48,248 research outputs found

    Property rights in a flea market economy

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    This paper studies liberalized grain markets in Madagascar and examines how property rights are protected and contracts are enforced among agricultural traders. We find that the incidence of theft and breach of contract is low and that the losses resulting from such instances are small. This, however, does not result from reliance on legal institutions actual recourse to police and courts is fairly rare, except in cases of theft but from traders' reluctance to expose themselves to opportunism. As a result, Malagasy grain trade resembles a flea market, with little or no forward contracting and high transactions costs. The dominant contract enforcement mechanism is trust-based relationships. Trust is established primarily through repeated interaction with little role for referral by other traders. Information on bad clients does not circulate widely, hence severely limiting group punishments for non payment.Property rights. ,Grain trade. ,

    Divide and Sprawl, Decline and Fall: A Comparative Critique of Euclidean Zoning

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    As many commentators have pointed out, the land use patterns prevalent in the United States since the advent of Euclidean-style zoning have played a direct role in the development of a surprisingly broad range of problems: “[b]y fostering or requiring low density development with a high separation of uses, Euclidean zoning is one of the great generators of suburban sprawl, with all of its environmental, economic, and social costs.” These costs include pollution, loss of wilderness and farmland, racial and socioeconomic segregation of the population, and legal obstacles to effective urban rehabilitation.6 Moreover, in combination with prevailing patterns of local funding, the socioeconomic segregation caused by Euclidean zoning perpetuates itself by channeling less well-off children into chronically underequipped public schools and stretching the resources of many urban municipalities too thin, leaving them to choose between raising property tax rates or allowing their infrastructure to decay. That devil’s bargain bolsters the tendency of middle- and higher-income people to live in suburbs rather than cities, deepening the downward spiral in which many American cities find themselves. And the damage goes even further: “many current zoning practices disregard or even work against crime prevention goals” in both cities and suburbs. This is particularly problematic in light of the fact that “Euclidean systems of separation—conventional zoning—have been implemented ubiquitously” in the United States: “[a]bout ninety-seven percent of incorporated communities zone.

    On the relationships between self-reported bicycling injuries and perceived risk among cyclists in Queensland, Australia

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    The focus of governments on increasing active travel has motivated renewed interest in cycling safety. Bicyclists are up to 20 times more likely to be involved in serious injury crashes than drivers so understanding the relationship among factors in bicyclist crash risk is critically important for identifying effective policy tools, for informing bicycle infrastructure investments, and for identifying high risk bicycling contexts. This study aims to better understand the complex relationships between bicyclist self reported injuries resulting from crashes (e.g. hitting a car) and non-crashes (e.g. spraining an ankle) and perceived risk of cycling as a function of cyclist exposure, rider conspicuity, riding environment, rider risk aversion, and rider ability. Self reported data from 2,500 Queensland cyclists are used to estimate a series of seemingly unrelated regressions to examine the relationships among factors. The major findings suggest that perceived risk does not appear to influence injury rates, nor do injury rates influence perceived risks of cycling. Riders who perceive cycling as risky tend not to be commuters, do not engage in group riding, tend to always wear mandatory helmets and front lights, and lower their perception of risk by increasing days per week of riding and by increasing riding proportion on bicycle paths. Riders who always wear helmets have lower crash injury risk. Increasing the number of days per week riding tends to decrease both crash injury and non crash injury risk (e.g. a sprain). Further work is needed to replicate some of the findings in this study

    Distance matters: a look at crime trip distances in Flanders

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    Most journey-to-crime studies are flawed in two ways: they predominantly rely on local police data and although a number of studies hint at the presence of substantially longer crime trips than commonly reported, long trips are deliberately removed from further analysis. Consequently, the scope of the conclusions of current journey-to-crime studies is limited to local offending and their empirical design is biased towards finding short trips. This paper substantiates the need for dedicated criminological research into long crime trips and provides an initial insight into journey-to-crime distances in the greater Ghent area, Belgium. By analyzing 5 year public prosecutor data on property crimes from the greater Ghent area, the length of the journey to crime and the number of long crime trips is assessed. Findings demonstrate a substantial amount of long crime trips with 35% of crime trips over 10 km. The criminological implications for future journey-to-crime research are discussed

    Neighborhood Crime and Transit Station Access Mode choice - Phase III of Neighborhood Crime and Travel Behavior

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    This report provides the findings from the third phase of a three-part study about the influences of neighborhood crimes on travel mode choice. While previous phases found evidence that high levels of neighborhood crime discourage people from choosing to walk, bicycle and ride transit, consistent with the authors’ hypothesis, they also produced counterintuitive findings suggesting that in some cases, high crime neighborhoods encourage transit ridership at the expense of driving—the opposite of what common sense would suggest. Phase 3 tested possible explanations for these counterintuitive findings with a series of methodological improvements. These improvements were: Improvement 1: Used the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system‘s 2008 Station Profile Survey travel data set to replace the Bay Area Travel Survey (BATS) 2000 data used in previous phases. Improvement 2: Separated drop-off and drive-alone modes in logit models. Improvement 3: Variables at the corridor level replaced previous variables at the transportation analysis zone (TAZ) level. Improvement 4: Average parcel size (APS) variable replaced the intersection density measure of urban design. Improvement 5: Used nested logit modeling techniques. These yielded strong evidence supporting the hypothesis that high-crime neighborhoods encourage driving, and they generated none of the counterintuitive findings from previous phases

    Relocating Disorder

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    Judicial challenges to order-maintenance policing apparently are leading some city officials to adapt the tools of property regulation to a task traditionally reserved for the police - the control of disorderly people. Examples of efforts to regulate disorder, ex ante, through land-management strategies include homeless campuses that centralize housing and social services, neighborhood exclusion zone policies that empower local officials to exclude disorderly individuals from struggling communities, and the selective targeting of inner-city neighborhoods for aggressive property inspections. These tactics employ different management techniques - some concentrate disorder and others disperse it - but they have same goal: to relocate urban disorder from one place (where it is perceived to be harmful) to another (where it hopefully will be more benign). These developments are not surprising. Urban policymakers long assumed that regulations ordering land uses effectively curb disorder (an assumption that I have questioned). And, moreover, the broad deference granted to the government-qua-regulator makes disorder-relocation policies particularly attractive. Unfortunately, these new disorder-relocation policies may create what Dan Kahan has called a cost of rights problem: In an effort to avoid constitutional challenges, local governments may adopt policies that impose costs at least as significant as their order-maintenance-policing substitutes. This Article seeks to understand what those costs might be

    Relocating Disorder

    Get PDF
    Judicial challenges to order-maintenance policing apparently are leading some city officials to adapt the tools of property regulation to a task traditionally reserved for the police - the control of disorderly people. Examples of efforts to regulate disorder, ex ante, through land-management strategies include homeless campuses that centralize housing and social services, neighborhood exclusion zone policies that empower local officials to exclude disorderly individuals from struggling communities, and the selective targeting of inner-city neighborhoods for aggressive property inspections. These tactics employ different management techniques - some concentrate disorder and others disperse it - but they have same goal: to relocate urban disorder from one place (where it is perceived to be harmful) to another (where it hopefully will be more benign). These developments are not surprising. Urban policymakers long assumed that regulations ordering land uses effectively curb disorder (an assumption that I have questioned). And, moreover, the broad deference granted to the government-qua-regulator makes disorder-relocation policies particularly attractive. Unfortunately, these new disorder-relocation policies may create what Dan Kahan has called a cost of rights problem: In an effort to avoid constitutional challenges, local governments may adopt policies that impose costs at least as significant as their order-maintenance-policing substitutes. This Article seeks to understand what those costs might be

    John Lindsay, the Association for a Better New York, and the privatization of New York City, 1969-1973

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    Focusing on the collaboration between Mayor John Lindsay and business advocacy group the Association for a Better New York (ABNY), this article illustrates the utility of public and elite anxieties over street crime in legitimizing new, privatized models of urban governance during the early 1970s. ABNY’s privatized crime-fighting initiatives signified a new direction in city law enforcement strategies, a new “common sense” regarding the efficacy and authority of private or voluntarist solutions to urban problems, and proved of lasting significance for labor relations, the regulation of urban space, and the role of the private sector in urban policy. It concludes that, despite their limitations, the visibility of ABNY’s initiatives, their ability to construct a pervasive sense of crisis, and their apparent demonstration of public and elite consent played a significant role in the transformation of New York into the “privatized” or “neoliberal” city of today

    John Lindsay, the Association for a Better New York, and the privatization of New York City, 1969-1973

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    Focusing on the collaboration between Mayor John Lindsay and business advocacy group the Association for a Better New York (ABNY), this article illustrates the utility of public and elite anxieties over street crime in legitimizing new, privatized models of urban governance during the early 1970s. ABNY’s privatized crime-fighting initiatives signified a new direction in city law enforcement strategies, a new “common sense” regarding the efficacy and authority of private or voluntarist solutions to urban problems, and proved of lasting significance for labor relations, the regulation of urban space, and the role of the private sector in urban policy. It concludes that, despite their limitations, the visibility of ABNY’s initiatives, their ability to construct a pervasive sense of crisis, and their apparent demonstration of public and elite consent played a significant role in the transformation of New York into the “privatized” or “neoliberal” city of today
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