677 research outputs found
Matching under Preferences
Matching theory studies how agents and/or objects from different sets can be matched with each other while taking agents\u2019 preferences into account. The theory originated in 1962 with a celebrated paper by David Gale and Lloyd Shapley (1962), in which they proposed the Stable Marriage Algorithm as a solution to the problem of two-sided matching. Since then, this theory has been successfully applied to many real-world problems such as matching students to universities, doctors to hospitals, kidney transplant patients to donors, and tenants to houses. This chapter will focus on algorithmic as well as strategic issues of matching theory.
Many large-scale centralized allocation processes can be modelled by matching problems where agents have preferences over one another. For example, in China, over 10 million students apply for admission to higher education annually through a centralized process. The inputs to the matching scheme include the students\u2019 preferences over universities, and vice versa, and the capacities of each university. The task is to construct a matching that is in some sense optimal with respect to these inputs.
Economists have long understood the problems with decentralized matching markets, which can suffer from such undesirable properties as unravelling, congestion and exploding offers (see Roth and Xing, 1994, for details). For centralized markets, constructing allocations by hand for large problem instances is clearly infeasible. Thus centralized mechanisms are required for automating the allocation process.
Given the large number of agents typically involved, the computational efficiency of a mechanism's underlying algorithm is of paramount importance. Thus we seek polynomial-time algorithms for the underlying matching problems. Equally important are considerations of strategy: an agent (or a coalition of agents) may manipulate their input to the matching scheme (e.g., by misrepresenting their true preferences or underreporting their capacity) in order to try to improve their outcome. A desirable property of a mechanism is strategyproofness, which ensures that it is in the best interests of an agent to behave truthfully
A Simply Exponential Upper Bound on the Maximum Number of Stable Matchings
Stable matching is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the
subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since its introduction in
1962 in a seminal paper by Gale and Shapley. In this paper, we provide a new
upper bound on , the maximum number of stable matchings that a stable
matching instance with men and women can have. It has been a
long-standing open problem to understand the asymptotic behavior of as
, first posed by Donald Knuth in the 1970s. Until now the best
lower bound was approximately , and the best upper bound was . In this paper, we show that for all , for some
universal constant . This matches the lower bound up to the base of the
exponent. Our proof is based on a reduction to counting the number of downsets
of a family of posets that we call "mixing". The latter might be of independent
interest
Manipulation of Stable Matchings using Minimal Blacklists
Gale and Sotomayor (1985) have shown that in the Gale-Shapley matching
algorithm (1962), the proposed-to side W (referred to as women there) can
strategically force the W-optimal stable matching as the M-optimal one by
truncating their preference lists, each woman possibly blacklisting all but one
man. As Gusfield and Irving have already noted in 1989, no results are known
regarding achieving this feat by means other than such preference-list
truncation, i.e. by also permuting preference lists.
We answer Gusfield and Irving's open question by providing tight upper bounds
on the amount of blacklists and their combined size, that are required by the
women to force a given matching as the M-optimal stable matching, or, more
generally, as the unique stable matching. Our results show that the coalition
of all women can strategically force any matching as the unique stable
matching, using preference lists in which at most half of the women have
nonempty blacklists, and in which the average blacklist size is less than 1.
This allows the women to manipulate the market in a manner that is far more
inconspicuous, in a sense, than previously realized. When there are less women
than men, we show that in the absence of blacklists for men, the women can
force any matching as the unique stable matching without blacklisting anyone,
while when there are more women than men, each to-be-unmatched woman may have
to blacklist as many as all men. Together, these results shed light on the
question of how much, if at all, do given preferences for one side a priori
impose limitations on the set of stable matchings under various conditions. All
of the results in this paper are constructive, providing efficient algorithms
for calculating the desired strategies.Comment: Hebrew University of Jerusalem Center for the Study of Rationality
discussion paper 64
Stable schedule matching under revealed preference
Baiou and Balinski (Math. Oper. Res., 27 (2002) 485) studied schedule matching where one determines the partnerships that form and how much time they spend together, under the assumption that each agent has a ranking on all potential partners. Here we study schedule matching under more general preferences that extend the substitutable preferences in Roth (Econometrica 52 (1984) 47) by an extension of the revealed preference approach in Alkan (Econom. Theory 19 (2002) 737). We give a generalization of the GaleShapley algorithm and show that some familiar properties of ordinary stable matchings continue to hold. Our main result is that, when preferences satisfy an additional property called size monotonicity, stable matchings are a lattice under the joint preferences of all agents on each side and have other interesting structural properties
Defining Equitable Geographic Districts in Road Networks via Stable Matching
We introduce a novel method for defining geographic districts in road
networks using stable matching. In this approach, each geographic district is
defined in terms of a center, which identifies a location of interest, such as
a post office or polling place, and all other network vertices must be labeled
with the center to which they are associated. We focus on defining geographic
districts that are equitable, in that every district has the same number of
vertices and the assignment is stable in terms of geographic distance. That is,
there is no unassigned vertex-center pair such that both would prefer each
other over their current assignments. We solve this problem using a version of
the classic stable matching problem, called symmetric stable matching, in which
the preferences of the elements in both sets obey a certain symmetry. In our
case, we study a graph-based version of stable matching in which nodes are
stably matched to a subset of nodes denoted as centers, prioritized by their
shortest-path distances, so that each center is apportioned a certain number of
nodes. We show that, for a planar graph or road network with nodes and
centers, the problem can be solved in time, which improves
upon the runtime of using the classic Gale-Shapley stable matching
algorithm when is large. Finally, we provide experimental results on road
networks for these algorithms and a heuristic algorithm that performs better
than the Gale-Shapley algorithm for any range of values of .Comment: 9 pages, 4 figures, to appear in 25th ACM SIGSPATIAL International
Conference on Advances in Geographic Information Systems (ACM SIGSPATIAL
2017) November 7-10, 2017, Redondo Beach, California, US
Pairwise Stability in Two Sided Market with Strictly Increasing Valuation Functions
This paper deals with two-sided matching market with two disjoint sets, i.e.
the set of buyers and the set of sellers. Each seller can trade with at most
with one buyer and vice versa. Money is transferred from sellers to buyers for
an indivisible goods that buyers own. Valuation functions, for participants of
both sides, are represented by strictly increasing functions with money
considered as discrete variable. An algorithm is devised to prove the existence
of stability for this model.Comment: 10 pages, no figure
A constraint programming approach to the hospitals/residents problem
An instance I of the Hospitals/Residents problem (HR) involves a set of residents (graduating medical students) and a set of hospitals, where each hospital has a given capacity. The residents have preferences for the hospitals, as do hospitals for residents. A solution of I is a <i>stable matching</i>, which is an assignment of residents to hospitals that respects the capacity conditions and preference lists in a precise way. In this paper we present constraint encodings for HR that give rise to important structural properties. We also present a computational study using both randomly-generated and real-world instances. We provide additional motivation for our models by indicating how side constraints can be added easily in order to solve hard variants of HR
A Constraint Programming Approach to the Hospitals / Residents Problem
An instance I of the Hospitals / Residents problem (HR) involves a set of residents
(graduating medical students) and a set of hospitals, where each hospital has a given
capacity. The residents have preferences for the hospitals, as do hospitals for residents.
A solution of I is a stable matching, which is an assignment of residents to hospitals
that respects the capacity conditions and preference lists in a precise way. In this
paper we present constraint encodings for HR that give rise to important structural
properties. We also present a computational study using both randomly-generated
and real-world instances. Our study suggests that Constraint Programming is indeed
an applicable technology for solving this problem, in terms of both theory and practice
- …