Efficient Methods for Automated Multi-Issue Negotiation: Negotiating over a Two-Part Tariff

In this article, we consider the novel approach of a seller and customer negotiating bilaterally about a two-part tariff, using autonomous software agents. An advantage of this approach is that win-win opportunities can be generated while keeping the problem of preference elicitation as simple as possible. We develop bargaining strategies that software agents can use to conduct the actual bilateral negotiation on behalf of their owners. We present a decomposition of bargaining strategies into concession strategies and Pareto-efficient-search methods: Concession and Pareto-search strategies focus on the conceding and win-win aspect of bargaining, respectively. An important technical contribution of this article lies in the development of two Pareto-search methods. Computer experiments show, for various concession strategies, that the respective use of these two Pareto-search methods by the two negotiators results in very efficient bargaining outcomes while negotiators concede the amount specified by their concession strategy

Towards a quantitative concession-based classification method of negotiation strategies

In order to successfully reach an agreement in a negotiation, both parties rely on each other to make concessions. The willingness to concede also depends in large part on the opponent. A concession by the opponent may be reciprocated, but the negotiation process may also be frustrated if the opponent does not concede at all.This process of concession making is a central theme in many of the classic and current automated negotiation strategies. In this paper, we present a quantitative classification method of negotiation strategies that measures the willingness of an agent to concede against different types of opponents. The method is then applied to classify some well-known negotiating strategies, including the agents of ANAC 2010. It is shown that the technique makes it easy to identify the main characteristics of negotiation agents, and can be used to group negotiation strategies into categories with common negotiation characteristics. We also observe, among other things, that different kinds of opponents call for a different approach in making concession

How Binding Are WTO Rules? A Transatlantic Analysis of International Law

Presented at the University of Tuebingen, 14-16 October 2004 Conference on Changing Patterns of Authority in the Global Political Econom

Bargaining and Influence in Conflict Situations

[Excerpt] This chapter examines bargaining as an influence process through which actors attempt to resolve a social conflict. Conflict occurs when two or more interdependent actors have incompatible preferences and perceive or anticipate resistance from each other (Blalock 1989; Kriesberg 1982). Bargaining is a basic form of goal-directed action that involves both intentions to influence and efforts by each actor to carry out these intentions. Tactics are verbal and/or nonverbal actions designed to maneuver oneself into a favorable position vis-a-vis another or to reach some accommodation. Our treatment of bargaining subsumes the concept of negotiation (see Morley and Stephenson 1977). This chapter is organized around a conceptual framework that distinguishes basic types of bargaining contexts. We begin by introducing the framework and then present an overview of and analyze theoretical and empirical work on each type of bargaining context

Resolving Conflict through Explicit Bargaining

This article analyzes the impact of conciliatory initiatives on conflict resolution in two-party bargaining. It specifically develops and tests a theory of unilateral initiatives derived from Osgood\u27s (1962) notion of Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension Reduction (GRIT). The major propositions of the theory indicate that, given a pattern of mutual resistance or hostility, unilateral initiatives and tit-for-tat retaliation in response to punitive action will produce more conciliation and less hostility by an opponent. To test the theory, a bargaining setting was created in a laboratory experiment in which parties exchanged offers and counteroffers on an issue across a number of rounds while also having the option to engage in punitive action against one another. The results indicated that (1) unilateral initiatives produced more concession making and less hostility than a reciprocity strategy, and (2) tit-for-tat retaliation heightened hostility initially but reduced it over time. The article suggests some general, abstract conditions under which two parties in conflict can produce conciliation and reach agreements without the intervention of third parties

Resolving Multi-party Privacy Conflicts in Social Media

Items shared through Social Media may affect more than one user's privacy --- e.g., photos that depict multiple users, comments that mention multiple users, events in which multiple users are invited, etc. The lack of multi-party privacy management support in current mainstream Social Media infrastructures makes users unable to appropriately control to whom these items are actually shared or not. Computational mechanisms that are able to merge the privacy preferences of multiple users into a single policy for an item can help solve this problem. However, merging multiple users' privacy preferences is not an easy task, because privacy preferences may conflict, so methods to resolve conflicts are needed. Moreover, these methods need to consider how users' would actually reach an agreement about a solution to the conflict in order to propose solutions that can be acceptable by all of the users affected by the item to be shared. Current approaches are either too demanding or only consider fixed ways of aggregating privacy preferences. In this paper, we propose the first computational mechanism to resolve conflicts for multi-party privacy management in Social Media that is able to adapt to different situations by modelling the concessions that users make to reach a solution to the conflicts. We also present results of a user study in which our proposed mechanism outperformed other existing approaches in terms of how many times each approach matched users' behaviour.Comment: Authors' version of the paper accepted for publication at IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering, IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering, 201

Negotiating With Terrorists Considered: A Review of Scholarly Literature

It is unrealistic to determine what is the most cost-effective counter-terrorist strategy without taking into account efficacy of all available counter-terrorist tactics. Logically the best strategy is that which allows one to construct a variety of tactics that tailors to a given situation. However such a meta-strategy is highly limited by the outright dismissal of a given tactic on the basis of moral arguments or assumptions. A practical analysis of a tactic is required first before asking whether it is worth keeping and what its best for when a terrorist situation is presented. While military and police options have been explored with many successes and failures within the United States and abroad there has been much less of a consideration given to negotiation and diplomatic relations with terrorist groups in the culture at large. In order to best ensure that a potentially vital tactic in dealing with terrorists is not being ignored, this paper will review and address the research pertaining to negotiating with terrorist groups. Specifically the results will answer whether or not governments should negotiate with terrorists and what meaningful distinctions exist between groups like al Qaeda and other terrorists in terms of negotiation. For the purposes of this paper, terrorism is the use of strategic violence or threat to incite disproportional loss of resolve or morale in a population or organization and terrorist groups are those who have been labeled or associated with the term whether self-applied, internationally, or by governments local to the groups. In addition, groups labeled as such employ such tactics as part of their repertoire for political ends as they overwhelmingly tend to act against an organized entity to enact some change

A different approach to WTO negotiations in services

International negotiations on the liberalisation of service trade are concentrated at non-tariff barriers (NTBs). National government measures form important obstacles for service providers when they want to access foreign markets. International studies predict substantial welfare benefits from removing trade obstacles for services. Negotiations on lowering these obstacles are complicated because government regulations are seldom strictly oriented at keeping foreign firms out their domestic service markets. Some of them (e.g. quantity-based restrictions) are clearly at odds with WTO principles. We argue however that in most cases regulators primarily aimed at correcting domestic market failures with disregard for the potential repercussions for foreign providers of services. In negotiations this problem can be approached by introducing economic necessity tests, but that is a very long and tedious process. We propose a different negotiation approach based on lessons learned from WTO negotiations on agricultural support measures.

An analysis of integrative outcomes in the Dayton peace negotiations

The nature of the negotiated outcomes of the eight issues of the Dayton Peace Agreement was studied in terms of their integrative and distributive aspects. in cases where integrative elements were Sound, further analysis was conducted by concentrating on Pruitt's five types of integrative solutions: expanding the pie, cost cutting, non-specific compensation, logrolling, and bridging. The results showed that real world international negotiations can arrive at integrative agreements even when they involve redistribution of resources tin this case the redistribution of former Yugoslavia). Another conclusion was that an agreement can consist of several distributive outcomes and several integrative outcomes produced by different kinds of mechanisms. Similarly, in single issues more than one mechanism can be used simultaneously. Some distributive bargaining was needed in order to determine how much compensation was required. Finally, each integrative formula had some distributive aspects as well