberation. More fundamentally, this issue questions the explicit and implicit underlying assumptions in examining the issue of development cooperation: namely, the dichotomy of ‘traditional’ and ‘emerging’ donors. The subjects covered in the various articles range from exploring the importance of knowledge in the development cooperation experience of emerging economies; the challenges involved in the policy formulation and implementation of triangular cooperation within a sometimes contradictory set of processes embedded in South–South cooperation; the dynamics of ‘two-way interaction’ between donors and recipients in chains of knowledge creation; and there is an important reassessment of the critical data upon which estimates of China’s foreign aid disbursements are made and understood in international comparison.Japan International Cooperation Agency Research Institute (JICA