Collective economic decisions and the discursive dilemma

Most economic decisions involve judgments. When decisions are taken collectively, various judgment aggregation problems may occur. Here we consider an aggregation problem called the "discursive dilemma", which is characterized by an inconsistency between the aggregate judgment on the premises for a conclusion and the aggregate judgment on the conclusion itself. It thus matter for the decision whether the group uses a premise- or a conclusion-based decisionmaking procedure. The current literature, primarily within jurisprudence, philosophy, and social choice, consider aggregation of qualitative judgments on propositions. Most economic decisions, however, involve quantitative judgments on economic variables. We develop a framework that is suitable for analyzing the relevance of the discursive dilemma for economic decisions. Assuming that decisions are reached either through majority voting or by averaging, we find that the dilemma cannot be ruled out, except under some restrictive assumptions about the relationship between the premise-variables and the conclusion.Collective economic decisions, Judgement aggregation, Inconsistency

The Discursive Dilemma in Monetary Policy

The discursive dilemma implies that the policy decision of a board of policymakers depends on whether the board reaches the decision by voting directly on policy (conclusion-based procedure), or by voting on the premises for the decision (premise-based procedure). We derive results showing when the discursive dilemma may occur, both in a general model and in a standard monetary policy model. When the board aggregates by majority voting, a discursive dilemma can occur if either (i) the relationship between the premise and the decision is non- monotonic, or (ii) if the board members have di¤erent judgments on at least two of the premises. Normatively, a premise-based procedure tends to give better decisions when there is disagreement on parameters of the model.Discursive dilemma; Monetary policy; MPC; Policy boards

Ethics outside, within or beyond OR models

Since ethical concerns are calling for more attention within Operational Research, we present three approaches to combine Operational Research models with ethics. Our intention is to clarify the trade-offs faced by the OR community, in particular the tension between the scientific legitimacy of OR models (ethics outside OR models) and the integration of ethics within models (ethics within OR models). Presenting and discussing an approach that combines OR models with the process of OR (ethics beyond OR models), we suggest rigorous ways to express the relation between ethics and OR models. As our work is exploratory, we are trying to avoid a dogmatic attitude and call for further research. We argue that there are interesting avenues for research at the theoretical, methodological and applied levels and that the OR community can contribute to an innovative, constructive and responsible social dialogue about its ethics.Ethics, models, processes, OR

Searching for Methodology: Feminist Relational Materialism and the Teacher-Student Writing Conference

Using feminist relational materialism as a theoretical map, this paper seeks to reimage traditional case study methodology through the use of diffractive methodology. Reading and writing data diffractively is to refuse to privilege teacher and student talk and to instead study how material-discursive practices intra-act as phenomenon. To do this, we developed question-sets based upon Barad’s (2007) work to interrupt our habits of thinking in regard to a teacher-student writing conference. These question sets provoke our thinking with data from fourth grade teacher-student writing conferences. We play with diffractive methodology highlighting one teacher-student writing conference as intra-activity. Experiencing the teacher-student writing conference again (and again) the question-sets diffract a response and a response diffracts the question-sets, calling us to a continuous becoming, an ethical consideration of how our research and teaching practices matter. We are left wondering if there is a methodology to search for or if methodology is an invitation to an ongoing performance, to join a dance of-the-world, in a constant making and re-making and wondering of what might be

Ecological conversations and systems thinking

Ideas like ‘ecosystems approach’ or ‘complex adaptive systems’ are often invoked as a panacea for addressing the complex interrelationships and interdependencies associated with issues of climate change. But thinking about nature through ‘systems’ invokes different perspectives, and therefore limitations on our understanding of nature. Systems are maps – conceptual devices for making sense of complex realities and communicating with others about improving those realities. Worthwhile enthusiasm for the study of living systems by complexity scientists and chaos theorists can sometimes distract attention away from this basic premise behind systems thinking. The semiotic idea of confusing the map for the territory is significant particularly when systems are used not only as (inevitably partial) representations of reality, but also as mediating devices for effective ecological conversation with the purpose of generating meaning and value. Fritjof Capra’s ideas on ecoliteracy provides an example of a well-intentioned systems-informed approach towards better informed conversations on environmental issues, but how politically sensitive is this framing device? Building on other systems philosophers - West Churchman, Werner Ulrich and Humberto Maturana - a critical systems approach towards supporting ecological conversations is explored identifying three distinct systems framing – frameworks for understanding (fwU), frameworks for practice (fwP), and frameworks for responsibility(fwR). Whereas fwU can help appreciate the holistic realities of the natural world, fwP can support constructive engagement with multiple perspectives, and fwR reminds us of the limitations of any fwU and fwP whilst keeping attention to improving our framing devices to suite demands of environmental responsibility. Although the gift of framing is one shared by all humans, some frameworks of reference are inevitably given primacy over others, particularly in formulating policy and guiding action. This raises questions about who constructs the framing devices and what legitimacy they have

Economic rationality and ethical behavior

This paper argues that economic rationality and ethical behavior cannot be reduced one to the other, casting doubts on the validity of formulas like 'profit is ethical' or 'ethics pays'. In order to express ethical dilemmas as opposing economic interest with ethical concerns, we propose a model of rational behavior that combines these two irreducible dimensions in an open but not arbitrary manner. Behaviors that are neither ethical nor profitable are considered irrational (non-arbitrariness). However, behaviors that are profitable but unethical, and behaviors that are ethical but not profitable, are all treated as rational (openness). Combining ethical concerns with economic interest, ethical business is in turn an optimal form of rationality between venality and sacrifice. Because every one prefers to communicate that he acts ethically, ethical business remains ambiguous until some economic interest is actually sacrificed. We argue however that ethical business has an interest in demonstrating its consistency between communication and behavior by a transparent attitude. On the other hand, venal behaviors must remain confidential to hide the corresponding lack of consistency. This discursive approach based on transparency and confidentiality helps to further distinguish between ethical and unethical business behaviors.Rationality, business ethics, economic rationality, transparency, confidentiality

Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation

In response to recent work on the aggregation of individual judgments on logicallyconnected propositions into collective judgments, it is often asked whether judgmentaggregation is a special case of Arrowian preference aggregation. We argue the op-posite. After proving a general impossibility result on judgment aggregation, weconstruct an embedding of preference aggregation into judgment aggregation andprove Arrow's theorem as a corollary of our result. Although we provide a new proofof Arrow's theorem, our main aim is to identify the analogue of Arrow's theoremin judgment aggregation, to clarify the relation between judgment and preferenceaggregation and to illustrate the generality of the judgment aggregation model.

Arrow's Theorem in Judgement Aggregation

In response to recent work on the aggregation of individual judgements on logically connected propositions into collective judgements, it is often asked whether judgement aggregation is a special case of Arrowian preference aggregation. We argue the opposite. After proving a general impossibility theorem, we construct an embedding of preference aggregation into judgement aggregation and prove Arrow's theorem as a corollary of our result. Although we provide a new proof of Arrow's theorem, our main aim is to identify the analogue of Arrow's theorem in judgement aggregation, to clarify the relation between judgement and preference aggregation and to illustrate the generality of the judgement aggregation model.judgement aggregation, formal logic, preference aggregation, Arrow's Theorem, discursive dilemma

A UK indicator of education for sustainable development

Report references UK Government publication 'Securing the Future'.Report on workshops consulting members of the education community on their preferred approach to the indicator announced in the UK strategy for sustainable development, 'Securing the Future'.Publisher PD